Political Law Reviewer

Prefatory: Cases written by Justice V. V. Mendoza will be marked with an asterisk (*).

Constitutional Law

Bill of Rights

Due Process

Request of Radio-TV coverage of plunder cases of Estrada

Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (June 29, 2001)
* Digest of this case is particularly longer because of the novelty of the issue.
FACTS: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the SC to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo

HELD: Petition denied. In the case of Estes vs. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the television coverage of judicial proceedings is an inherent denial of due process to the accused. The Court in this case also identified the following as being likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television . . . is perhaps of the greatest significance. . . . From the moment the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause célèbre. The whole community, . . . becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. . . .
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. . . .. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task requires his undivided attention. . .
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of mental — if not physical — harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him — sometimes the difference between life and death — dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."

Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom.

The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

* Re: Request for live radio-tv coverage of the trial, etc. v. Joseph E. Estrada, et al.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (September 13, 2001)

Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioner’s request for permission to televise & broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petition was filed by the DOJ, claiming that there is no conflict between the right of the people to public info & the freedom of the press, on one hand, & the right of the accused to a fair trial on the other.

Held: With a vote of 9-6, the SC denied the motion. An audio-visual recording was ordered to be made, under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan, for documentary purposes only. There will be no live broadcast before the promulgation of the decision. Upon release for broadcast, the original shall be deposited with the National Museum & Archives Office. The reasons for the audio-visual recording of the trial are as follows: 1. the hearings are of historical significance. They are an affirmation to our commitment to the rule that “the king is under no man, but he is under God & the law”; 2. the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted; and 3. audio-visual presentation is essential for the education & civic training of the people.

Warrantless arrests / Searches and Seizures

People v. Pasudag
G. R. No. 128822. (May 4, 2001)

FACTS: SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Pasudag owned it. A team was dispatched and the team arrived and went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. The police looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about five (5) meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag standing beside one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned the marijuana plants. SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report which accused Pasudag signed. Arrest and seizure valid?

HELD: As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The testimony of SPO3 Jovencio Fajarito reveals that appellant was not duly informed of his constitutional rights. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.

People v. Hindoy
G.R. No. 132662 (May 10, 2001)

FACTS: A woman informant came to the station and reported that a certain "Bella" of 248 Sto. Rosario St., Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of illegal drugs that day. On the strength of that information, Antiojo organized a team that would conduct a buy-bust operation. At around 3 a.m., the team, headed by Antiojo himself and guided by the woman informant, went to said address. Eugenio and Cariaga acted as poseur-buyers, while SPO4 Rolando Cruz, SPO3 Antonio Nato, and Prianes served as backup. They knocked on the door and BELLA's live-in partner ENRIQUE opened it. Eugenio said, "May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If there's new stuff, we'll get some)," referring to marijuana. ENRIQUE answered, "Meron" (Yes, there is) so Eugenio gave him one P500.00 and five P100.00 marked bills. After counting the money, ENRIQUE asked BELLA to get the stuff. She complied and brought a brick of marijuana, with an estimated weight of one kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper. ENRIQUE, in turn, handed it over to Eugenio. That was when they identified themselves as police officers. After giving the prearranged signal to the backup operatives, he and Cariaga entered the house then announced that they were going to conduct a search. Under a table, they found a bag made of abaca containing twelve more bricks of marijuana. The evidence was marked then turned over to Prianes, who transmitted the same to the NBI for chemical analysis.

HELD: The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the sellers and possessors of the seized marijuana cannot be doubted, for they were caught in flagrante delicto in a standard police buy-bust operation. Such positive identification prevails over their feeble denial and declaration that the abaca bag which contained twelve blocks of marijuana was only left to their custody by a certain Marlyn. Moreover, under the circumstances, it was the duty of the police officers to conduct a more thorough search of the premises after a successful entrapment, then make the necessary arrest of the suspects and seizure of suspected contraband. The search, being incident to a lawful arrest, was valid notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. In fact, the warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. In the case at bar, upon consummation of the illicit sale, PO3 Eugenio introduced himself and SPO1 Cariaga as police officers. ENRIQUE and BELLA were apprised of their constitutional rights. Thereafter, the officers searched the room where BELLA supposedly got the first block of marijuana. There, they found an abaca bag under a folding table. Upon inspection, the bag yielded twelve more blocks of compressed marijuana inside a plastic bag. The trial court, therefore, was correct in admitting all thirteen blocks of marijuana in evidence.

* People v. Cubcubin, Jr.
G.R. No. 136267. (July 10, 2001)

FACTS: Witnesses identified Accused-Appellant as the last person to have been seen together with the murdered victim. Policemen went to his house and asked permission to search. They found a bloodied white shirt and two .38 caliber shells. The policemen asked him to go with them to the café where he was last seen with the victim where the witness positively identified him. The Policemen asked for his permission to go back to the house to search for the gun. They found the weapon and arrested Accused-Appellant.

HELD: The arrest without warrant was illegal because the police officers did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances was based entirely on what the witnesses had told them. The police officers did not have probable cause either because at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant was not doing anything overtly criminal. However, accused-appellant cannot question the validity of his arrest without warrant because he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. He also did not move to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction due to the illegal arrest.

The bloodied shirt, shells, and firearm are inadmissible as evidence for being the product of an illegal search. The search was illegal because it was not proven that the accused-appellant gave his consent to the search. Even assuming that the arrest was valid, the search cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because the items that were seized were not within the immediate control of the accused. In fact, the policemen seized the firearm only after going back to the house of accused-appellant. Neither can the plain view doctrine apply in this case since the policemen did not come upon the objects inadvertently.

People v. Licayan
G. R. Nos. 140900, 140911 (August 15, 2001)

Facts: Licayan and Lara were found guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC as amended. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. In their appeal, they contended that they were illegally arrested since the circumstance under which they were arrested do not fall under the warrantless arrest. In addition, they claim that after their arrest, they were already under custodial investigation and therefore, should have been informed of their constitutional rights which the arresting officer did not do. They did not have counsel when Lara made an admission of participation in the commission of the crime.

