Phenomenal Experience
Phenomenal Experience In Modern Philosophy by Malcolm McNeill
995863258
PHLB35H3 F
Modern philosophy was the era of new thought and expanding growth. Newer theories regarding the nature of our world based on scientific findings were starting to become accepted. Yet, philosophers still found it too early to abandon their God-appeal sentiments. Phenomenal experience was not a subject of discourse until the new enlightenment gave way to open discourse of new ideas. Berkeley and Leibniz regard the source of our perceptions as the ultimate, infinite being which is God. Berkeley explains this by claiming that materialism leads to skepticism and further argues that there is no such thing as material external objects but rather everything is …show more content…
A necessary universal substance is one whose existence is logically necessary and cannot be denied without causing some form of self-contradiction (Leibniz, G. W. 1686-87). Leibniz suggests that the necessary conditional substance is God. God is absolutely real, infinite, and perfect. All perfection and all reality comes from God. God as the supreme monad is an absolute unity (Leibniz, g. w. 1686-87). Therefore, every monad is produced from a primary unity, which is God (Leibniz, G. W. 1686-87). Every monad is eternal and contributes to the unity of all other monads in the universe (Leibniz, G. W. 1686-87). Therefore, according to Leibniz all perceptions and changes are governed by …show more content…
Berkeley 's account of phenomenal experience takes a wrong turn when he objects to the response that our brains are the external property that give rise to our perceptions. After this objection Berkeley only provides a jagged argument for our perceptions as being provided to us by God. Leibniz 's account of phenomenal experience, monadology, is perhaps the lesser coherent argument from the two since, according to him, the nature of perceptions are accounted for by the internal actions of monads the simplest substances that cannot be further broken down. This is the problem right here. How can we possibly concur that these simple substances actually exist or that in reality degradation of substances isn 't infinitely continual, meaning there is no simple substance that cannot be further broken down. The problem is that Leibniz has created this concept of a monad and established his entire argument based on
995863258
PHLB35H3 F
Modern philosophy was the era of new thought and expanding growth. Newer theories regarding the nature of our world based on scientific findings were starting to become accepted. Yet, philosophers still found it too early to abandon their God-appeal sentiments. Phenomenal experience was not a subject of discourse until the new enlightenment gave way to open discourse of new ideas. Berkeley and Leibniz regard the source of our perceptions as the ultimate, infinite being which is God. Berkeley explains this by claiming that materialism leads to skepticism and further argues that there is no such thing as material external objects but rather everything is …show more content…
A necessary universal substance is one whose existence is logically necessary and cannot be denied without causing some form of self-contradiction (Leibniz, G. W. 1686-87). Leibniz suggests that the necessary conditional substance is God. God is absolutely real, infinite, and perfect. All perfection and all reality comes from God. God as the supreme monad is an absolute unity (Leibniz, g. w. 1686-87). Therefore, every monad is produced from a primary unity, which is God (Leibniz, G. W. 1686-87). Every monad is eternal and contributes to the unity of all other monads in the universe (Leibniz, G. W. 1686-87). Therefore, according to Leibniz all perceptions and changes are governed by …show more content…
Berkeley 's account of phenomenal experience takes a wrong turn when he objects to the response that our brains are the external property that give rise to our perceptions. After this objection Berkeley only provides a jagged argument for our perceptions as being provided to us by God. Leibniz 's account of phenomenal experience, monadology, is perhaps the lesser coherent argument from the two since, according to him, the nature of perceptions are accounted for by the internal actions of monads the simplest substances that cannot be further broken down. This is the problem right here. How can we possibly concur that these simple substances actually exist or that in reality degradation of substances isn 't infinitely continual, meaning there is no simple substance that cannot be further broken down. The problem is that Leibniz has created this concept of a monad and established his entire argument based on