POPPER'S FALSIFICATIONISM- USEFUL BUT NOT DEFINITIVE
POPPER’S FALSIFICATIONISM- USEFUL BUT NOT DEFINITIVE
Karl Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery developed a theory of falsificationism as a guide to how science should be conducted, and as a demarcation principle to differentiate between science and pseudoscience. This principle I hold, though useful, is not definitive, and does not serve as an adequate guide to scientific practice. This essay will present the case to defend this thesis, first by clearly explicating falsificationism and showing what ways it is useful, presenting two arguments against the theory and responding to an objection. This will show why Popper’s falsificationism is useful but not a definitive guide to scientific practice.
Before the reasons why falsificationism is not a definitive guide to scientific practice, falsification theory itself must be made clear. Falsificationism was intended as a means to draw a clear line between science and pseudo science1 and to be a way of making deductive, as opposed to inductive reasoning central in science2. In essence, it states that a bona fide scientific theory or hypothesis is one that is in principle falsifiable3. There has to be some kind of test that could yield results contrary to the content of the theory4. As a result, theories that are very vaguely worded, or that cover all possible cases cannot be taken to be scientific theories. For some examples, the basic theory that “metals expand when heated” can in principle be proven false by testing the theory to find if there are any metals that do not expand when heated. Hence, that particular theory is a real scientific theory according to Popper’s principle. A claim or theory is pseudoscientific then if it cannot be falsified, for example Marxist theory. To paraphrase Popper, if the totality of observation statements is like a circle, a valid scientific theory is one that excludes at least one possible state of affairs, like having a radius in a circle5.
The last paragraph
Karl Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery developed a theory of falsificationism as a guide to how science should be conducted, and as a demarcation principle to differentiate between science and pseudoscience. This principle I hold, though useful, is not definitive, and does not serve as an adequate guide to scientific practice. This essay will present the case to defend this thesis, first by clearly explicating falsificationism and showing what ways it is useful, presenting two arguments against the theory and responding to an objection. This will show why Popper’s falsificationism is useful but not a definitive guide to scientific practice.
Before the reasons why falsificationism is not a definitive guide to scientific practice, falsification theory itself must be made clear. Falsificationism was intended as a means to draw a clear line between science and pseudo science1 and to be a way of making deductive, as opposed to inductive reasoning central in science2. In essence, it states that a bona fide scientific theory or hypothesis is one that is in principle falsifiable3. There has to be some kind of test that could yield results contrary to the content of the theory4. As a result, theories that are very vaguely worded, or that cover all possible cases cannot be taken to be scientific theories. For some examples, the basic theory that “metals expand when heated” can in principle be proven false by testing the theory to find if there are any metals that do not expand when heated. Hence, that particular theory is a real scientific theory according to Popper’s principle. A claim or theory is pseudoscientific then if it cannot be falsified, for example Marxist theory. To paraphrase Popper, if the totality of observation statements is like a circle, a valid scientific theory is one that excludes at least one possible state of affairs, like having a radius in a circle5.
The last paragraph
Bibliography: Caws, Peter. The Philosophy of Science. Princeton, New Jersey; D. Van Nostrand Company Inc. 1965. Chalmers, Alan. What is this Thing Called Science? Queensland; University of Queensland Press. 1976 Duhem, Pierre Hansson, Sven Ove. Falsificationism Falsified. Foundations of Science. Volume 11. Issue 3. 2006. Pp. 275-286. Last accessed Second of September 2013. DOI: 10.1007/s10699-004-5922-1 Hume, David Kemeny, John G. A Philosopher Looks at Science. Princeton, New Jersey; D Van Nostrand Company Inc. 1959. Law, Stephen. Eyewitness Companions: Philosophy. London; Dorling Kindersley Limited. 2007. McGrath, Alister E. Science and Religion: An Introduction. Massachusetts; Blackwell Publishers. 1999. Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London, New York; Routeledge. 2002 Popper, Karl R Popper, Karl R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York; Basic Books Inc. 1959. Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, New York; Routeledge. 1992 Quine, Willard Van Orman Schlipp, Paul Arthur. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Illinois; The Library of Living Philosophers. 1974.