Motion To Quash

Republic of the Philippines
National Capital Judicial Region
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 1, Manila

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,

-versus- Crim Case No. _____ For ___________________

______________________, Accused. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MOTION TO QUASH

Accused, by his undersigned attorney, respectfully moves to quash the information filed against him on the ground that:

(state one or more grounds provided for in Rule 117, Rules of Court)

ARGUMENTS

(state the reasons in support of the ground/s mentioned)

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the information filed against the accused be dismissed.

Other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for.

Manila, 29 November 2013 Atty. Y Counsel for Accused

(With Notice of Hearing, Proof of Service and Explanation)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 50
QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff,

- versus - CRIMINAL CASE No. Q-10-56789 Violation of Section 5, Article II Republic Act No. 9165, (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)

ROBIN LOPEZ PADILLA, Accused. x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION

Accused Robin L. Padilla, by counsel, respectfully moves for the quashal of the Information dated 20 August 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Willie E. Revillame on the following ground:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

Commenting on the possible abuses that are prone to occur in a buy-bust operation the Supreme Court held in the case of People vs. Ambih1:

“While buy-bust operation is a recognized means of entrapment for the apprehension of drug pushers, it does not always commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act as it is susceptible to mistake as well as to harassment, extortion and abuse.”

Accused is no drug pusher. The only reason he is now in the custody of the police is because he was illegally arrested for reasons he still cannot comprehend.

Accused thus respectfully moves for the Quashal of the Information dated 20 August 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Willie E. Revillame, on the following ground:

THE COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED AS THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL.

1. In the present case, the prosecution asserts that the warrantless arrest of the accused Robin L. Padilla was the result of a validly conducted buy-bust operation. They likewise claim that the arrest was performed after the accused had been duly informed of his constitutional rights.

2. Contrary to the claim of the apprehending police officers that the warrantless arrest was the result of a valid buy-bust operation, no actual buy-bust operation did in fact take place. As stated by the accused in his Counter-Affidavit, members of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) broke into his house by breaking open the padlock of his garage gate. Without introducing themselves as PDEA officers or presenting any warrant, 12-15 operatives of the PDEA armed with high-powered firearms then stormed his home confiscating money, cellular phones and other valuables from the persons of the accused and his visitors. The PDEA members then proceeded to haul off various items from within the home of the accused.

3. The accused then recounts that the PDEA operatives then escorted him and his companion Richard G. Gomez to a Red Toyota Revo, which then brought them to Camp Karingal. The accused and Richard G. Gomez were not informed of their rights upon their arrest, as well as what offense they were being charged with.

4. The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is an inviolable right protected by the Constitution2. As such no person may be validly arrested without the benefit of a warrant of arrest, except in the specific instances provided by law. Any warrantless arrest done outside the specific instances provided by law are thus deemed to be contrary to law and illegal.

5.The law as it presently stands, enumerates the instances when an warrant without warrant is valid in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The enumeration contained in section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court being exclusive, any arrest without warrant done outside of those specified in therein are deemed illegal.

9. The accused Robin L. Padilla could not have been caught committing the crime in the presence of his arresting officers, as he did not in fact sell any illegal drugs. Nor could the PDEA claim that they had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed and that the accused had in fact committed it. This is simply because there was no crime or valid buy-bust operation to speak of. Neither was the accused Robin L. Padilla a fugitive at the time he was arrested. None of the instances for a valid arrest without warrant under the Rules of Court were present. The arrest was thus illegal and as a consequence, the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused. As such, the accused may move for the quashal of the information or complaint filed against him/her as provided in the Rules of Court.3

6.Thus considering that the only means, by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused is either by his/her arrest or voluntary appearance, the effect of an illegal arrest absent the voluntary appearance of the accused is that the court does not acquire jurisdiction over his/her person.4 There is no recourse left other than to quash the present information, as the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, considering the manifest illegality of the arrest of the accused Robin L. Padilla on 20 July 2010 and the consequent absence of jurisdiction by the court over the person of the accused, it is respectfully prayed that the Information for Violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as “The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”, issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Willie E. Revillame on 20 August 2010 against the accused be quashed.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.
City of Manila for Quezon City,
17 September 2010.

ABCDE LAW OFFICE
Counsel for Accused
20TH Floor SBC Plaza,
Mendiola,
City of Manila

By:

ISRAEL SOGUILON
Roll of Attorneys No. 12345
PTR No. 1234567; 01-05-2010; Pasig City
IBP No. 234567; 01-05-2010; Makati City

ARTHUR IMANUEL N. ZAPANTA
Roll of Attorneys No. 23456
PTR No. 9876543; 01-05-2010; Pasig City
IBP No. 876543; 01-05-2010; Quezon City

CopY Furnished:

the BRANCH clerk of court
Regional Trial Court
National Capital Judicial Region
Quezon City, Branch 100

THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
Office of the City Prosecutor
Hall of Justice, Quezon City

NOTICE OF HEARING

Greetings:

Please take notice that the foregoing Motion will be submitted for the Court’s consideration and resolution on 24 September 2010 at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as matter and counsel may be heard.

