This can expose the anxieties and pressures faced by the guards within the prison environment. A number of authors (Conover, 2001; Crouch, 1980; Lombardo, 1989) have pointed to common characteristics in those choosing a career in corrections. In particular, they note that people do not typically aspire to become prison guards; rather, seeking this work is often a reaction to the need for employment or is the result of unexpected job changes. For most seeking positions as guards, job security and a regular salary are vital. In many rural areas, working in the prison system represents the only form of employment, and the prison offers the opportunity to remain in the local environment, rather than having to travel to the city for work. Lombardo explains that about one-third of the officers that he interviewed at the Auburn Prison considered danger and mental tension as the most dissatisfying parts of their job. For example, Connover ( 2001 ) reports one incident in Sing Sing involving an inmate who had been sweeping the flats outside the cells with a push broom. When another inmate appeared, the inmate attacked him, broke the broom handle over his head, and then attempted to spear his face with the splintered ends of the broom. Most guards considered prison violence a constant possibility that might result from the seemingly arbitrary events, and they believed in their ability to sense the likelihood of violence through their awareness of behavior patterns within the prison. Guards frequently experience personal challenges from inmates. Security and control are the fundamental tenets of guard work because inmate misconduct not only threatens the prison order, but also may impact the guards' personal safeties (Crouch and Marquart, 1980). This concern for security and order tends to cause guards to view any event that interrupts the prison routine suspiciously. For instance, the entry of outside prison treatment personnel into the prison is a particular cause of concern for most guards. This is for the fact that most of the guards believe that the incomers know very little about the inmates, thus, they fail to appreciate the need for constant security (Klofas, 1984). Nonetheless, guard attacks on inmates have been greatly reduced because prisons are now far more open to outsiders. However, when there is physical conflict between a guard and an inmate, and force is used to bring the inmate under control, inmates commonly claim that the guard "gets in a few extra licks". According to Crouch and Marquart (1980), an additional tenet of guard work taught to new recruits is the need to maintain social distance from the inmates. Also, guards must maintain the approach that they seem to be "tough, knowledgeable, and able to handle inmates". Guards are concerned about the lack of inmate understanding of their situation, especially in view of the fact that the inmates want the guards to understand their position. Some guards pointed to the sarcasm and perpetual insults they receive from inmates on a daily basis, which they say creates a hostile environment for their workplace (Lombardo, 1989). Similarly, guards feel that they lack the support of their supervisors and administrators. They see themselves as working against everyone, and feel isolated from both the inmates and supervisors. This type of situation also appears in Robert Johnson's "Hard Time" book, where he discusses the fine line as to where supervisors draw the proverbial line of socialization between the guards and the inmates. Johnson goes on to write that while guards tend to make the life of an inmate's stay at a prison as comfortable as possible, these types of actions are frowned upon. Because of this, correctional officers seem to be at odds as to how to perform their duties in such an environment. Webb and Morris (1980) found that guards perceived prison administrators as outsiders with political connections whose main focus was to look good, and who did not posses the guards' knowledge of the institution and the inmate population. The notion that a guard's authority over inmates can become corrupted is well established in correctional studies, and is frequently referred to as ethical misconduct.
