Preference Utilitarianism Vs Hedonism

The Hedonistic utilitarianism’s view is that happiness is the ultimate good. According to two hedonistic utilitarian philosophers, Bentham and Mill, happiness is the surplus over pain and everything we do is motivated by a desire to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. Preference utilitarianism, on the other hand, is the view that what is good for a person and what is good overall is determined entirely by people’s preferences. In what follows, I will argue that Preference utilitarianism is not more plausible than Hedonistic utilitarianism.
Hare, a preference utilitarian, view is that human logic applies to moral assertions and that moral judgements can be made in terms of people’s preferences. According to Hare, there are two levels of moral
thinking, namely intuitive and critical. Intuitively people apply prima facie (latin term meaning “on the first appearance”) principles that they learn from others during upbringing and past encounters to moral situations. However, intuitive moral thinking is not sufficient because at least two moral presumptions may clash when applying to a new moral dilemma. Hence, we must resort to critical thinking. As indicated by Hare, the process of critical moral thinking involves consider people’s preferences, and thereby thinking in a preference utilitarian way and the good is that which is subjectively preferred. Hare seems to deny that objective moral principles (those regarding good and evil) exist, which I disagree with. We intuitively hold moral judgements, and these are just as important as consequences of actions or preferences . There are moral situations where common sense prevails, and limited reflection or justification is required. We simply ought not to do certain actions because they are evil . Although I agree with Hare that moral intuitions are not sufficient in moral decision making, morals are complex and therefore preferences are unquestionably not by any means the only considerations in making moral judgements. (Simoes)
Further to the above, Hare’s preference view on moral judgements is based on universal prescriptivism which means that moral judgements are prescriptions, not statements, and therefore cannot be true or false (Hare). I agree with Henry Sidgwick’s view, an objectivist, in that moral judgements can be objectively true. Across human cultures there exist some basic standards of morality and a nearly universal human intuition that certain things are objectively right or wrong. Objectivism increases the appeal on hedonistic utilitarianism that happiness is the ultimate good. Happiness is not merely a subjective assessment of one’s own psychological state, but a state of consciousness that is the psychological aspect of living one’s life as a human being (Objectivism in depth). It is this state of consciousness that one wish to continue. The pleasure and pain mechanisms and our emotions exist to help us to live. They warn us against disvalue and urge us towards valuable things . I further agree with the understanding of Sidgwick that pleasure is the ultimate value, however, a broad notion of pleasure is required, and that pleasure is much more than sensory pleasures. An example of this is intellectual exercise (Skelton). Happiness consists of living a human life, achieving worthwhile pursuits. I prefer the view of Sidgwick in that nothing is intrinsically good unless it has some relation to consciousness to the view of preference utilitarianism that people’s preferences count even when they do not know whether they have come true or not. A person may also prefer something that does not actually change their state of consciousness.
Nozick’s pleasure experience machine is a powerful machine to reject hedonistic utilitarianism as the desire theory does not locate ultimate value in mental states alone.
According to Nozick we do not want to plug into Nozick’s pleasure experience machine which means that other experiences matter other than conscious experiences . It also shows that we desire to live in contact with reality. (Tann book). Peter Singer, once an unmistakable preference utilitarian, has moved away and now consider himself a hedonist. I agree with Peter Singer when he states that we need to appreciate the strengths of intuitions that we have against plugging into the machine. Singer compares these intuitions with the intuitions we have for not wanting to drink a glass of apple juice if a sterilized cockroach has been dipped into it (experience done by Jonathan Haidt). Intellectually we know that the juice is harmless i.e. the cockroach has no diseases, however our intuitions tell us that this is simply gross. These intuitions are the result of our nature of purpose human beings i.e. we act purposely, and immediate pleasures are overridden for the sake of larger purposes also known as the paradox of hedonism. Therefore Nozick’s experience machine is not sufficient reason for abandoning hedonism in favour of preference
utilitarianism.
A serious flaw in preferentialism is interpersonal comparisons as it is difficult to compare the strengths of individuals’ preferences.
Mainstream economic theory denies that interpersonal comparisons between intensities of preferences are possible . If such comparisons are impossible, it is even more difficult to see that comparisons between past, present and future preferences of a single person fare any better. My future self is not available to examination now. It is not much easier to tell what my preferences would be if I could dispose of some preferences that I now want to dispose of. Interpersonal comparisons of happiness or pleasure, on the other hand, even if they are difficult to make with any precision, are meaningful, at any rate . Edgeworth and Bentham seem not to have found interpersonal comparisons of well-being problematic. A hedonistic unit can be found to measure how much the circumstance of one individual is enhanced when a specific change is achieved, when contrasted with how much the circumstance of someone else is impoverished. It is sensible to acknowledge that sub-noticeable differences of well-being are morally important, and the smallest sub-noticeable distinction ought to be taken as our unit in our moral calculations. The estimation is in two measurements, intensity and time and the classical utilitarian formula should be based on felt time as opposed to physical time. In contrast to preference utilitarianism, the overall plausibility of
interpersonal comparisons in hedonistic utilitarianism can be rationally sustained. (Tann book)
Utility assignments are a constraint of preference utilitarianism as the observed preference of the person should be respected. The example that Tomazik uses is when people say they are happy to be alive as opposed to temporarily unconscious, we ought to take this at face value and assume their lives are above zero at that moment. In contrast, hedonistic utilitarianism allows for substantial flexibility in deciding how much pleasure or pain a given ordeal involves. For instance, negative-inclining utilitarians can set the misery estimation of an exceptionally agonizing experience as significantly more negative than a more positive-inclining hedonistic utilitarian would (Tomazik).Hedonic emotions are just tallied when they are encountered, in this manner Hedonistic utilitarianism keeps away from the mess that intertemporal preference utilitarianism appears to generate on the grounds that past, present, and future organisms would all be able to at the same time have preferences about their past, present, and future selves. Although organisms may have verifiable admired preferences about everything at each minute , they just experience particular feelings at a given minute . (Tomazik)
I conclude that preferential utilitarianism is less plausible than hedonistic utilitarianism. I cannot comprehend that anything will matter if no-one is getting any enjoyment out of anything. People do have preferences however, why we have them, is that they are a response to a perception of something good.