Peter Singer Famine Affluence And Morality Analysis

The issue of moral obligations towards the global poor has always been a contentious affair to be discussed for fear of problematic resolutions that may affect academia on a personal level. Peter Singer, most notable for his authorship of “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” and the drowning child analogy, presents the rather uncommon normative view that affluent persons are morally obligated to donate more resources to humanitarian causes than the present standard. Singer’s perspective on these seemingly radical moral ideals are confronted by many a pragmatic objection, ranging from entitlement principles to moral inequalities. Nevertheless, Singer builds his argumentative framework in regards to moral obligations to the global poor on solid
normative rationale, despite unpopular criticisms of the status quo.
Singer presents a strong, fluid argument that claims a moral obligation from the affluent to contribute more to the global poor than what is considered normal in present circumstances. In “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” he arranges two premises for his argument; the first being an assumption that suffering from lack of food, shelter, or medical equipment is bad, and the second being a moral obligation to prevent bad things from happening without sacrificing “anything of comparable moral importance” if it is within an individual’s power. Furthermore, as affluent society is, by definition, comparatively wealthier than the poor, the affluent have the ability to help. If the two premises are agreeable, then Singer’s argument may proceed. Singer references the principle learnt from his signature analogy of saving a child from drowning at the cost of dirtied clothing: an individual ought to, morally, provide aid regardless of relatively insignificant sacrifices on the individual’s part. From that, because the principle makes “no account of proximity or distance,” the subject matter of the global poor can be addressed cohesively within Singer’s normative framework. Those with ability and resources, namely society’s affluent individuals, are very obviously tasked with a moral obligation to aid the poor regardless of distance and relatively minor sacrifices to be made. However, it is apparent from a descriptive observation of global poverty that said individuals have, at best, only partially fulfilled their moral obligations. In the light of this matter, Singer concludes his argument by claiming that “we ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of … disasters.” Despite Singer’s neatly argued rationale favoring certain moral obligations towards the global poor, there are still a considerable range of objections to be addressed.
While Singer’s view regarding moral obligations towards the global poor does not appear to contain significant irrationality across the thrust of his argument, a few matters must be clarified prior to a proper conclusion. One of the major issues opponents of Singer’s argument wish to address is the problem of entitlement and just deserts. Such critics of Singer’s view claim that individuals are sometimes entitled to invoke their own rights to justify their inaction. Hardworking individuals should have a positive right to their wages, and it is also true that there is no obvious social contract between the underprivileged and the benefactor in this present age. Furthermore, if men hold the right to entitlement and moral equality, then it stands to reason that they are allowed to pursue their “own lives without interference from others, just as no person is the natural slave of another.” The greatest criticism of Singer’s moral code, however, is the impracticality in its application in present-day society. Due to these considerable objections, Singer’s moral standpoint on the global poor appears to be unrealistic and undependable despite its coherency. Nevertheless, such objections to Singer’s view regarding the moral obligations towards the global poor are overrated and have missed the point of Singer’s normative construct.
None of the precepts of justice aim at rewarding virtue. It is true that there is no legal obligation to save a drowning child; in a morally just society, each individual is most certainly entitled to his just deserts. Singer acknowledges that fundamental issue, “the whole way we look at moral issues – our moral conceptual scheme,” and believes it to be skewed, if not entirely wrong. Just as the individual in Singer’s drowning child analogy expects the deterioration of his personal clothing rather than a reward when he goes in the pond to save the child, so the affluent should expect a sacrifice on their part of entitlements instead of recompense when aiding the poor. In regards to claims regarding the impractical side of Singer’s argument, it should be noted that there is a world of difference between what society should appear to be and what society is at the moment. Singer’s perspective is clearly a normative proposal rather than descriptive, and while Singer does admit that it would be extremely difficult to alter an entire society’s moral code, “at the very least…one can make a start.” It is true that Singer’s argument is somewhat ambitious to apply to the present affluent society at the moment due to radical shifts in the status quo, but that is not a legitimate reason to dismiss what has
been proposed. Lastly, it should also be mentioned that Singer’s argument on the matter of moral obligations is not to be held responsible for failing to address circumstantial opportunities and economic developments. Various opponents of Singer’s approach offer what appears to be equally viable alternative approaches, “including ethical tourism and fair trade in luxury goods.” Nevertheless, what is proposed as a “systematic and theoretically informed approach to poverty relief” does not appear to be more than an evasive approach against effective action. Just as Singer is not responsible blacklisting every charity fraud institution from the overall humanitarian organization, so Singer is not responsible for nitpicking past every method of charitable duty towards the global poor. Systematized, but opponents of such a view have yet to present unambiguous alternatives other than eventual low-risk investments. Singer has already anticipated claims disregarding individual contributions to “privately run charities,” and found the assumptions unsupported, if not altogether implausible. It should not be necessary to reiterate the circumstances in which Singer’s argument takes place: when “Famine, Affluence and Morality” was written in 1971, Bengal was taken as Singer’s example due to the immediate concern and publicity of the world governments, particularly that of the United Kingdom. Even after the crisis had become something akin to mere historical interest, Singer still addresses the equally pressing need for assistance across several countries, a need that is certainly not meant to be taken as a leisurely corporate investment opportunity. The point of Singer’s view on moral obligations to the global poor is not concerned with the returns and assets of the affluent. The rational coherency behind Singer’s view regarding our moral obligations towards the global poor is solid and understandable, though the conclusion of the matter has most definitely prompted a plethora of criticisms from academia.
The real-world application of Singer’s argument is no doubt difficult to implement, but that cannot be considered a fault due to unreasonable demand. Personal discomfort is to be expected, as Singer’s view on moral obligations and global poverty is uncompromisingly utilitarian. Nevertheless, a minor monetary inconvenience for the affluent should be considered relatively insignificant when compared to the incalculable value of a human life. As there are no major inconsistencies to be seen in Singer’s argumentative framework as a whole, there is merit in accepting his position on the moral obligations towards the global
poor.