paper

Article Analysis Techniques:
Do Animals Have Rights?
[Carl Cohen]

Professor: Jai Chetram
Article Analysis Techniques

Article Analysis Techniques
Step 1: Main Conclusion
Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in and has force within a human moral world (¶1).

Step 2: The Main Concepts
Rights (¶1)
Humane (¶17)
Animals (¶1)
Human Moral World (¶18)
Interests (¶1)
Moral Patients (¶20)
Moral Agent (¶1)
Moral Agents (¶20)
Valid Claim (¶1)
Human Morality (¶22)
Moral Right (¶3)
Capacities (¶24)
Biomedical Investigations (¶8)
Autonomy (¶25)
Morally Wrong (¶9)
Rationality (¶25)
Phantasm (¶10)
Actus Reas (¶26)
Justice (¶11)
Mens Rea (¶26)
Medical Experiments (¶11)
Moral State of Mind (¶26)
Obligations (¶13)
Antinomies (¶27)
Moral Principles (¶17)
Inherent Value (¶33)

Step 3: The Main Conceptual Question
Are rights reserved only to the human moral world?

Do animals have a moral state of mind?
Do the rights of humans override the rights of animals?
Is the use of animals in medical experiments not just?
Do rights entail obligations?
Do moral patients lack moral principles?
Are biomedical investigations (using animals) humane?

Step 4: The main Premise in Support of the Main Conclusion
(¶12) P1: Many obligations are owed by humans to animals; few will deny that. But it certainly does not follow from this that animals have rights because it is certainly not true that every obligation of ours arises from the rights of another.

(¶15) P2: One may be obliged to another for a special act of kindness done; one may be obliged to put an animal out of its misery in view of its condition- but neither the beneficiary of that kindness nor that dying animal may have had a claim of right.

(¶19) P3: Rights are of the highest moral consequence, yes; but zebras and lions and rats are totally amoral; there is no morality for them; they do no wrong, ever. In their world there are no rights.

(¶21) P4: When using animals in our research, therefore, we ought indeed be humane- but we can never violate the rights of those animals because, to be blunt, they have none. Right do not apply to them.

(¶40) [HP]: Most advances in medicine will continue to rely on the use of nonhuman animals, or they will stop. [Can medicine further advance without the routine use of animals in experimentation?]

Preliminary Chart

Rights
Human Moral World
Human (¶18)
Moral Agents (¶20)
Obligations (¶16)
Human Morality (¶22)
Cognitive Criteria (¶25)
Moral Community (¶22)
Valid Claim (¶1)
Organic Moral Community (¶22)
Justice (¶11)
Objective Ethical Order (¶22)
Authority (¶14)
Moral Fabric (¶22)
Potential Claim (¶1)
Moral Self-Legislation (¶25)
Concept (¶27)
Inherent Value (¶34)

Carl Cohen systematically investigates whether it is that animals are capable of possessing rights. He tackles this controversy from both sides of the spectrum; dealing with why they can, and why they cannot. He formulates arguments in favor of the latter, ultimately concluding that animals cannot bear rights. Further, Cohen addresses many discrepancies with his adversary Tom Regan’s arguments; who is an advocate for animal’s rights. Cohen argues that rights are privy only to the human moral world, or better yet, only human beings are privy to rights – meaning, animals cannot bear rights. Further, although Cohen condones the routine use of animals in medical experimentation, he still appeals to their sentience, and thereby, contends to have them treated humanely. Moreover, Cohen argues that the concept of rights is essentially human; it is embedded in a human moral world, and is therefore exclusive only to human beings, because unlike animals, human beings can discern right from wrong. Therefore, Cohen doesn’t believe animals’ rights can be violated, because they simply have none. Cohen further demonstrates how the argument of animals having remarkable capacities is essentially a weak defense for animal rights because it has nothing to do with the rights themselves. He discerns that moral agents (humans) possess moral self legislation; the ability to reason and commit crimes. Oppositely, animals cannot commit crimes because they have no moral state of mind, according to Cohen respectively. He convincingly argues that the misapplication of concepts is what leads to confusion and error. More importantly, Cohen justifies the routine use of animals for the purpose of advancing medicine and ultimately saving the lives of millions of human beings. He argues that dangerous experiments require living organisms as subjects, and without animals, many cures will not be discovered. Lastly, Cohen argues that animals are not due equal consideration, because they are not equal to humans. However, animal experimentation may seize in the future; not on the grounds that they have rights, but on the grounds that they may receive legal protection from medical experimentation, and this he argues, will come at a great cost to human beings.

Step 6.1: Are the Concepts Clearly Defined?