Held: The accused have already waived their rights to question the legality of their arrests when they pleaded not guilty during the arraignment without moving to quash the information on the ground that their arrest was invalid. Any irregularity attendant to accused-appellant’s arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial. With regards to the contention they there was no counsel when the extrajudicial confession was made, the Court held that the admission was made voluntarily and with the assistance of a counsel de oficio who assisted the accused while he was giving his sworn statement.

People v. Gonzales

G. R. No. 121877 (September 12, 2001)

Facts: The police were tipped that a woman wearing maong pants and Ray Ban sunglasses carrying a black travelling bag would be riding a trisikad to transport marijuana. On the basis of this tip, the police conducted a patrol and found a woman who matched the description. The police asked her if she owned the bag and if the bag may be opened. The woman, who is the accused herein, refused. The police opened the bag and found marijuana inside. The accused was arrested. Later, the trial court convicted her of illegal possession of marijuana. Was the search and seizure of the marijuana illegal?

Held: No. Although the search of the accused was not made through a warrant, nevertheless, it was still valid, as there was probable cause to search the accused. When the police were tipped on the transport of marijuana, there was no sufficient time to procure a warrant. Furthermore, the police were given a sufficient description of the person who will be transporting the illegal drugs.

People v. Del Mundo

G.R. No. 138929 (October 2, 2001)

FACTS: During a stakeout, the policemen observed accused-appellant hand something over to the other person. Upon their approach, accused sped away with his tricycle. Two of the policemen caught up with him. Accused was subjected to a body search but nothing was found. When they searched the tricycle, they found a package wrapped in newspaper inside a plastic bag. They detected the distinct scent of marijuana. Upon opening the package, they found two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. Accused was charged and convicted for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. Further, the trial court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and seizure of plastic bag containing marijuana.

HELD: The warrantless arrest and seizure of the marijuana was valid and legal. Accused was caught attempting to flee from the pursuing policemen. Such act was indicative of his guilt which gave the police reasonable grounds to believe that he was dealing or transporting prohibited drugs, having been so informed by a reliable police informer. Even if the arrest was invalid, any objection must be made before a plea is entered. Having failed to move for the quashing of the Information before arraignment, accused is estopped. The police did not even have to open the package to determine its contents. It is of judicial notice that marijuana has a distinct, sweet and unmistakable aroma very different from that of ordinary tobacco. There is thus no merit in accused’s argument that the evidence presented was obtained through an illegal warrantless search. Besides, there is no showing that accused objected to the search of this vehicle and opening of the package. Drugs discovered as a result of consented search are admissible in evidence.

People v. Whisenhunt

G. R. No. 123819 (November 14, 2001)

FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of murder. After the crime occurred and the body of the victim disposed, the NBI arrested the accused at Apex Motors Corp. The trial court convicted the accused of murder. The accused appealed, claiming that he was illegally arrested.

HELD: The accused is barred from contesting the illegal arrest. The proper thing to do was to object to the illegal arrest before entering his plea during arraignment. Failing to do so, the accused waived to any objections to his illegal arrest.

Constitutional Presumption of Innocence

People v. Amestuzo
G.R. No. 104383. (July 12, 2001)

FACTS: Accused was convicted on the basis of an out of court identification made by the complainants. Before the complainants identified accused, they were informed by the policemen that the accused had been previously identified by an eye witness. Accused also had a solid alibi, which was supported by credible witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of accused was proper.

HELD: No. Where there are two possible explanations for the circumstances and the inculpatory one does not satisfy the moral certainty required for a conviction, the constitutional presumption of innocence shall prevail.

The identification made by the complainants was faulty for being practically suggested to them by the officers.

Right to Bail

Yap v. CA

G. R. No. 141529 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Yap was charged and convicted of estafa in the RTC of Pasig City. On appeal to the CA, Yap applied for bail. The CA set the bail at P5.5 million and required Yap to notify the court and private complainant that he will change his residence. Yap claimed that the bail is excessive and violative of his constitutional right against excessive bail.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the bail was too excessive. The amount set did not have any factual basis to support itself.

Right to Abode

Yap v. CA

G. R. No. 141529 (June 6, 2001)

HELD: The right to abode and travel is not absolute. It may be restricted, especially if the accused tried to flee when the case against him was still pending. Moreover, the accused here was not prevented from changing abode. He was merely required to notify the court when he wishes to change abode.

People v. Del Rosario
G. R. No. 131036 (June 20, 2001)

FACTS: Del Rosario was charged with the crime of roberry with homicide. During custodial investigation, Del Rosario, assisted by counsel, signed a confession. The trial court convicted him of robbery with homicide. Del Rosario questions the validity of the confession, stating that his constitutional rights were violated when he signed it.

HELD: The confession was valid and admissible. There was no violation of Del Rosario’s constitutional rights. There was no proof that Rosario’s counsel was remiss in his duties when the confession was signed.

People v. Salonga
G. R. No. 131131 (June 21, 2001)

FACTS: The Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank conducted an investigation regarding anomalies made in the issuance of cashier checks. Salonga was interviewed and was appraised of his constitutional rights during the interview. Salonga admitted that he committed the anomalies and signed a confession. The trial court and the CA convicted Salonga of qualified theft. Salonga contends that his confession is inadmissible as evidence as it violated his constitutional right to counsel.

HELD: The confession was admissible. His right to counsel only existed when he is under custodial investigation. He was not under custodial investigation during his interview. He was interviewed by a bank officer, not a police officer.

Alvarez v. CA
G. R. No. 141801 (June 25, 2001)

FACTS: Alvarez was convicted of the crime of homicide. Alvarez contests the ruling of the court, claiming that the statement of police officer Bugnot testifying that he admitted killing victim in self-defense is inadmissible for being violative of his right to counsel.

HELD: The statement was held to be admissible. No proof was shown that the accused was under custodial investigation. The rights of the accused do not apply to spontaneous statements given in an ordinary manner.