In essence, "corruption of authority" refers to a practice by guards of deliberately refraining from enforcing prison rules and regulations. Contrasting police and prison guards' use of discretion, Lombardo (1989) notes that when a policeman decides whether and how to enforce the law, this decision is considered an exercise of his or her discretion. However, when a guard decides when and how to enforce rules, his or her decision is constructed as an exercise in corruption of authority. This is because that deciding not to enforce the rules is perceived by guards as necessary to gain inmate cooperation, and is a reflection of the guards' relative powerlessness. Both decisions are exercised with discretion, but the police action is cast in positive terms, while the guards' decision is cast in negative terms. By the guards' discretion being viewed in a negative light, it reflects that the general perception of guard work being distasteful, unrewarding, and of low, non-professional status. Crouch and Marquart (1980) summarize two other forms of potential corruption. The first is the loss of authority that may arise when guards become too friendly with inmates, and fail to maintain the required social distance, sentiments echoed by Robert Johnson. This may be particularly prevalent with new recruits when the new …show more content…
guard feels him or herself to be closer to the inmates rather than the superiors. The second form of potential corruption involves handing over guard tasks to the inmate. When inmates carry out duties such as mail delivery and housekeeping, the guards may become dependent on their labor and, to that extent, their authority may be undermined. Webb and Morris (1980), in their interviews with guards, found that although guards frequently commented on the need for discipline, and thought that strict discipline was good for inmates, they were also quick to point out the need not to go strictly by the book. They contend that rules are made to be broken, and that a commonsense approach had to be taken in applying discipline. Hepburn (1989) discusses how guards operate as agents of social control, and how they draw attention to the "role ambiguity" that guards experience as a result of having to perform both treatment and custodial roles. The treatment role requires that guards demonstrate helping behaviors, enforce the rules with discretion, and establish a degree of personal relations with inmates. In contrast, the custodial role calls for impersonal relationships, a controlling demeanor, and complete enforcement of prison rules. Role ambiguity is created when vague or contradictory instructions determine how the role is to be exercised. While guards are expected to show flexibility and discretion, they are still liable to be disciplined themselves if they violate or allow inmates to violate prison rules. Guards are also dependent on prisoners for their own physical safety, and they depend on inmates for the successful fulfillment of their duties (Hepburn, 1989). For example, inmates may resist guard control through work slowdowns or an increase in disciplinary problems. This tends to focus the prison administration on a guard's inability to maintain control. Guards may have to depend on prisoner cooperation to demonstrate their ability to manage prisoners and to obtain recognition and promotion. The most obvious fact about the prison environment is that guards are vested with power and authority over the prisoners. For the most part, guards exercise power to control them, in accordance with the prison rules and regulations. A number of studies have attempted to explain the basis and nature of this coercive power and authority. It is the exercise of this power that creates ethical issues and dilemmas. In his depicture of power in the prisons, Hepburn (1985) lists five forms of power: legitimate power, coercive power, reward power, expert power, and referent power. When defining legitimate power, the guard is invested with authority to command as a result of his or her position as a guard of prisoners. It is the position of guard itself within the correctional facility that confers the right to give instructions and to be obeyed (Hepburn, 1985). In other words, a guard's orders are obeyed because they are the orders of a guard, and the prisoner complies by virtue of his or her status as a prisoner.
Coercive power is based on an inmate's perceptions that guards have the capacity to punish prisoner disobedience. Correctional officers who rely on this kind of power run the risk of prisoner retaliation as well as the risk that their superiors will question their ability to coerce control over the inmates. To me, this type of power would be one to avoid, as it seems there is no win-win situation in whichever path is taken, in regards to authority. Reward power is the third form of power Hepburn listed. Reward power describes the situations where prisoners perceive that officers are able to issue rewards. The fact that the guards may confer rewards is, in itself, a basis of power. However, as a result of judicial action, guards nowadays are less able to influence internal decisions. Although these formal rewards have been terminated, a system of informal rewards has been sustained between the guards and the inmates. Under such systems, guards will compromise with prisoners on the basis of reciprocity. This form of reward encompasses such things as the toleration of minor rule violations and petty theft. The fourth type of power is the expert power. Expert power derives from the prisoners' perception that guards have special skills or expertise. Such power is especially likely to arise in prisons where treatment is emphasized, and where guards are seen as part of the overall therapeutic environment. However, this type of power may be undermined by the unwillingness of