The author has used the concept phantasm in paragraph 10, where he has failed to define this term in context to the article. In paragraph 10, the author states, “Bear in mind that the replacement of animal subjects by computer stimulations, or tissue samples, and so on, is in most research a phantasm, a fantasy.” I do not believe this definition to be compelling by Cohen, because it simply is not defined clearly. He provides one word: fantasy, to define phantasm, but how that relates to biomedical investigation is unclear to me. Research can be performed without animals, so labeling it as a “phantasm” seems not only inaccurate, but far fetched. Overall, his definition and use of phantasm is ambiguous, unclear, and vague because its implications can mean many different things. Perhaps, Cohen is trying to say that the advancement of technology, society, medicine, etc. cannot proceed without biomedical investigations on animals, or perhaps he is trying to say that in general, all dangerous medical experiments must be done on living (nonhuman) organisms because it requires living cells/ tissue. Or perhaps Cohen is trying to say that only the best medical advancements can be done with animal experimentation, anything less than this, will not suffice, in his view. Thus, I think this meaning went beyond the context of the article; leaving it to be confusing and unclear.
The author has used the concept moral principles in paragraph 17, where he has failed to define it in the context of the article. In paragraph 17, Cohen states:
We humans are obliged to act humanely, that is, being aware of their sentience, to apply to animals the moral principles that govern us regarding the gratuitous imposition of pain and suffering; which is not, of course, to treat animals as the possessors of rights.
In this paragraph, Cohen’s use of moral principles is ambiguous and unclear. He states that human beings are obliged to act humanely, as in the application of moral principles, but yet he condones animal experimentation. He does not believe in experimenting on human beings; so I don’t understand how he could apply the same moral principles to animals, as he does to humans regarding pain and suffering (when animals are capable of feeling these things). Animals are sentient beings; they feel pain. To put them through torturous experiments is hardly the application of moral principles, from my understanding. Torturing an animal, in and of itself, defeats the entire purpose of moral principles. Therefore, I am very unclear of what he means by moral principles. His idea of moral principles can be very different from someone else’s, thus, applying his idea of moral principles to a topic that is universally bound is somewhat subjective and unclear to me, the reader. Cohen’s idea of right may not be someone else’s idea of right, and vice versa, so to generally assume that “his” moral principles should be applied to animals is poor structure, and consequently ambiguous. Further, he does not define what it is he means by moral principles in the context of the article, but simply throws this concept into the midst of his sentence, and consequently, only weakens his argument. I therefore believe that Cohen’s use of moral principles is ambiguous and unclear for the context of this article, as he is actually referring to his moral principles, and not the general moral principles of society.

The author has used the concept affirmative showing in paragraph 30, where he has failed to define it in the context of the article. In paragraph 30, the author states, “An affirmative showing is needed-but there is not even a single mention of animal rights before the eighth chapter of the book. Where then is the “case” for animal rights?” In this paragraph, Cohen has failed to provide a compelling definition of what he means by affirmative showing. I am not sure whether he means that individualized issues should prove to predominate over common issues or whether his opponent Regan should challenge more than just common proof. Or perhaps Cohen is trying to say that one cannot argue an issue without first showing evidence to prove it. In any case, not only does he not provide a definition of what he means by affirmative showing in context to the article, but it could have ambiguous meanings, and is therefore, vague and unclear.