Estelito Remolona v. CSC

G. R. No. 137473 (August 2, 2001)

Facts: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster at Post Office Service in Quezon. He was dismissed from service upon his admission in a preliminary investigation of the CSC that he had paid a certain Atty. Salupadin to acquire a fake eligibility for his wife in the Civil Service Commission. The CSC found him guilty of possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. Estelito now contends that he was deprived of his right to due process because (1) he was not assisted by counsel during preliminary investigation, and (2) he was removed from his position without cause which is contrary to Section 2(3), Article XI B of the Constitution which provides that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause.” It is his contention that although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under CS laws, such act must have been committed in the performance of his function and duty as a Postmaster. Since the charge of dishonesty involves falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife, the same has no bearing on his office.

Held: The right to counsel guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. It is only at this stage that the right to counsel attaches. The exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in administrative investigation. Under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself. Administrative inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees and with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. Admissions by Remolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.

People v. Morial
G. R. No. 129295 (August 15, 2001)

Facts: Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial confession claiming that such confession was made without the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the constitution during a custodial investigation. Apparently, the counsel given to him by the police was not present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend to some personal matters while the interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that he was present when Morial signed the admission.

Held: The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start until the termination of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel “necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.” Section 2A of RA No. 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. … In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted.” Additionally, there was an invalid waiver of the right to counsel since this right cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.

Right to be informed of the charges

People v. Panganiban
G. R. No. 138439-41 (June 25, 2001)

HELD: Although the victim testified that she was raped more than three times, the accused can only be convicted for three counts of rape for which he was charged. To convict him of more than three counts of rape would be to violate the right of the accused to be informed of the accusations against him.

People v. Asoy
G. R. No. 132059 (June 29, 2001)

FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of rape. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty to the charge against him. The trial court convicted him of rape. The accused appeals, contending that he made an improvident plea of guilty.

HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the accused. The information was read to the accused in English. The accused being a probinsyano, he cannot be expected to know of the charges filed against, as he is not accustomed to the English language. The information should have been interpreted in the local dialect for the accused to understand what is being charged against him. For its failure to interpret the information in the local dialect for the accused, the trial court violated the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him.

People v. Supnad
G. R. No. 133791-94 (August 8, 2001)

FACTS: The accused was charged with rape by his 12-year old niece. The trial court convicted him of rape. The sentence was death because the trial court found that the accused was the guardian and was related to the victim. The accused appealed and contended that he can only be convicted of simple rape as the information did not allege the fact that the victim was related to him.

HELD: The Supreme Court sustained the argument of the accused. Since the information did not allege that the accused was related to the victim, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape. Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information to convict the accused of qualified rape. Otherwise, there would be a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges.

People v. Toralba
G. R. No. 139411 (August 9, 2001)

Facts: Agapito Toralba who fathered complainant Cornelia with his own daughter was accused of raping Cornelia. The mother of Cornelia found him raping Cornelia. He was found guilty of qualified rape because Cornelia was mentally retarded. Toralba appealed on the grounds that it is incredulous to suppose that the accused despite his advanced age would design to and succeed in raping a full grown woman. Also, the appeal drew attention to the conduct of the accused at the time of the arrest, when he voluntarily and unresistingly went with the police. Alternatively, the appeal stated if the court should find him guilty of the crime, he should only be convicted of simple rape and not of qualified rape since mental disability of the offended party was not alleged in the information.

Held: There is no inconsistency with the testimonies of Cornelia and her mother. Further, the argument that Toralba was so advanced in age as to render it doubtful for him to have committed the crime is belied by his having been caught inflagrante delicto. Advanced age is not known to render sexual intercourse impossible nor to deter sexual interest and capability. Non-flight is not a conclusive gauge of innocence-it is simply inaction, which may be due to several factors. There is merit however to the contention that Toralba should only be found guilty of simple rape. The information should allege the circumstances which would qualify the crime. If not, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape.

People v. Salalima
G. R. No. 137969-71 (August 15, 2001)

Facts: Rafael Salalima was convicted of three counts of rape and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death by lethal injection for each of the three conviction. Salalima was accused by his step granddaughter, a 13 year old minor of raping her 3 times. Salalima denied the accusations against him claiming that as he was sickly and too old to be capable of the sexual acts being imputed against him. In his appeal, the appellant alleged that the information filed was defective because the date and time of the commission was not stated with particularity, therefore, the indefiniteness of the information deprives him of his right to be informed of the offense charged against him and of the opportunity to prepare his defense. Further, he contends that the death penalty was improperly imposed.

Held: With regards the first issue, the failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The precise date and time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstance enumerated under Art. 335 of the RPC.

With regards to the second issue raised, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. The seven circumstances in Art. 335 of the RPC partake of special qualifying circumstances which must be properly pleaded. If they are not properly pleaded in the information, their proof as such by evidence offered at the trial cannot sanction the imposition of the penalty. The information in the said case failed to allege the relationship of the appellant to the complainant, hence he cannot be convicted under Paragraph 7 of Art. 335 of RPC as amended by Section 11 of RA no. 7659.

People v. Catubig

G. R. No. 137842 (August 23, 2001)

FACTS: The accused was found guilty of raping his 18 year-old daughter on November 27, 1997 and was sentenced to death. The case was brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review and the accused raised the issue that the complaint did not state that he was the victim’s father and that the victim was only 18 years old which are qualifying circumstances under R.A. 7659.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that because the complaint was, in fact, defective, the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty on the accused. Thus, Catubig is only guilty of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Bordomeo
G. R No. 138358-59 (November 19, 2001)

FACTS: Bordomeo was charged with the crime of rape. The RTC convicted him of qualified rape and sentenced him to death. Bordomeo appeals, contending that since the qualifying circumstance of minority or use of deadly weapon was not alleged, he can only be convicted of simple rape.

HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with Bordomeo. Bordomeo can only be convicted of simple rape, not qualified rape. The information did not allege that the victim was a minor, or that Bordomeo used a deadly weapon in raping the victim. To convict Bordomeo of qualified rape is to violate his right to be informed of the charges against him.

Right to counsel

* Cesina Eballa v. Judge Estrellita Paas, Doctolero and Depalobos

A. M. No. MTJ-01-1365 (August 9, 2001)

Facts: Eballa is accused of trespass to dwelling and malicious mischief in a case pending before the respondent judge. Eballa filed a complaint charging Judge Paas with ignorance of the law for having cited her in contempt and ordering her detention, she also claimed violation of her right to choose her own counsel. According to her she requested Judge Paas for postponement of hearing when her cases were called for arraignment because her counsel was absent and she had filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Prosecutor’s Office. Instead of granting her plea, the judge assigned a counsel de officio and ordered the reading of the information in open court with intent to humiliate her. On the other hand, the judge claims that upon reading of the complaint, Eballa made faces at the court which embarrass the judge and therefore she was cited with contempt.

Held: Upon the filing of the complaint or information, jurisdiction of the case lies with the court and the disposition of the case rests upon its sound discretion. Since Eballa filed her motion for reinvestigation with the Prosecutor’s office instead of the court, Judge Paas cannot be faulted for proceeding with complainant’s arraignment. Neither can Eballa claim violation of her right to have counsel of her own choice. Her counsel failed to appear despite due notice to her, and therefore, respondent Judge was justified in appointing a counsel de oficio to assist her during her arraignment. Judge Paas cannot be administratively held liable for citing complainant in contempt and ordering her detention. If complainant believes that she has been cited for contempt without cause, her remedy was to file a petition for certiorari.

Right to a speedy trial

Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 144542 (June 29, 2001)

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari, petitioners ascribe to public respondent Sandiganbayan grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to quash or dismiss Criminal Case No. 23662, which was premised on the ground of inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation amounting to a violation of their constitutional rights to due process of law and to a speedy disposition of the case against them. The prosecution explained the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation by claiming that (a) herein petitioners and their co-accused sought on several occasions for an extension of time to file their counter-affidavits; (b) GIO Tolentino received queries, requests, and other communication, which she had to take into consideration, reply to, and act upon; and (c) the case was transferred to GIO Coresis, who thereafter terminated the investigation.

HELD: The right to “a speedy disposition of cases” is guaranteed by the Constitution. This right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

The first two reasons cited do not justify the delay. Indeed, as pointed out by petitioners, it took them only three months to complete their counter-affidavits. There were several requests or inquiries made. However, not much time was needed to act on those inquiries or requests.

The third cited reason could have been one of the causes of the delay. The case was transferred to GIO Coresis sometime between the last quarter of 1994 and first quarter of 1995 as can be gleaned from the letters on record. He had to go over the lengthy COA report and counter-affidavits of the five respondents, as well as the numerous receipts and other evidence forming part of the “voluminous records.” It took him more or less two years to evaluate the evidence and come up with a resolution. In any event, the delay could scarcely be considered as “vexatious, capricious and oppressive.”

Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. They slept on their right – a situation amounting to laches. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

Licaros v. Sandiganbayan
G. R. No. 145851 (November 22, 2001)

FACTS: A case was filed against the petitioner in the Sandiganbayan. After the presentation of evidence, the case was submitted for decision. The Sandiganbayan did not act on the case for 10 years after it was submitted. The petitioner filed a case before the Supreme Court to have the case dismissed, as there was a violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case.

HELD: Case against petitioner is dismissed. The failure of the Sandiganbayan to resolve the case of petitioner for 10 years after it was submitted to the court for decision without any valid reason violated petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case.

Right of Confrontation

Cariaga v. CA

G. R. No. 143561 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Jonathan Cariaga was charged with the crime of qualified theft. The RTC convicted him and based its ruling on the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court as a witness. Is the sworn statement of Ricardo admissible?

HELD: No. Ricardo was not a witness who cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or unable to testify. He was only subpoenaed once, in which he did not appear. The court was informed that Ricardo was in a place that was 4 hours away from it. The admission of Ricardo’s statement was violative of Jonathan’s right to confront the witnesses against him.

Double Jeopardy

* Sarabia, PNP v. People

G. R. No. 142024 (July 20, 2001)

FACTS: Sarabia, a police officer, poked his gun at two lovers. He forced them to do sexual acts and extorted them for money. A complaint for grave coercion was filed against him by the victims. The MTC convicted him, and its ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The CA denied Sarabia’s appeal. Sarabia now contends that double jeopardy has attached to his case, as the incident in the present case was also the subject of a criminal case for robbery with violence against or intimidation of person wherein he was convicted.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not attach. There was no identity of offenses. The crime of grave coercion is not the same as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of person. The former is not an attempt or a frustration to commit the latter. The former does not necessarily include, and is not necessarily included in the latter.

Argel v. Judge Pascua

A. M. No. RTJ-94-1131 (August 20, 2001)

FACTS: In the case entitled “People v. Miguel Argel,” Judge Pascua rendered a judgment of acquittal in Argel’s favor. However, a lawyer called the judge’s attention to the fact that a witness was able to positively identify the accused and such feat was recorded in the judge’s notes. On the basis of such findings, the judge ordered the arrest of the accused Argel and rendered a new judgment finding Argel guilty of murder. Argel filed an administrative case against the judge for gross ignorance of the law. The question is whether Argel may be convicted of the crime of murder.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Argel cannot be convicted of murder. A judgment of acquittal becomes final upon promulgation. It cannot be amended, recalled or withdrawn by another order after attaining finality. Since Argel was acquitted, Judge Pascua cannot issue another order amending the previous judgment of acquittal, as to do so would place Argel in double jeopardy.

