Passchendaele Battle Analysis

Launched on 31 July of 1917, the Battle of Passchendaele also known as the Third Ypres was meant to be the key for the Allied forces to gain entry into the Flanders, Belgium. Vehemently planned and rehearsed this campaign continued until 6 November 1917 ending in the Passchendaele village. Although the offensive gained position for the Allies its cost in human lives greatly overshadowed them. Tactics employed during this campaign continue to be the source of great controversy an ended the tactics of attrition currently being employed by the Allies.

Set in motion by the assessment of Admiral Jellicoe that shipping losses would impair the British forces ability to sustain the war. These losses were directly contributed to German submarines originating from pens off the Belgian coast. It was imperative for the allies, most
As a result, Plumer fought a series of small battles within Flanders – the Battle of Menin Road Bridge, the Battle of Polygon Wood and the Battle of Broodseinde (Trueman 2016). These battles occurred between September and October of 1917. Haig seeing the territorial advantage east of Ypres, ordered the offensive to continue to the Passchendaele Ridge. In the span of 3 days two additional battles occurred Poelcappelle and the First Battle of Passchendaele. German forces within Passchendaele Ridge were reinforced with additional troops from the eastern front with the intent of strengthening the defense. The German forces boosted and additionally equipped with mustard gas successfully defended the Passchendaele Ridge. This defeat regardless of its outcome did little to sway Haig, who ordered three additional attacks upon the ridge until the eventual occupation of Passchendaele village on 6 November 1917. It was this success that finally ended the Third Battle of