Step 6.2: Are They Used In a Sense That is Too Narrow or Too Wide? The concept morally wrong in paragraph 9 is used by Carl Cohen too widely because it goes beyond the context of the article. Carl Cohen states in paragraph 9, “Defenders of animal rights need not hold that medical scientists are vicious; they simply believe that what medical investigators are doing with animals is morally wrong.” One could pose to Carl Cohen and ask whether he is referring to the goodness or badness of human action, or a standard of right and wrong, or perhaps an action in good conduct. Perhaps to an individual, what medical scientists are doing is morally wrong precisely because it’s vicious, or vice versa. The concept morally wrong can have an ample set of meanings, and Cohen failed to define, more specifically what he meant by morally wrong, because something such as the routine use of animals to further advance medicine can still be vicious and morally wrong, whether he condones it or not. The best thing to do may not always be the right thing to do, and the best thing to do (experimentation to advance medicine), can still be vicious, whether Cohen labels it as such. Therefore, Cohen used the concept morally wrong too widely, failing to define, more specifically, what he means by it because many things are wrong, and many things are morally wrong, but torturing animals via experimentation, is at the very least, cruel.
The author included the concept rationality in paragraph 25, where he has used it too narrowly. Cohen states in paragraph 25, “Rationality is not at issue; the capacity to communicate is not at issue.” However, rationality is one of the most pervasive and convincing issues raised against Cohen’s argument. An animal, being capable of rationalization, is therefore, quite similar to a human. So how could Cohen not apply more weight to something so significant? Carl Cohen has included a concept in his article that he has failed to give proper recognition and credence to. The ability for an animal to rationalize is not a miniscule aptitude; it is in fact a central variable to their latent ability. The author has therefore failed to ensure the appropriate characteristics are given to this concept, by using it too narrowly in the context of his argument. Moreover, one might pose to Cohen that some animals (chimps) are more rational than some human beings (the senile), and in this case, is it not narrow-minded to disregard the amazing capabilities of these animals, when in fact they are capable, in some aspects, more than humans? Thus, Cohen has failed to give enough recognition to something as important as rationality, and has therefore, used it too narrowly in the context of the article. Carl Cohen included the concept moral duties in paragraph 26, where he has used it too widely. He states in paragraph 26, “That recognition, not just of possible punishment for an act, but of moral duties that govern us, no rat or cow ever can possess.” This concept is beyond the concept of the article because although human beings have moral duties, and animals do not, respectively, perhaps one could argue that one moral duty of a human being is to speak on behalf of those who cannot speak for themselves – animals, that is. Cohen’s use of moral duties is so wide, it does not take into account that perhaps there are smaller moral duties within the grand concept of moral duties (for example, to some, humans should have the moral duty to protect animals from such things as animal experimentation). Therefore, I believe the author stretched the concept of moral duties beyond the context of the article and beyond the context in and of itself, failing to entertain the fact that because an animal cannot have moral duties, it does not mean an animal cannot be protected against certain things, by persons who do have those moral duties. Cohen has oversimplified the use of moral duties, leaving it unclear, and too broad- wide.

Step 6.3: Are The Concepts Consistently Used?
Carl Cohen has equivocated on the concept of rights in two separate paragraphs, and I therefore thought it would be interesting and necessary to discuss both.

(¶11) P1: [Rights] is used is the sense of something to which someone has a claim - a legal meaning. (¶11) P2: [Rights] is used is the sense of being morally right or correct - a moral meaning.
(¶18) P1: [Rights] is used as a separate issue; unjustified.
(¶18) P2: [Rights] is used as a concept that humans employ.
Carl Cohen uses the concept of rights, which has equivocated in meaning in two separate paragraphs. In paragraph 11, the author states, “For Regan, the interests of humans, their desire to be freed of disease or relieved of pain, simply cannot outweigh the rights of a single rat.” Here, Cohen is saying that for Regan, rats have rights, as in the right to not be experimented on; a legal claim. Then Cohen goes on to say in paragraph 11, “Do you believe that the work of Drs. Salk and Sabin was morally right?” Here Cohen is asking the reader to think whether the work of two doctors (who saved tens of thousands of children from diseases with biomedical investigations using animals) was morally good, as in the correct thing to do; experimenting on animals to save thousands of children; a moral choice. The author has slid between two meanings of the same word, and has thus, committed the fallacy of equivocation. Further, in paragraph 18, Cohen states, “Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in, and has force within, a human moral world.” In this premise, Cohen has equivocated on the concept of rights because in the second sense, yes, human beings do employ the concept of rights, and ultimately do have obligations and duties to other human beings, but whether humans have rights to begin with (as used in the first sense) is unjustified, and merely assumed. Thus, Cohen has failed to give a compelling argument in paragraph 11 and 18 because he has equivocated in meaning between the concepts of rights. His structure is therefore invalid, and a violation of the criterion of a well formed argument.

(¶25) P1: [Autonomy] is used in the sense of rationality and the capacity to make decisions – bioethical philosophy.

(¶25) P2: [Autonomy] is used in the sense of moral respectability for one’s actions – moral/ political philosophy.

The concept autonomy has equivocated in meaning in paragraph 25 of Carl Cohen’s article. Cohen states, “And, if autonomy be understood only as the capacity to choose this course rather than that, autonomy is not the point either.” Here he is saying that autonomy refers to the capacity to make decisions, which animals are capable of doing, even if it is not to the extent that humans are capable of. He then goes on to say, “But moral autonomy – that is, moral self-legislation- is to the point, because moral autonomy is uniquely human and is for animals out of the question, as we have seen.” Here, Cohen is using autonomy in the morally philosophical sense of respectability for one’s actions – respect, pride, guilt, etc. which animals are not capable of. He shifts the term autonomy from a bioethical philosophical meaning to a morally philosophical one. I think Cohen deliberately equivocated here, because he knows in one sense animals are rational, but in another (morally) they are not. Thus, by inserting the word “morally” in front of the same term (autonomy), he attempts to switch its context entirely, but nevertheless, equivocates on the concept autonomy.