prisoners to acknowledge the competence of guards. Any type of doubt in a correctional officers' field of expertise can only lead to a disruption of any sort, whether it be big or small. Finally, referent power is the power a guard uses as a result of gaining respect and admiration of the prisoners. Here, the guard's personal qualities, including leadership skills and persuasion, give some guards what Lombardo calls "personal authority" (1989). Correctional employees with this type of power are considered fair in their relations with prisoner. They are said to show a certain degree of respect for them, and as not acting out of malice or in any type of belittling manner. In his survey of how these kinds of power operated in one prison, Hepburn discovered that prison guards think that their powers of control derive largely from their position as guards, and from their reputation for competence and good judgment. Of the five powers, guards consider legitimate and expert power to be important in ensuring prisoner cooperation. Also, the greater the guard's experience, the greater the importance he or she is attached to expert power, and less importance is placed on coercive and legitimate power (Hepburn, 1985). When looking at the prison guard in a professional manner, there seem to be certain things that need to be examined. In the correctional enterprise, guard work seems to have certain criteria that are looked upon. Certain criteria include: evaluating guards, rewards and punishments, enforcing rule violations and finally, informal controls (Domurad, 2000). Looking at these four points is a way to sum up the life of what the prison guard is held standard to. When evaluating guards, the close relationship and association between guards and prisoners in the New Jersey Security Prison Sykes' study (1999) gave rise to a relationship that is based on reciprocity, because guards could not remain distant or completely withdraw from them. A guard is to be evaluated by his supervisors on his ability to control inmates. The supervisor would want the correctional officer to demonstrate that he or she was or is able to perform his or her duty with the minimal amount of trouble. The supervisor would also make note to see if the officer is deemed cognizant of the chances of a riot occurring within the prison walls, and how he is to prepare or prevent such an occasion from happening. This view of evaluating prison officials is supported by Poole and Regoli (1980), who found in a survey of guards that a high rate of disciplinary action is perceived by supervisors as evidence of poor work performance and of an inability to handle the inmates. Similarly, in a study in three California prisons, Glaser and Fry (1987) found that a clear majority of the staff at all three institutions agree with the statement that an officer reporting all rule violations coming to his or her notice, would be seen by supervisors as someone who could not control the inmates of his or her own unit.
Secondly, looking at rewards and punishments, Sykes (1999) does not think that the use of rewards and punishments offers an adequate basis for guards to enforce control. Sykes considers punishments to be insufficiently different to the regular routine of prison life to count for anything. He also notes that rewards are already offered at the start of a prison term, principally in the form of "good time". Thus, privileges and rewards are not specifically tied to everyday conduct and compliance, but are already granted. This means there is an absence of any ongoing positive incentives for either the guards or inmates (Sykes, 1999). Sykes also argues that, ultimately, the authority of the guard is corrupted by their having to continually compromise their captives, so that their dominant position can only be enforced through accommodations through inmates. In her study of the prison system in Massachusetts, Kauffman (1988) also discusses punishments and rewards. She finds that rewards for inmates are essential to ensure their sustained cooperation. For example, inmate workers in the facility were allowed to obtain food from the kitchen, and even small tasks performed by these certain inmates prompted award giving. Although rewards might be limited to a pack of cigarettes, to even buying a prisoner a soda, guards might offer more significant rewards. These rewards could include that of illegal contraband (drugs), information, and in refraining from prosecuting inmate offenses. While these awards yielded positive results from the prisoners, the rewards did not come without any dangers. These dangers included several things, such as: the possibility that inmates might try to corrupt guards and make false allegations about officer corruption, and also, that rewards might be used by inmates to blackmail guards to ensure the continuation of those rewards (Glaze, 2002). Another danger listed is that the rewards themselves might cause disputes or even violence among inmates, unless incentives are evenly distributed. Also, the possibility that more valuable rewards, such as drugs, would endanger more conflict. The last danger that could be noted is the fact that officers engaging in the reward process run the risk of endangering their own fellow guards. The third factor that I will look at is that of enforcing rule violations. Based on his study, Lombardo (1989) maintains that the process of corruption is far more complex than Sykes describes it. Lombardo believes that, while inmate cooperation with the guards is a factor in the life of a prison official, the relationship between guards and inmates to rules also plays a part in handling minor violations. The inmates often see guards who write violation reports for minor offenses as lacking the ability to handle things on a man-to-man basis. The inmates also see the guard as having a strategy, designed