CopY Furnished:

the BRANCH clerk of court
Regional Trial Court
National Capital Judicial Region
Quezon City, Branch 100

THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
Office of the City Prosecutor
Hall of Justice, Quezon City

Republic of the Philippines
National Capital Judicial Region
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Quezon City, Branch 32

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

- versus - Criminal Case No. 06-135919

NORA ANGELA PASTOR, Accused. x------------------------------------------x URGENT MOTION
TO QUASH INFORMATION

Accused, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court, respectfully moves for the quashal of the Information on the following grounds and arguments:

Ground

This Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged

Arguments/Discussion

Pursuant to the Conclusiveness of Judgment principle, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case since the validity and authenticity of the Contract of Lease, subject matter of the case, has already been admitted and passed upon in prior actions by the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City

Rule 39, Section 47(c) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that:

“Section 47. Effect of judgment or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: xxx xxx xxx
c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.”
(emphasis supplied)

Simply put, issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even it it involves a different cause or causes of action.
As held in REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION) vs. RAMON YU, TEOFISTA VILLAMALA, LOURDES YU and YU SE PENG, G.R. No. 157557, March 10, 2006:

“At this juncture, we need to stress that res judicata has two concepts:(1) "bar by prior judgment" as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b)of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) "conclusiveness of judgment" in Rule 39, Section 47(c). There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is "conclusiveness of judgment." Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.”
(emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, in CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION, vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 832, G.R. No. 167426, January 12, 2009, the doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" provides that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Under this doctrine, identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues. Otherwise stated, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

It is respectfully manifested, as the accused has previously manifested over and over again during the preliminary investigation of the present harassment criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor, that the prosecution can not argue that the Contract of Lease, subject matter of this case, has been falsified. A copy of the Memorandum (summarizing her arguments) submitted by the accused in that forum is attached as Annex A,

Simply stated, the validity and authenticity of the said Contract of Lease has been implicitly admitted by herein private complainant Jovito Cavite in “Nora Angela Pastor vs. Jovito Cavite”, previously docketed as Civil Case No. 04-27631 (for Ejectment) before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan City (hereafter, MTC). He did not question the existence and due execution of the said Contract of Lease. Instead, Cavite admitted its existence and due execution in his Answer with Counterclaim (a copy is attached as Annex B), to wit: “19. The lease remained verbal even after the demise of Mauro Pastor in 1994. It was only in 1996 and 1997 that one year leases were entered into between Defendant and Elvira Pastor. After 1997, the leases were no longer in writing and was allowed to continue until the demand to vacate the premises came in October 2003 because Defendant would not agree to pay two months deposit as demanded by Plaintiff which Defendant found inappropriate because they have been occupying the premises since 1971, and have been dealing with the widow, Elvira Pastor.”
(emphasis supplied)

The MTC gave credence to the complaint of the plaintiff (accused herein) in that said action and favorably decided in favor of the plaintiff (accused herein). A certified machine copy of the Judgment of the MTC dated April 28, 2005 is attached as Annex C.

While the Judgment was appealed by defendant Jovito Cavite (private complainant herein) to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City (hereafter, RTC), it is quite glaring that the appellant did not raise the issue of the alleged forgery of the Contract of Lease. The most that appellant did was to argue, as an obvious afterthought, that he committed a mistake in admitting the existence and due execution of the Contract of Lease. This argument was struck down by the appellate court in its Decision (a certified machine copy is attached as Annex D) as being barred by estoppel, to wit:

“The second issue is barred by estoppel. What defendant previously admitted he cannot now deny after it turned out as adverse to his interest.”

The dispositive portion of the Decision dated April 28, 2005 is quoted, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, finding no basis to reverse, modify, or amend the Judgment dated October 14, 2004 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 49, this City in Civil Case No. C-27631 for Ejectment, the same is hereby AFFIRMED en toto.”

(emphasis supplied)

It should be clarified and stressed that the appellant raised the issue of the alleged falsification, for the first time, only when he filed the Complaint-Affidavit (for Falsification of Public Document) on April 5, 2005, or more than fifteen (15) months since appellee filed an Unlawful Detainer case against the appellant. It only highlighted its character as being obviously an afterthought. If there is any falsification, it was certainly not the accused who should be charged therefor.

It is now respectfully prayed that the foregoing circumstances necessitate the timely intervention of this Honorable Court to prevent a miscarriage of justice and the oppressive persecution of an innocent person.

Prayer

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing Urgent Motion to Quash Information be granted by this Honorable Court.

Quezon City, June 12, 2009.

The Law Firm
Of
ANDREI BON C. TAGUM & ASSOCIATES
Counsel for Accused
No. 12C Malamig St., Teachers’ Village West
Quezon City

By:

KENNETH J. JUSAY
IBP No. 788096-4/14/09-QC
PTR No. 2525051-6/8/09-QC
Roll No. 56643
MCLE Exempt
(Admitted to the Bar: April 30, 2009)

Notice of Hearing/Copy Furnished

Office of the City Prosecutor
Hall of Justice
Quezon City

Brillantes (Nachura) Navarro Jumamil
Private Prosecutor
105-B ECJ Condominium Bldg.,
Real corner Arzobispo St.,
Intramuros, Manila

Branch Clerk of Court
Metropolitan Trial Court
Quezon City
Branch 32

GREETINGS:

Please submit this Urgent Motion to Quash Information on July 28, 2009 at 1:30 p.m. for the consideration and approval of this Honorable Court.

KENNETH J. JUSAY

EXPLANATION

A copy of the foregoing Urgent Motion to Quash Information was filed and served upon the prosecution via registered mail on grounds of proximity of the offices of counsels, practicability and time constraints.

KENNETH J. JUSAY