Step 6.4: Can Their Weaknesses Be Strengthened? The author uses the term obligations (¶12), where he has created a compelling argument and explanation of this term. In paragraph 12, Cohen writes:
Many obligations are owed by humans to animals; few will deny that. But it certainly does not follow from this that animals have rights because it is certainly not true that every obligation of ours arises from the rights of another. Not at all. We need to be clear and careful here. Rights entail obligations. If you have a right to return the money I borrowed, I have an obligation to repay it… But the proposition all rights entail obligations does not convert simply, as logicians say… Not all obligations are entailed by rights… But many obligations are owed to persons or other beings who have no rights whatever in the matter. His argument is quite compelling because he does not shift in meaning with the word obligations. Cohen uses the term obligations in a clear and consistent manner throughout paragraph 12. However, he could have included what obligations he believes are owed to animals by humans because it is evident that he does not dislike animals, but also that he is in favor of the routine use of animals. He does state that obligations are owed to persons or beings who have no rights, but he does not specify what types of obligations. Could it be feeding/ walking a pet, not wearing fur, not eating meat, not experimenting on mice or primates, etc.? Carl Cohen structured his argument well in paragraph 12, and used such concepts as obligations clearly and unambiguously, but he could have taken his argument to the next level and narrowed it out slightly by explaining why it is that only certain obligations are owed to animals, and not others. It is as if he had drawn a line between what animals are owed and what they are not. Not only is this fairly subjective, but the reader is unaware of what obligations animals are entitled to, because Cohen fails to state it explicitly. It is evident that Cohen justifies the routine use of animals in experimentations (we know that), but he has failed to address other forms of torture, such as slaughter houses, the fur industry, circuses, etc. In my opinion, his attempt to inspire empathy weakens his argument ever so slightly, because he fails to back it up. It is quite contradictory to claim we have moral obligations to animals, such as acting humanely, but justify cutting pieces of their brains out to advance medicine. Had he removed that personal, subjective element, his argument would have been even more persuasive. Regardless, I credit Carl Cohen for his compelling argument in paragraph 12.

The author uses the term capacities (¶24), where he has managed to create a very convincing and strong argument for why animals cannot possess rights. He states:
It is not the individual persons who qualify (or are qualified) for the possession of rights because of the presence or absence in them of some special capacity, thus resulting in the award of rights to some but not to others. Rights are universally human; they arise in a human moral world, in a moral sphere. In the human world moral judgments are pervasive; it is the fact that all humans including infants and the senile are members of that moral community- not the fact that as individuals they have or do not have certain special capacities, or merits- that makes humans bearers of rights.
Carl Cohen’s argument in paragraph 24 is very compelling because he challenges one of the most recognized counter arguments, being: animals have more capacities, than for instance, an infant, or a senile. He argues that infants or the senile do not lose their moral rights because they, in particular, do not exhibit certain capacities, but rather rights, in general, are universally human; bound to each and every human, regardless of their individual capabilities or merits. He also raises the point that, he too understands that animals do possess certain capacities, such as reasoning, but regardless, they cannot possess rights, because rights are exclusive to the human moral world only, respectively. However, Cohen could have made it even more compelling had he discussed the idea of inherent value, which animals do have. Maybe they do not bear rights as humans do, but do they not require some sort of respect or protection from the superior being: humans. In actuality, there are animals, such as Bonobos, (who are the closest living relatives to humans), who possess a larger array of emotional responses and capabilities, than that of an infant, senile, or comatose person. Therefore, whether all humans fall under one category (moral community) is a decision that Cohen has discerned subjectively, and that being said, it should not be equally fair to categorize all animals under one category, as in a worm and a Bonobo – because their capabilities are quite different from one another, as is a fully functioning person and a comatose person. Nonetheless, the author’s argument is compelling in paragraph 24, where the concept capacities does not shift in meaning, but had he expanded, and perhaps taken into consideration that an animal that shares 99% of the same genetic material as a human cannot, and should not respectively, be thrown into the same category as a rat, for example- it simply, does not make sense. Perhaps Cohen should entertain the idea of a hierarchy in the animal kingdom – of course a mosquito will not bear the same rights as a dog or a chimpanzee, but some (higher order) animals deserve more credit than Cohen has given them. Nonetheless, his argument is clear and concise, and thus, well structured.

Step 7.1: Evaluate the Argument
Section 1: What is a right, and who is entitled to it?
(¶1) P1: A right (unlike an interest) is a valid claim, or potential claim, made by a moral agent, under principles that govern both the claimant and the target of the claim.
**{most conceptually problematic}**

(¶5) P2: Some persons believe those animals have rights as surely as though Jews had rights, and they therefore look on the uses of animals in medical investigations just as we look at the Nazi use of Jews, with moral loathing.