Executive Department

Prohibition on Cabinet Members

De la Cruz v. COA

G. R. No. 138489 (November 29, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Board of Directors of the NHA. The COA disallowed the payment of per diems to each of the petitioners, as this was a violation of the prohibition on extra compensation. Petitioners appealed, claiming that the prohibition does not apply to them, as they are not Executive Department Secretaries. The appeal was denied.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the COA’s ruling. Petitioners were the alternates of Executive Department Secretaries. As such, they are not entitled to extra compensation, inasmuch as their principals cannot claim extra compensation.

State of Rebellion

Lacson v. Perez G.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001)
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,” which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.

HELD: On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.

As to petitioners’ claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary investigations will be conducted.

Moreover, petitioners’ contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informations against the petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case. Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.

Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void since petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition.

Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since such right to relief must be clear at the time of the award.

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty (PMAP), argues that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to interpret what took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest. LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.

Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.

PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Period to Render Decisions

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit v. Judge Arinday, Jr.
A.M. No. 99-5-162-RTC. May 11, 2001

FACTS: An audit showed that on February 19, 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Silay City , Branch 69 had a total caseload of 231 which included twenty-four (24) cases submitted for decision. The Court directed former Judge to explain within ten (10) days from notice why no administrative sanction should be imposed upon him for failure to decide/resolve Criminal Cases and Civil Cases within the reglementary period. Judge explained that he could not decide some of the cases on time either because of unavailability of the transcripts of stenographic notes or delay in the submission of the same; the non-compliance of either the prosecution or the defense in criminal cases with the orders of the court; the motions of inhibitions filed by counsel in civil cases; and the opportunity given to litigants to amicably settle their differences.

HELD: Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Under Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution, lower courts have three months within which to decide cases submitted to them for resolution. The Court has constantly stressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them. On the unavailability of the transcripts of stenographic notes, judges are required to take down notes and to proceed in the preparation of decisions even without the transcripts. The Court has held that the three-month reglementary period continues to run, with or without the transcripts or memoranda, if required.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Castillo

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1634 (October 25, 2001)

FACTS: Respondent Judge allegedly failed to decide a land registration case within the 90 day reglementary period, the case being submitted for decision on December 12, 1995. Although respondent judge explained that a decision has been rendered, Justice Davide ruled that respondent Judge still failed to account for the delay. Hence, it was recommended that an appropriate administrative sanction be imposed against him. The OCA however prayed for the dismissal of the case. They found that the land registration case was actually submitted for decision only on June 24, 1998 after the completion of the ex-parte hearings. The decision was handed down on July 23, 1998 or within the prescribed term.

HELD: Art. 8 Sec 15(1) of the Constitution requires judges of lower courts to decide cases or resolve matters within three months from the date of their submission for resolution. There is no gainsaying, however, that the ninety-day period applied only after the case is submitted for decision, not from the start of the trial. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the Court itself.

Constitutional Commissions

Civil Service Commission Primarily Confidential Positions

Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 131954 (June 28, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners applied for promotional appointment to the position of “Secretary to the Assistant General Manager” or “Private Secretary C”. When their appointments were forwarded to the CSC Field Office, the latter refused to approve petitioners’ appointments as “permanent” on the ground that the position applied for was a “primarily confidential” and “co-terminous” position. This ruling was upheld by the CSC Regional Officeand affirmed on appeal by respondent.

Petitioners contend that respondent abused its power to promulgate rules and regulations by issuing the challenged circular, because the grant of rule-making power to respondent did not authorize it to amend the law by adding to the statutory enumeration. Petitioners conclude that since said memorandum circular was issued in excess of the powers granted to respondent, it is null and void and consequently, the assailed CSC resolution has no leg to stand on.

HELD: In the present case, there is no clear and persuasive showing that respondent grossly abused its discretion or exceeded its powers when it issued the assailed circular. On the contrary, respondent was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve.

Computation of Terminal Leave Pay

Belicena v. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 143190 (October 17, 2001)

FACTS: Former President Ramos designated Belicena as Acting Secretary of Finance for the duration of the trip to Hongkong of Secretary of Finance de Ocampo. He took his oath of office as Acting Secretary on May 22, 1997. For the purposes of computing the terminal leave pay of Belicena, the latter alleges that his highest monthly salary shall be that corresponding to the position of Secretary of Finance.

HELD: When the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary on May 22, 1997, he did so under a well considered opinion that the absence of Secretary de Ocampo was of such an extent that the latter would be unable to perform his duties and by reason of such opinion, the President extended a temporary designation of petitioner under Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

The COA has held that a government official appointed or designated in an acting capacity pursuant to Sec 17 Chap 5 Title 1 Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code is entitled to salary differential and that his highest monthly salary for purposes of computing his terminal leave pay shall include such salary differential. Belicena’s highest monthly salary is that corresponding to position of Sec of Finance which petitioner received while he was Acting Secretary. Highest monthly salary means the highest rate received.

Dishonesty as a Ground for Dismissal

Estelito Remolona v. CSC

G. R. No. 137473 (August 2, 2001)

HELD: Remolona was dismissed for cause. The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.

Neglect of Duty

Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa
G. R. No. 140519 (August 21, 2001)

FACTS: Respondent Thelma Rupa was Human resources Management Officer of the Philippine Retirement Authority, a government agency tasked to promote the Philippines as a retirement destination for foreigners. Her squabbles with PRA Gen. Manager and CEO Atty. Paco started when, tasked to convert the retirees deposits into investments, she refused to do so for two Indian nationals. Similar incidents occurred wherein she refused to do her task saying she cannot be rushed. She was then reassigned to another post which she refused to assume. Thus, she was charged with three (3) offenses: Insubordination, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and Neglect of Duty in the Civil Service Commission. The CSC found respondent guilty of the grave offense of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service solely for neglecting to promptly process the requests of the two (2) Indian retirees. She was meted the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay. The CSC absolved the respondent from the other charges. However, the CA found the respondent guilty of the less grave offense of simple neglect of duty and imposed on her the lesser penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay. The PRA contends that the CA erred in modifying the decision.

HELD: Gross Neglect of Duty denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. Simple Neglect of Duty, however, signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. The SC found that the respondent was properly adjudged guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty. The respondent’s offense is not grave or odious as to amount to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service or Gross Neglect of Duty.