to avoid losing the cooperation of the inmates by creating unnecessary tensions among the prison population (May, 1980). Such minor violations that are frequently reported are failing to shave or receive a haircut, and unable to keep his or her cell kept in a neatly, tidy fashion. The guards' focus was/is very much on the use of rule violations. Informing an inmate of a rule violation, rather than writing a citation, was not considered an act of leniency. Instead, it would be regarded as an act of strength, because the guard was asserting his or her control over the situation. By not issuing a citation to the inmate for a violation was demanding the inmate's acknowledgement of the guard's control. Like police officers dealing with the public, the inmate's attitude becomes crucial in determining a correctional prison guard's response to a minor rule violation. Many guards in Lombardo's study saw that inmate attitude as more important than actual conduct. Obviously, guards are alert for challenges to their authority as a worker and as a person. They are prepared to interpret conduct as a personal challenge; sometimes pursuing questions of attitude, and ignoring the behavior that prompted the interaction with the particular inmate. Guards point out that inmates are better educated and more organized than ever before. They also claim new groups that move into the prison are involved in drugs and extortion (Lombardo, 1989). The last aspect that I will digress to is that of the informal controls of a prison officer. In addition to formal controls over inmates through the formal disciplinary process, it is common within the prison environment to find that guards exercise various informal controls. However, the operation of these types of controls can produce ethical issues and dilemmas. I want to give an example of informal controls, and I will use the Massachusetts State prison. Writing disciplinary reports was not seen as an appropriate means of maintaining control. Writing reports of rule breaches resulted in inmate threats, eventual lack of camaraderie amongst the guards, and a general loss of respect for being a "ticket-writer". Kauffman (1988) found that most guards rarely wrote disciplinary reports, except for the major infractions. The actual sanctions that might be imposed were limited, and did not affect a prisoner's status because they were restricted to loss of "good time". The limited sanctions meant that guards considered writing disciplinary tickets as a waste of their time, and they, therefore, resorted to informal punishment. As one guard put it, "If you give them your own type of punishment, they will think more" (Kauffman, 1988). At a prison facility known as Walpole, a guard might resort to locking inmates in their cells, instead of issuing a disciplinary report for an infraction, such as an inmate refusing to step back into line. This type of informal punishment would be implemented when the guard simply refrained from unlocking that inmate's particular cell during the daily prison routine. The practice of locking down the guilty inmate would be especially effective on Friday nights. This was because the inmate usually had to wait in his cell until Monday morning before he or she could see the deputy superintendent of the facility. Other informal methods of control included guards shutting off the electricity for the entire tier of cells, turning off the hot water, withholding toilet paper or matches, or even keeping back food. Sometimes, more indirect and secretive methods would be carried out (Jacobs, 1977). These quiet methods included making inmates wait a substantial amount of time to use the phone, denying access to writing paper, destroying an inmate's plants that he had carefully cared for in his cell, or scratching a piece of furniture manufactured by the inmate in the prison factory. As one guard put it, "There are so many ways you can get to these guys" (Kauffman, 1988). These methods would often be employed as an alternative to physical reprisals that may provoke administration action against the guards. Lombardo (1989) noted forms of informal control as well. For example, one incident would be that a guard would lock a man out of his cell for some time, while other inmates were kept in their cells. By doing this, it would create an overwhelming sense of anxiety for the prisoner, perhaps provoking panic attacks. Guards also resorted to disconnecting water or electricity supply. Also, some guards would leave "keep locked" tags on cell doors, which would result in an inmate to be locked up for a number of days. Methods of getting back at inmates in an unofficial way included not telling the prisoner of scheduled appointments. In these types of approaches, it is important that the inmate is aware of the deliberate nature of the guard's actions, to note that the inmate is fully aware that the guard is attempting to make life as uncomfortable as possible for the cell-holder. While our society believes that the guarding of our prisons is a noble, admirable task to undertake, it is also evident that we, as a society, do not see the promising temptations that come along with the job. Our culture thinks of a prison guard, and immediately imagines the type of person that is a blue-collar, middle-America, type of individual. Society, for the most part, assumes that these types of people will work hard to make an honest living; however, like with all jobs, there are temptations that lie everywhere. This is no different with the prison guard; corruption can play an enormous role in the life of the prison guard. McCarthy (1995) distinguished patterns of corruption and the level of staff involved in particular corruptions. Such corruptions that were discovered that took place were that of petty theft, trafficking, contraband, embezzlement, and misuse of authority.