(¶6) P3: If animals have rights they certainly have the right not to be killed to advance the interests of others, whatever rights those others may have.

(¶8) P4: A safe vaccine for humans we do not yet have – but soon we will have it, thanks to the use of those mice, many of whom will have died in the process.

(¶11) [HP]: But the consequences of his view will give most of us, I submit, good reason to weigh very carefully the arguments he offers to support such far-reaching claims. [Should animal experimentation be okay because the pros outweigh the cons?]

(¶11) [C]: If you would join me in this support we must conclude that the defense of animal rights is a gigantic mistake.

P1 is conceptually problematic. The two terms: rights and moral agents are conceptually problematic because they can mean several different things. The term rights can have either a legal or moral meaning. Cohen does provide a clear meaning of what a right is, regardless, the premise becomes problematic when he applies the concept of rights only to moral agents. Here the author fails to define what, and who is a moral agent. Although it would be convenient to toss all humans into one category of moral agents, it may in fact be more complicated than that. For example, a vegan can have drastically opposing views regarding rights, than a medical scientist; both of which are part of the moral agents group, but yet share polar beliefs; both to whom are morally justified. Rights were created by moral agents; it is foreign to animals because they cannot understand it. That being said, Cohen has failed to identify why it is that humans have rights in the first place. For Cohen to define, so precisely, who qualifies for rights and who does not qualify, is slightly misleading, and thus, the use of these two concepts creates a problematic premise where the terms could have several meanings, and are ultimately unclear in the context of the article.

Section 2: Why Animals Do Not Have Rights

(¶15) P1: One may be obliged to another for a special act of kindness done; one may be obliged to put an animal out of its misery in view of its condition- but neither the beneficiary of that kindness nor that dying animal may have had a claim of right.

(¶16) P2: Some of our most important obligations- to members of our family, to the needy, to neighbors, and to sentient creatures of every sort- have no foundation in rights at all.

(¶17) P3: A rat may suffer; surely we have the obligation not to torture it gratuitously, even though it be true that the concept of a right could not possibly apply to it.

(¶26) P4: The actus reus (the guilt deed) must be accompanied, in a genuine crime, by a guilty mind, a mens rea.
**most conceptually problematic**

(¶26) [HP]: Animals never can be criminals because they have no moral state of mind. [To bear rights, one must be capable of committing a crime.]

(¶27) [C]: To say that rats have rights is to apply to the world of rats a concept that makes good sense when applied to humans, but which makes no sense at all when applied to rats.

The author, in paragraph 26, uses two terms: actus reus and mens rea, in attempt to support his argument. These two concepts are in fact quite problematic because they can have several different meanings. Cohen states that human beings are bearers of rights because they have the ability to discern right from wrong, and consequently commit a crime, whereas animals are incapable of having this moral state of mind. However, he fails to take into consideration that there are many people who commit crimes, only to plead insanity (because they didn’t know what they did was wrong or they were unaware of what they did entirely). For example, a person suffering from somnambulism (sleep walking) can be completely unaware that he/ she may have just killed someone. Thus, Cohen does not take into consideration, that a person who has no recollection of what they did five minutes ago, cannot possibly bear the same merits as someone who feels remorse. The author’s use of actus reus and mens rea is too vague because some human beings are incapable of having a guilty mind, because they are simply unaware what they did was wrong, and would it be fair to include them under the moral community because they are human beings, when in fact there are some animals who possess more capacities then these human beings? These two concepts are thus problematic, leaving an unclear argument that can generate different meanings.

Section 3: Why Animals Are Mistakenly Believed To Have Rights
(¶29) P1: Regan sought to show, patiently and laboriously, that the common belief that we do have obligations to animals, although they have no rights, has not been defended satisfactorily.

(¶33) P2: Inherent value is an expression used by Regan (and many like him) with two very different senses- in one of which it is reasonable to concluded that those who have inherent value have rights, and in another in which that inference is wholly unwarranted.

(¶40) P3: Advances in medicine absolutely require experiments, many of which are dangerous.

(¶40) P4: Dangerous experiments absolutely require living organisms as subjects.
**most conceptually problematic**

(¶40) [HP]: Regan is free to say in response, as he does, “so be it.” The rest of us must ask if the argument he presents is so compelling as to force us to accept that dreadful result. [Is ending animal experimentation worth the risk to humans?]

