Nietzsche's Argument Against The Paradox Of Perspectivism

However, it is that many have questioned this apparent so called ‘Paradox of Perspectivism’, which arises because Nietzsche claims that knowledge is from a particular perspective and so cannot be objectively true. However, this in itself is a perspective. This leads to the question of if what Nietzsche prescribes about perspective is objectively true or not. If Perspectivism is meant to be objectively true then this would be a contradiction as objective truths do not exist under Perspectivism. But if this is not the case then this leaves all perspectives to just be perspectives. One will now take the remaining space of this essay to discuss this paradox, and it's offered solutions. This discussion is integral to the purpose of Perspectivism
Firstly, Nietzsche argues that there can be a loose hierarchy of perspectives and that this is not to say that they are objectively true, just that some are less distorted than others. In saying that some perspectives are less distorted, Nietzsche is referring to the fact of perspective awareness. Becoming aware of one's own perspectival nature is an improvement in the pursuit of knowledge. From this, one can become less bias by accumulating a number of different perspectives, to aid a complete understanding of a concept or belief (Nietzsche, on the genealogy of morals, 1887). This is important because it highlights the man overriding purpose of Perspectivism, to allow one to be separated from their own internal perspective in a collaborative effort to avoid falling into the stagnation of values, as one is able to form a comprehensive understanding of the world from multiple
Perhaps the least attractive, but equally as plausible, answer to the paradox is the idea that Nietzsche simply gave up on his criticisms of truth in his later writings on Perspectivism and simply proposed a less than watertight theory for others to consider and improve upon. This is interesting because it opened the door for neo-Nietzscheans to see the flaws in Nietzsche's Perspectivism as something which demands both a value of the subjective but also the overarching value of objectivity in the truth of his thoughts. From this, the neo-Nietzschean theory of Transcendental Perspectivism has emerged and considers Nietzsche's Perspectivism blended with the values of the transcendental moment of the enlightenment, though discussions of the so-called ‘perceiver’ and the ‘other’ (Werner, 2002). Transcendental Perspectivism challenges Nietzsche's view that there are no objective truths while holding onto the idea that all truth can only be known in its own context of the individual's mind, as subjective to perspective. Perspectivism argues that the only valid form of truth is the truth perceived by the perceiver. This leaves truth as arbitrary and the other is reduced to just a part in the self-affirmation of the perceiver's truth. The issue neo-Nietzscheans faced was that they couldn't value traditional objective truth either because under this, both the perceiver and the other share a transcendental