Security of Tenure
Adiong v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 136480. (December 4, 2001)

FACTS: Mayor Batua issued a permanent appointment to Nuska to the position of Municipal Local Civil Registrar. On June 30, 1995, Mayor Adiong issued a memorandum informing all municipal employees of the termination of their appointment and directing them to clear themselves from money and property accountabilities. On July 1, 1995, another memorandum clarified this by specifying that the mass termination of services applied only to temporary or casual workers and requiring those holding approved permanent appointments to submit copies of their appointments. Due to respondent Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her appointment coupled with her failure to make a courtesy call on the petitioner as the new mayor, he terminated her services and appointed a certain Samporna in her stead. Nuska appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which held that the termination of the services of Nasiba A. Nuska as Municipal Local Registrar not in order.

HELD: The petition is without merit. In this case, respondent Nuska had a permanent appointment to the position of municipal civil registrar. She thus enjoyed security of tenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee in the civil service and as a civil service eligible, respondent Nuska is entitled to the benefits, rights and privileges extended to those belonging to the classified service. She could not be removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process. Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform. Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge. In this case, respondent Nuska's failure to perform her duties was involuntary and cannot be considered as acquiescence.

Commission on Audit

Olaguer v. Domingo

G. R. No. 109666 (June 20, 2001)

FACTS: The NHMFC resident auditor conducted an audit. The auditor resolved to disallow the loan granted to the SPCDFI-AMAKO and to hold petitioners liable for granting the loan. The COA affirmed the ruling of the auditor. Petitioners filed a case questioning the COA’s ruling holding them liable and disallowing the loan.

ISSUE: Should the ruling of the COA be upheld?

HELD: The COA’s ruling is affirmed. Rulings made by government agencies in the exercise of their special technical knowledge and training will be respected. More so if the ruling is affirmed and reaffirmed along the administrative hierarchy.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Powers of the Ombudsman

Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman and Judge Alumbres

G.R. No. 132177. (July 19, 2001)

FACTS: Because of a physical altercation, Judge A filed against Judge C, before the Ombudsman, a criminal complaint for physical injuries, etc. Judge A also filed an administrative complaint with the SC, praying for the dismissal of Judge C from the judiciary.

Judge C, instead of responding to the complaint with a counter-affidavit as was required by the Ombudsman, filed for referral of the matter to the SC – this was denied by the Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD: No. The Ombudsman only has primary and not exclusive jurisdiction. It cannot deprive the SC of its constitutionally vested power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.

Nava v. COA

G.R. No. 136470 (October 16, 2001)

FACTS: Commission on Audit conducted an audit investigation on the procurement of the DECS Division Office of Davao City of school construction materials for its 1991 School Building Program. Report revealed that the items sold to DECS exceeded the prevailing market prices in the city ranging from 6.09% to 695.45%, resulting to a government loss. Report was transmitted to the Deputy Ombudsman. The latter, finding prima facie evidence to proceed with preliminary investigation, ordered petitioner to file their answer. Nava denied the charges. But the Ombudsman still issued a resolution finding sufficient evidence to hold that there was a violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A complaint was later filed before the Sandiganbayan. Nevertheless, the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges, which was disapproved by Ombudsman Desierto.

HELD: Ombudsman Desierto did not commit grave abuse of discretion. In disapproving the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor, Desierto was merely exercising his powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. His determination of the existence of a reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof, is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. There is a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally-mandated powers.

Judge Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
G.R. No. 124295 (October 23, 2001)

ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

HELD: No. RA 6770, Sec. 21 provides that the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

Recovery of Ill-gotten Wealth

Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto

G.R. No. 137777 (October 2, 2001)

FACTS: Former President Ramos issued A.O. 13 creating the Presidential Adhoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans to make an inventory of all alleged behest loans, determine the parties involved therein and recommend appropriate actions to be pursued by the government. Among the accounts referred to the Committee for investigation was the loan account of the Bukidnon Sugar Milling Co. (BUSCO) which has been transferred and assigned by the PNB. Committee concluded that loan between PNB and BUSCO bore characteristics of a behest loan specifically for not having been secured with sufficient collateral and obtained with undue haste. PCGG then filed a sworn complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the RA 3019 against directors and officials of BUSCO. BUSCO alleged that the complaint of PCGG is barred by prescription having been filed more than twenty years after the approval of the alleged behest loan. PCGG on the other hand alleged that the date of discovery of the offense should be the reckoning point for computing the prescriptive period since the acquisition of the loan was attended with fraud and that Art. 11, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution provides that prescription does not apply to actions for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth Ombudsman later dismissed the complaint of PCGG.

HELD: The prescriptive period for the offenses with which BUSCO was charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. It is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. The sole basis for the dismissal of the complaint was insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause. To insulate the Ombudsman from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers.

Coconut Levy Funds

Republic v. COCOFED
G.R. Nos. 147062-64. December 14, 2001

FACTS: Executive Order No. 14 empowered the PCGG to sequester shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged "one million coconut farmers," the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. (hereinafter "Cojuangco") purchased with the Coco Levy funds. The PCGG voted on the sequestered UCPB shares. A petition was filed to enjoin the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the respective names of the more than one million coconut farmers The court gave them their rights to vote their shares of stock and themselves to be voted upon in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) at the scheduled Stockholders' Meeting. A petition was filed questioning this.