(¶39) [C]: I conclude with the observation that, had his mistaken views about the rights of animals long been accepted, most successful medical therapies recently devised- antibiotics, vaccines, prosthetic devices, and other compounds and instruments on which we now rely for saving an improving human lives and for the protection of our children-could not have been developed; and were his views to become general now (an outcome that is unlikely but possible) the consequences for medical science and for human well-being in the years ahead would be nothing less than catastrophic.

Carl Cohen uses the terms dangerous experiments and subjects, in paragraph 40, where they are, to a degree, conceptually problematic. The author contends that, nonhumans (animals) are needed for dangerous experiments. However, the issue of ambiguity comes into play because it is difficult to discern whether it is only dangerous experiments that require animals as subjects, and if so, why is it only dangerous experiments requiring animals as subjects? Further, why must animals be the subjects when, for example, medical investigators can use stem cell research? Is Cohen attempting to justify his position by virtue of this ultimatum? It is therefore; relatively unclear why only animals must be subjects, because as a subject, obviously, the animal will suffer. Is Cohen putting his needs above an animal? Is he not taking into consideration the connection between interests and sentience? An animal in a dangerous experiment will endure much pain; is Cohen oblivious to the fact that these animals undergo pain at the expense of medicine, even when alternative methods are available? In my opinion, Cohen has failed to explicitly and clearly provide a justification as to why only dangerous experiments require the use of animals, when in fact there are alternative methods. I do not know whether he genuinely believes that animals have interests, but if he does, this premise goes against it because using an animal as a subject in a dangerous experiment is hardly a moral interest on his part, whether rights come into play or not. Thus, these terms are used ambiguously, resulting in a conceptually problematic premise, as well as an unsound one, because the premise does not conform to facts.

Step 7.2: Does the Argument Violate Any Criteria?

The author has violated the sufficiency criterion of a well formed argument in paragraph 19, where he has committed the fallacy of question begging epithet. In paragraph 19, Cohen states, “The human has a right not to be eaten alive; it is, after all, a human being. Do you believe that the baby zebra has the right not to be slaughtered by that lioness? Question begging epithet is using strongly emotional language to force home an otherwise unsupported conclusion. Here, the author uses an epithet (slaughtered) when speaking of animals, versus humans. He is practically begging the question with this one word because it is unnecessary, and included only to influence the outcome. This epithet is Cohen’s attempt at distinguishing animals from human – humans get eaten, animals get slaughtered, even when it is an animal doing both these things. With that said, the author has violated the sufficiency criterion of a good argument because he has failed to provide reasons that are sufficient in number, kind, and weight to support the acceptance of his conclusion. Thus, his premise lacks the sufficiency required to establish his argument, and ultimately, his conclusion.

The author has violated the relevancy criterion of a well formed argument in paragraph 40, where he has committed the fallacy of appealing to fear. The author states, in paragraph 40, “Therefore, most advances in medicine will continue to rely on the use of nonhuman animals, or they will stop.” The fallacy of appealing to fear is simply, seeking to persuade through fear. Cohen is attempting to frighten his readers into accepting his conclusion by virtue of a threat: if animal research seizes all medical advancements seize also; therefore animal research should not seize. He is arguing that; if animals have rights, those rights result in protection from medical experimentation. This protection will end all medical advancements; no cures will ever be discovered again, and ultimately, civilization will suffer a large detriment because of it. This argument violates the criterion of a good argument because, although it may be true that animals cannot possess rights, this does not mean that we must experiment, and thus, torture animals to advance our welfare. Moreover, nor is it true that medical advancements will stop without animal experimentation. It is entirely possible to continue medical investigations, while abstaining from torturing innocent animals, for example, using stem cell research, in vitro, silico, or even human beings in some cases (many studies seek human beings and pay large sums of money for their participation – which often involves taking medication in the making (very tiny doses; not toxic). Animal experimentation can be limited or stopped without hindering scientific progress. Cohen has thus, violated the relevancy criterion of a good argument because he has failed to present reasons that are directly related to the merit of the position at issue. His argument in paragraph 40 is irrelevant to his conclusion, because although animals may not bear rights, it does not mean that scientific progress will seize if they’re given immunity from dangerous experiments.

Step 7.3: Neutralize the Fallacy

In paragraph 8, the author has committed the fallacy of bifurcation. Cohen states, in paragraph 8, “We use mice or monkeys because there is no other way.” The fallacy of bifurcation is, considering a distinction or classification exclusive and exhaustive when other alternatives exist. In paragraph 8, Cohen is not entertaining all options; such as stem cell research, for example, or even perhaps granting some animals immunity (higher order) like a hierarchy. By oversimplifying the problem, he is eluding the possibility of some middle ground, and ultimately, failing to entertain all plausible alternatives; consequently providing only two opposing measures, which differ drastically.

