Normative Moral Relativism

This paper will be a discussion of moral judgments and the disagreements surrounds their validity in the absolute and moral sense.Most philosophers believe in either Normative Moral Relativism or Moral Objectivism. In class, Normative Moral Relativism is defined as the view that the truth or falsity of moral judgments is relative to the traditions etc. of a society or culture. Moral Objectivism, however, is defined in class as the view that morality is objective only if three rules are met, the first being that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute sense, the second rule being that many moral judgments are true and the third rule being that persons are often justified in believing true moral judgments and disbelieving
Berlin’s theory concluded that there is a minimum value of humanity without which no society could endure and that there is never any justification for violation of this minimum value. Terence Turner takes a relativist stand but unlike Berlin, he supports an anthropologist’s view and holds to a more complete Normative Moral Relativism. Turner believes in a subjective idealist form of relativity, in committing to withhold on morally judging a person, society or culture until a thorough attempt has been made at understanding that culture’s traditions, values, and context. Richard Shweder also defends an anthropological, and more complete, form of relativism. Shweder’s relativism stresses the importance of tolerance and moral diversity, allowing for difference in moral opinion among different cultures. Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas both argue for Moral Objectivism. Nussbaum takes an Aristotelian approach, examining daily and universal human experiences to claim that there is a single objective account of the human good. Aquinas defends objectivism by claiming a universal, natural
of a society or culture. We will assumed that Moral Objectivism is defined, as in class notes, as the view that morality is objective only if three rules are met, the first being that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute sense, the second rule being that many moral judgments are true and the third rule being that persons are often justified in believing true moral judgments and disbelieving false judgments. We will also assume that the term “human rights” is defined as certain claims automatically or intrinsically deserved by being