Neurolaw's Argumentative Analysis

In the field of criminal law there exist established defences such as provocation and self-defence which mitigate the culpability of the accused. However, with recent advances in neuroscience this stands to change following developments revealing the genetic and biological functions of the human brain and their relationship with the person’s capacity to make decisions for oneself. Broader questions of whether the brain can be divorced from the self, and its ramifications for personal responsibility and morality are raised in determining whether the ‘brain made me do it’ indeed stands as a valid defence to crimes committed.

This essay will argue against such a case, that such neurological arguments calling for a rethinking in judicial sentencing, legal definition of guilt and intent as too tenuous on a philosophical standpoint. The first part will examine the notion of punishment under a ‘neurolaw’ context and its purposes in the face of diminished personal responsibility, and the utilitarian counter-argument for punishment preserved as a form of community protection rather than retributive justice.
After all, how do we punish those who did not act out of their own accord, but merely had followed their brain’s ‘hard-wiring’? Yet this argument can be successfully countered adopting a utilitarian stance, as the claim of ‘my brain made me do it’ is easily defeated on grounds that the culpability of the accused in committing the crime is not contingent on his or her own control of actions, but rather is dependent on what society judges to be a threat to their safety. Therefore, a determination of guilt should not be construed narrowly on the accused’s personal actions, but instead involves a process of determining how to best protect society in light of the accused’s criminal