HELD: This Court holds that the government should be allowed to continue voting those shares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut levy funds -- funds that are prima facie public in character or, at the very least, are "clearly affected with public interest." At the outset, it is necessary to restate the general rule that the registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. This principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. Coconut funds are levied for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers. The coconut levy funds are likened to the sugar levy funds, both being special public funds acquired through the taxing and police powers of the State. The COA audit shows the public nature of the funds and the BIR has pronounced that the coconut levy funds are taxes. Laws governing coconut levies recognize their public nature. Having been acquired with public funds, UCPB shares belong, prima facie, to the Government.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Classification of Land

Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106763. (May 9, 2001)

FACTS: On 1964, the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, represented by its Mayor, Pablo G. Sarino, pursuant to Act No. 3312 and Municipal Resolution No. 89 as amended by Resolution No. 289. Prior to the sale, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Brigida Francisco, had been in possession of the subject lot and paid the real estate taxes thereon as early as 1907. The land was registered in their name. 25 years later, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the decision for registration, alleging that the registration proceedings were null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the parcels of land subject thereof were still classified as forest land, having been released therefrom only on February 21, 1972; that the OSG was not furnished with a copy of the application for registration and other records as mandated by Section 51, of the Public Land Act; and that the applicants have not shown possession and occupation of the lands in the manner and for the length of time required by section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.

HELD: A scrutiny of the foregoing documents fails to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land prior to its release as alienable and disposable in February 21, 1972. The aforesaid Land Classification Map drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1965 merely shows that the subject lots were part of a big tract of land in Bacoor, Cavite which was certified and declared as alienable or disposable land. The Republic does not stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the said parcels of land had already been declared alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion in favor of the Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to other private persons.

Proscription against Aliens in Acquiring Private Lands

Lee v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 128195 (October 3, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of title of a certain lot of the Capiz Cadastre. Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of a Chinese national, Lee Liong. The Register of Deeds issued a certification that a TCT was issued in the name of their predecessor but the records were burned during the war. Hence, RTC ordered reconstitution of the lost certificate of title. However, Solgen filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment alleging that petitioners were not proper parties since their predecessor did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese national and constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. CA ruled in favor of the Solgen.

ISSUE: Whether the predecessor has qualification to own land in the Philippines

HELD: Sale of the land was consummated sometime in March 1936 during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under such constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong was disqualified. In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. The proper party to assail the sale is the Solgen. He can initiate an action for reversion or escheat.

However, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens so the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title is rendered valid.

Franchises

Del Mar v. PAGCOR

G. R. 138298 (August 24, 2001)

FACTS: Respondents sought a clarification of the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration, namely: a. whether PAGCOR itself has a valid franchise to conduct jai-alai games, and b. whether PAGCOR can operate, maintain or manage jai-alai games in association with BELLE and FILGAME

HELD: The court ruled that only PAGCOR alone possesses a valid franchise to operate, maintain and/or manage jai-alai games. PAGCOR may not operate jai-alai games in association with BELLE and FILGAME.

Administrative Law

Delegation of Power to Hear Cases

Mollaneda v. Umacob

G. R. No. 140128 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Mollaneda was charged with sexual harassment. The records were elevated to the CSC, which designated Atty. Buena as the hearing officer. After the hearing, the CSC issued a resolution finding Mollaneda guilty of the charges. Mollaneda appealed to the CA, which upheld the findings of the CSC. Did the CA err in giving weight to the findings of the CSC?

HELD: No. An administrative agency can delegate the power to hear and receive evidence to a hearing officer, as long as the administrative body makes its own independent conclusions. Such findings shall be conclusive upon the courts.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106028. (May 9, 2001)

FACTS: Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), signed by the respondent DAR Regional Director where she was directed to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was ordered to pay the petitioner an aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for the two parcels of land. Gonzales claims in her petition for CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION that she never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her land. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

HELD: Questions as to the propriety of the issuance could have still been raised before the proper administrative forum. Instead of going directly to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, the petitioner should have sought redress in the DARAB, and the latter's officials should have been given an opportunity to review the matter and resolve the controversy. The Court was not convinced that any of the exceptions to the rule obtains here. The issue is not to be resolved by the Court of Appeals in the first instance on certiorari.

Garcia v. CA

G. R. No. 100579 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Leandro Garcia was charged with an administrative case. He asked for postponement of hearing and for the creation of a new investigating committee. The PCA governing board denied the request. Leandro filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC.

ISSUE: Can Leandro file the petition without exhausting administrative remedies ?

HELD: No. When administrative remedies are still available, a recourse through the courts is unavailing. Courts should not take cognizance of a case the jurisdiction of which lies with an administrative body.

Bordallo v. The Professional Regulations Commission

G. R. No. 140920 (November 19, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners in this case took the examinations for the marine deck officers. The PRC informed petitioners of the results of the exam. Petitioners were said to have failed the exams, as they were not able to obtain the passing mark of 75%. Petitioners protested and filed a petition with the Board of Marine Deck Officers. The Board denied the petition. On appeal to the CA, the CA ruled against petitioners as petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Is there a need for petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD: No. The general rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, as when the case involves pure questions of law. The case at hand involves pure questions of law. The issue boils down as to what law to apply in order to determine the passing mark for the marine deck officer’s exam, whether it be the law setting the passing mark at 70%, or the law setting the passing mark at 75%. The CA and the Board applied the law that was already repealed by a subsequent law lowering the passing mark to 70%.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Crisostomo Magat, et al. vs. Albert M. Delizo, et al.
G.R. No. 135199 (July 5, 2001)

FACTS: Slim Realty sold a piece of property to the Delizo spouses. Slim refused to receive payment until it had delivered title to the spouses. The spouses filed a complaint for specific performance with the RTC, where the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement. The Magat spouses, to whom Slim had previously sold the property, filed a Motion to Declare the Proceeding Null and Void alleging that the complaint for specific performance involved a subdivision lot, which was exclusively cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 1344 and not by the trial court.

HELD: There is no showing that the property was a subdivision lot or condominium as to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. The complaint simply stated that the subject matter was a “piece of real estate.” The records strongly suggest that the property involved was simply a house and lot. The controversy is thus cognizable by the trial court.

