Primary Divine Attributes: A Comparative Analysis

1. The three primary divine attributes:

Omnipotence: God has maximal powerful, is all powerful, capable of doing anything Omniscience: God is all seeing and all knowing Omnibenevolence: God does only good, God is morally perfect and is considered the source of morality

Two secondary divine attributes: Omniprescence: God is present everywhere at the same time Incorporeal: God is not composed of matter, has no material existence

2. The Thomistic Account of Omnipotence states that x is omnipotent, by definition for any logically possible state of affairs, o, it is possible for x to bring it about that o.

The Cartesian Account of Omnipotence states that x is omnipotent
By definition, omnipotence means that God is all powerful and capable of doing anything. Omnipotence is also a divine attribute of God. In line 1 Mavrodes presents two possible states of affairs. In line two he asserts the possibility of God not being able to do something, create a stone that he cannot life, which is the assertion of the first part of line one, thereby exhibiting limits upon His power. In line three he asserts the limitations that appear if God can create a stone that he cannot lift, thereby, also, not performing an action, and so it would seem, that God's omnipotence can be called into question.

This argument is valid and is in modus tollens form. It is valid because the assertion in line 4 logically follows from lines 1 through 3. However, the argument is not sound. Mavrodes attempts to show that God's omnipotence is paradoxical, for it appears that there is something that God cannot perform, as in not being able to create a stone which he cannot lift.

One objection to this argument can be found in line 3, per Saint Thomas' account of omnipotence which states that God is omnipotent by definition, that for any logically possible state of affairs, it is possible for God to bring something about.

This would show that the paradox is inconsistent with the definition of God's omnipotence. Simply because God, or something cannot perform a certain task, it does not mean
Ontological arguments are a priori, they begin with some prior claim about the concept of God, and deduce conclusions or proof from this conception. In line two, he asserts that if God, or x is the most perfect object thought, it then follows also that x exists either in the understanding or reality. Line 3 follows from this assertion. In line 4 Anselm asserts that if x exists in the understanding only, then something else greater can be thought and that being greater, it then must exist in reality. In line 5 he restates his assertion in line one, and concludes that x then exists in reality.

This argument is valid and is modus tollens. Ontological arguments are often accused of defining something into existence, one can show the nature of God, but cannot, in doing so, prove His existence. I do not feel that this argument is sound. I feel that it leaps from the notion of something existing in the understanding to the notion that it exists in reality without developing a clear concept or understanding of how that happens.