In paragraph 24, the author has committed the fallacy of begging the question. Cohen states, in paragraph 24:
In the human world moral judgments are pervasive; it is the fact that all humans including infants and the senile are members of that moral community- not the fact that as individuals they have or do not have certain special capacities, or merits- that makes humans bearers of rights.
This argument, made by Cohen, begs the question of what the difference is between an inadequate moral patient (animal) and an incapacitated moral agent (human). Further, Cohen quibbles his argument circularly, failing to provide a compelling reason why and how the two differ from one another because, for example, a chimpanzee is capable of counting, typing, learning, etc., yet, some human beings, such as the comatose, are incapable of all of those things. Therefore, his argument is unsound, because rather than offering proof for his conclusion, he simply reasserts the conclusion. Cohen has merely affirmed it, rather than confirmed it by virtue of the fallacy of begging the question.

The more serious of the two fallacies is the fallacy of bifurcation, located in paragraph 8 of Carl Cohen’s article, where he states, “We use mice or monkeys because there is no other way.” This argument does not meet the sufficiency criterion of a well formed argument because the author failed to provide reasons to support his argument, rather, making causal assumptions based on insufficient evidence. Further, this argument does not meet the acceptability criterion of a well formed argument because, once again, the author failed to provide reasons that would be accepted by a mature and rational person. Lastly, although this argument did not fail the relevancy criteria, because the first premise is in fact relevant where he states, “To test the vaccine first on children would be an outrage, as it would have been an outrage to do so with the Salk and Sabin polio vaccines years ago”, it still fails the other two criteria of a well formed argument, and does therefore, not fulfill the RSA criteria of a valid argument.

Step 1: The Main Conclusion Therefore, because we certainly may not use human children to test them, we will use mice (or as we develop an AIDS vaccine, primates) or we will never have such vaccines (¶8).

Step 2: Identify the Premise

(¶8) P1: To test the vaccine first on children would be an outrage, as it would have been an outrage to do so with the Salk and Sabin polio vaccines years ago.

(¶8) P2: We use mice or monkeys because there is no other way.

(¶8) P3: There will never be another way because untested vaccines are very dangerous; their first use on an organism is inescapably experimental; there is and will be no way to determine the reliability and safety of new vaccines without repeated tests on live organisms.

Step 3: Name the Fallacy

The fallacy committed is bifurcation.

Step 4: Identify the Criteria for the Fallacy

Bifurcation is considering a distinction or classification exclusive and exhaustive when other alternatives exist.

Step 6: Challenge the Fallacy

The author merely entertains only two options, either we experiment on animals, or we will never discover new vaccines. This violates the sufficiency criterion of a well formed argument because the author fails to entertain all plausible alternatives, such as stem cell research, or in vitro, for example. Thus, his argument is too polarized, failing to take into consideration any middle alternatives.

Step 7.4: Can Some of the Arguments Be Made Stronger?

In paragraph 27, Carl Cohen’s argument is quite compelling, where he states:
The misapplication of concepts leads to error and, sometimes, to nonsense. So it is with rights also. To say that rats have rights is to apply to the world of rats a concept that makes good sense when applied to humans, but which makes no sense at all when applied to rats.
This argument is quite convincing, and I credit Carl Cohen for putting together a compelling argument. However, even if his claims are true, he has failed to show that animals don’t in fact have rights, because he has failed to show that human beings do in fact have rights. There may be strength in Cohen’s argument that an animal cannot bear the concept of a right, but, that does not mean an animal cannot bear the property of a right. For example, animals are unaware of the concept of their status as being an animal, but regardless, they still are animals. Therefore, although his argument has its strengths, it is not accurate to deny animals all rights, simply because they don’t understand the concept of them. Further, because a concept is introduced by human beings, does not give them the authority to delineate who bears the property of something, and who does not. After all, animals cannot speak English, and can therefore not understand English, so it is quite conceivable that an animal is incapable of understanding the concept of something that is incomprehensible to them to begin with. Ultimately, it is unfair to deny an animal a right, simply on the basis that they know not what a right is. It may very well be true, as Cohen has argued convincingly, that an animal is incapable of bearing a right because of their moral status, but it is wrong to assume, that because an animal does not understand the concept of something, they therefore cannot have it. Animals do not understand the concept of their genetic code, yet they still have it – human beings cannot deny them of that. Thus, had Cohen taken this into consideration, his argument would have rendered much more compelling. Nonetheless, I give him credit for convincingly showing that animals cannot actually bear rights, in and of themselves, because it is a term created by man, for man – but Cohen could have noted the difference between concept and property; that would have made his argument even more compelling.