Castro v. Gloria

G. R. NO. 132174 (August 20, 2001)

FACTS: Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central School, Barili, Cebu. It was alleged that he had an illicit affair with Gutang’s wife, petitioner’s co-teacher at the same school. Castro was dismissed by the DECS Regional Director. He then filed a motion to set aside the decision which was ultimately denied by Secretary Gloria of DECS. Thereafter, Castro filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC asking it to set aside the order of dismissal and reduce it to a one-year suspension.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies since the Civil Service Commission still has the power to review, revise or modify the Secretary’s order. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

Election Law

Party-list systems

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC

G. R. No. 147589 (June 26, 2001)

ISSUE: Can political parties participate in the party-list elections?

HELD: Yes. Political parties can participate in the party-list elections. The Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a paty-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution also allows political parties to register under the party-list system. However, the candidates of political parties must be those: a. who belong to marginalized and under represented sectors, organizations and parties; and b. who lack well-defined constituencies; but c. who could contribute to the formation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

Public Officers

Confidential Employees

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza

G. R. 141141 (June 25, 2001)

FACTS: Rilloraza was a casino operations manager. He was dismissed by PAGCOR for gross misconduct, dishonesty and loss of confidence. The CSC and CA found Rilloraza guilty only of simple negligence. PAGCOR contends that since Rilloraza is a confidential employee, he may be dismissed for lack of confidence.

HELD: Rilloraza is not a confidential appointee. Although his tasks require faith and confidence in his competence to perform it, such does not by any means elevate Rilloraza’s position as primarily confidential. It is the nature, not the name of the position, that classifies it as primarily confidential.

Liability

Olaguer v. Domingo

G. R. No. 109666 (June 20, 2001)

FACTS: The NHMFC resident auditor conducted an audit. The auditor resolved to disallow the loan granted to the SPCDFI-AMAKO and to hold petitioners liable for granting the loan. The COA affirmed the ruling of the auditor. Petitioners filed a case questioning the COA’s ruling holding them liable and disallowing the loan.

ISSUE: Are petitioners liable for the grant of the loan?

HELD: Petitioners are liable. Although they did not personally approve the loan, nevertheless, they exercised the power of processing, evaluating and reviewing the applications for the loan. In effect, they had a hand in the grant of the loan.

Immorality

Lauro v. Lauro

A. M. No. P-91-642 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Efren Lauro was charged with having illicit relations with Nida Montante. Documents signed by Nida identifying herself as Lauro’s spouse were shown to prove Efren’s illicit relationship with Nida.

ISSUE: Is Efren administratively liable?

HELD: Yes. Disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense under Rule XIV, Sec. 2(o) of the Civil Service Rules.

Floria v. Sunga

A. M. No. CA 01-10-P (November 14, 2001)

FACTS: Floria, a CA employee, was charged in an administrative case with immorality for having illicit relations with Rodrigo, a married man. She is also charged with falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth, as she indicated therein that she was married to Rodrigo when in fact she was not. Floria alleged that she did not know that Rodrigo was married and that she terminated her relationship with Rodrigo upon knowing that he was married. The complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE: Is Floria liable?

HELD: Floria is liable. A public officer is bound to observe the highest standard of morality. Floria should have investigated the civil status of Rodrigo before entering into a relationship with him. Normally, this is what women do when they enter into a relationship with a man. Her defense could have been sustained were it not for the fact that Rodrigo’s wife was also an employee of the CA. Furthermore, the case cannot be dismissed simply because she broke up with Rodrigo. The stigma of immorality still attaches to Floria who as a public officer is sworn to uphold the highest standards of morality.

Public Corporations

Prefatory: Due to lack of current jurisprudence on this subject matter, respective Pubcorp cases found in last year’s digests are included.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
G.R. NO. 135962 (March 27, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent filed a case against petitioner enjoining them from opening the Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Hence this petition.

HELD: The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune Street which was not mandated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City, is illegal.

Powers

Expropriation

Heirs Of Suguitan v. City Of Mandaluyong
G.R. NO. 139087 (March 14, 2000)
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Suguitan. The city filed a complaint for expropriation when Suguitan refused to sell the property. The city later assumed possession of the property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court. The court later issued an order of expropriation. Petitioners argue that the local government unit’s delegated power of eminent domain must be exercised through the issuance of an ordinance, not by mere resolution.

HELD: The law may delegate the power of eminent domain to local government units that shall exercise the same through an ordinance. The local government unit failed to comply with this requirement when they exercised their power of eminent domain through a resolution. The Local Government Code’s requirement of an ordinance prevails over the Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring the issuance of a resolution.

Power To Sue And Be Sued

Mancenido v. CA
G.R. NO. 118605(April 12, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioners, who are public school teachers, filed a case against the provincial officials to compel them to pay their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition for review on certiorari, they argue that the CA erred in recognizing the authority of the council of the provincial officials to file a notice of appeal.

HELD: The SC held that in resolving whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In view of the damages sought in the case at bar which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to be improperly represented by private counsel.

Registration Of Tricycle And Licensing Of Drivers

Land Transportation Office v. City Of Butuan
322 SCRA 805
FACTS: The issue in this case is whether under the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to local government units.

HELD: The SC ruled that the registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB. Under the Local Government Code, LGUs have the power to regulate the operation of tricycle for hire and to grant franchise for the operation thereof.

Qualification Of Local Elective Officials

Torayno v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran for mayor.

HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

Legislation
Malonzo v. Zamora
323 SCRA 875
FACTS: A supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon three readings held on the same day. They were charged with misconduct.

HELD: There is no law prohibiting the holding of the three readings of a proposed ordinance in one session day.

Recall
Afiado v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 141787 (September 18, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition asking for the annulment of a resolution calling for the recall of the vice-mayor. The barangay officials in a preparatory recall assembly passed this resolution. The proclaimed mayor at that time was the son of the previous mayor who had already served for 3 consecutive terms. The father ran for a 4th term but withdrew, and was substituted by the son. The opponent filed a petition asking for the annulment of the substitution. When the SC ruled that the substitution was invalid, the vice-mayor became the mayor. Hence this petition.

HELD: The specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to revive the vice-mayor. However, the resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor anymore, since she gave up the office of vice-mayor when she assumed the position of mayor.