Moral Judgements and motivation: how do they relate?
Claudia Jansen
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Jan Bransen Drs. Dorothee Horstkötter
The most important thing about the practice of focus is that it cannot be forced. Trying hard to concentrate, doesn’t work. It produces frustration, tiredness, and narrowness of vision. Focus follows interest, and interest does not need coercion. A gentle hand on the steering wheel of attention will suffice -Timothy Gallwey -
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Contents
Preface Introduction 1. An initial acquaintance with the debate 2. The motivation debate 2.1. Existence internalism 2.2. Internalism versus externalism about reasons 2.3. Motivational judgment internalism - motivational externalism 3. Moral judgements: making a distinction between ‘X is right’ and ‘I ought to do X’ 3.1. The amoralist’s judgement 3.2. The logical relationship between the two types of judgement 3.3. A plurality of amoralists 3.4. The moral judgement ‘I ought to do X’ 3.4.1. First-person moral requirements 3.4.2. Moral agents and personal imperatives 3.4.3. Amoralists and personal imperatives 3.4.3 a The rational amoralist: lacking a personal imperative 3.4.3 b The depressed agent: subjected to a personal imperative 4. Failing or succeeding in making a moral judgement? 4.1. Insincere moral statements 4.2. Hare’s inverted comma judgement 4.3. Smith cognitive internalist account of moral judgements 4.4. Facing a problem 4.5. Insufficient mastery of moral concepts 4.6. A moral version of Moore’s paradox 4.7. A helpful tool In Closing References
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Preface
I have written a master thesis within the fields of meta-ethics and moral psychology. It is a fact. Until for about one and a half year ago, I had no idea what these terms represent and it was not until quite recently that I got a good impression of what these words refer to. I