In the article, Do Animals Have Rights, the author Carl Cohen has argued for the main conclusion, that animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in and has force within a human moral world. The key concepts that are central to the article are rights, interests, animals, and human moral world. One of the conceptual questions that one can ascertain in the article is: are rights reserved only to the human moral world? In this critical evaluation, I will attempt to evaluate the concepts rights and human moral world. This essay will diagnose the fallacy of bifurcation. In addition I will also be evaluating the argument found in paragraph eight and discuss why it is invalid, and lacks strength. The author introduces two very important concepts: moral principles and affirmative showing within his article. However, he has failed to use both of these concepts in their appropriative manner, thereby, resulting in an unexplained and ambiguous argument; exceeding the context of this article. Cohen fails to define clearly what he means by moral principles because the routine use of animals in experimentations, is not a general moral principle that many would expect to have applied to animals. The moral principles that Cohen discusses, are subjective to his notion, and cannot possibly reflect an entire culture of beings that practice these same moral principles. That being said, Cohen’s use of moral principles is vague and unclear because it is not understood where he is deriving the information of moral principles from, and more importantly, what moral principles are specifically. Further, Cohen uses another very important, but problematic concept; affirmative showing. Cohen fails to define what he means by this concept in context to his article, leaving it ambiguous, vague, and unclear. Cohen then goes on to discuss the concept of rationality and moral duties, again two very important concepts in his article, but used inappropriately. Cohen has also included a concept: rationality, which he has failed to give proper recognition and credence to. The ability for an animal to rationalize is not a miniscule aptitude; it is in fact a central variable to their latent ability. Cohen has therefore failed to ensure the appropriate characteristics are given to this concept by using it too narrowly. Further, Cohen uses the term moral duties, which he has again, failed to use appropriately in the context of his article because although human beings have moral duties, and animals do not, respectively; perhaps one could argue that one moral duty of a human being is to speak on behalf of those who cannot speak for themselves – animals, that is. Cohen’s use of moral duties is so wide; it does not take into account that perhaps there are smaller moral duties within the grand concept of moral duties that deserve attention. Therefore, I believe Cohen has stretched the concept of moral duties beyond the context of his article, and beyond the context in and of itself; failing to entertain the fact that because an animal cannot have moral duties; it does not mean an animal cannot be protected against certain things, and by persons who do have those moral duties. Cohen has oversimplified the use of moral duties, leaving it unclear, and too broad- wide. These four concepts are very important, but problematic; Cohen has failed to use these concepts in a compelling argument because they are unclear, vague, and ambiguous; going beyond the context of his article. The author, Carl Cohen, has violated the relevancy criterion of a good argument because he has failed to present reasons that are directly related to the merit of the position at issue. Cohen has committed the fallacy of appealing to fear; thereby violating the relevancy criterion. His argument is irrelevant to his conclusion, because although animals may not bear rights, it does not mean that scientific progress will seize if they’re given immunity from dangerous experiments. Cohen is attempting to frighten his readers into accepting his conclusion by virtue of a threat: if animal research seizes all medical advancements seize also; therefore animal research should not seize, respectively. Cohen has also committed the fallacy of bifurcation, which is in fact the most serious fallacy embedded within his article. Cohen justifies the use of animals, because there is no other way, respectively. Cohen is not entertaining all options; such as stem cell research, for example, or even perhaps granting some (higher order) animals immunity; as in a hierarchy. By oversimplifying the problem, he is eluding the possibility of some middle ground, and ultimately, failing to entertain all plausible alternatives, leaving only two diametrically opposing options. This argument does not meet the sufficiency criterion of a well formed argument because the author fails to provide reasons to support his position, rather, making causal assumptions based on insufficient evidence. Lastly, Cohen’s argument in paragraph 27 is quite convincing, however, had he entertained the difference between concept and property, it would have been even more compelling because although an animal may not be capable of understanding the concept of a right, it does not mean they cannot have the property of a right. After all, an animal is still an animal, without knowing the concept of being one. Carl Cohen’s use of concepts, at times, is vague and unclear. He also oversimplifies some of his arguments, resulting in violations and ambiguity amongst his points. He does however; convincingly bolster his credibility by proving animals cannot bear rights because the concept of rights is essentially human. However, had he entertained the idea of concepts versus property, his argument would have been even more compelling. Cohen has tackled an important, but controversial issue of animals and their rights, or lack thereof. However, he has not given sufficient reasons to claim his arguments. The use of his concepts are open to doubt; lacking clarity. His arguments are subjective and black and white at times. He should reference newer sources, and perhaps consider the difference between giving animals immunity, without directly granting them rights.