Persuasive Essay On Irregular Warfare

Sir,
I wish I could provide you a comprehensive, one-stop document to solve any irregular warfare problem. Unfortunately, such a document does not exist, nor will it ever exist. Lamentably, despite recent fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US political and military apparatus remains largely beholden to the idea of decisive action to achieve quick victory. Given its superior military might, the US prefers a single all determining battle or campaign to achieve victory and leave its enemy. Any talk of irregular warfare engenders thoughts of, as you put it, “a convoluted mix of actors, obscure objectives, shifting alliances, and seemingly random and wanton violence.” One does not talk of such things at cocktail parties. My intent is to provide you a better understanding of the elements of irregular warfare. In doing so, I will attempt to answer your central question distilled here: “Why is irregular warfare so messy and what can we do about it?”
To provide a common starting point, it is first necessary to agree upon terms. Dr. James Kiras, a SAASS professor and SOCOM irregular warfare subject matter expert, defines irregular warfare as “primarily about politics and organization.” The US commonly associates irregular warfare
Such an answer is as unappealing as it is variable. I have attempted to give you a wavetop survey of the difficulties and opportunities found in irregular warfare. Despite its frequent occurrence, the US oftentimes perceives irregular warfare as the antithesis to its way of war; overwhelming force to ensure a quick decisive victory. Irregular warfare is messy, full of snares and pitfalls for the state, the population, the insurgent, and most importantly, any intervening party. However, the desire to fight in a style best suited to our strengths should not abdicate us from examining, intellectually or otherwise, a fight for which we are