Petty theft was alleged by inmates in complaints of loss of both personal valuables, and contraband claimed to have been stolen during cell searches. Complaints were also made by visitors, claiming that their possessions had been stolen during searches in the visiting room. Also, goods and materials were alleged to have been stolen from the state, including devices such as walkie-talkies, tools, and calculators. Trafficking was also prevalent among prison guards. Trafficking relates to smuggling contraband, and was commonly practiced between the guards and the inmates. This smuggling of contraband into prisons included money, drugs, or services, usually of a sexual nature. McCarthy identified a number of contraband items including drugs, alcohol, money, and weapons. He found that the more individuals that were involved in trafficking, the more organized the operation ran. Sophisticated smuggling rings held inmates as leaders. These operations ranged from a guard bringing in alcohol for a single inmate to large-scale conspiracies involving drugs. Generally, those involved in the smuggling were guards, but counselors and job placement officers were also implicated. Guard involvement varied from simply collecting drugs from pre-arranged locations, and transporting them into the prison, to actually controlling the smuggling operations by directly selling items to the inmates. This was easily accessible for guards, because most of the drugs that entered the prison came through officers who could be paid off to allow their entry. The next type of corruption is that of embezzlement. Embezzlement relates to the conversion of state property or goods to one's own personal advantage or gain. Acts involved guards, shopkeepers, and clerks embezzling money from administrative units within the prison system. Staff audits commonly revealed that these acts involve both staff and inmates working alone or together. The misuse of authority concerns a willful misuse of one's discretion for personal material gain. The kinds of faulty discretion involved were transfers, assignment to jobs and housing blocks, and overlooking minor infractions or rules. McCarthy (1995) distinguished a number of forms of misuse of authority, including that of accepting gratuities for favorable consideration of inmate requests. Other examples include accepting gratuities to protect illicit activities, such as allowing gambling, drugs, or prostitution in a facility or protecting illicit activities from discovery or competition amongst other inmates. Even more corruptions uncovered were that of extortion of inmates through mistreatment, harassment involving shaking down inmates and sanctioning them for refusal to obey instructions, mismanagement, concealment of prior criminal backgrounds by prospective employees, and charges of sexual coercion against a supervisor by a female employee. There have also been reported cases of roles that guards play in corruption.
In one case, an affair between an officer and inmate was discovered, when the inmate used the officer's phone card to call the correctional employee while she was on vacation. In another case, an officer assaulted a co-worker on duty over a gambling debt, and it transpired that the officer, who was subjected to the assault, was in fact, a bookie employed by a major organized crime figure. Officers also have been arrested for smuggling heroin into a prison for inmates, arrested for bookmaking, and another has been arrested for attempting to transport marijuana into a
prison. The details that I have portrayed in this chapter should give an understanding of the guard in the prison system. Several things, such as how guards choose correctional employment, how they consider danger and mental tension as the core of their work, and how security and control are fundamental in their close interactions with the inmates, were discussed. From this paper comes a guard's sense of suspicion about events that are different or that interrupt prison routine. A number of studies have shown that guards have no absolute power over inmates, but are required to negotiate their authority. Tensions within the role of the guard include those of treatment role and custodial role, each calling for different skills and perspectives. Ultimately, guards are dependent on the prisoners for their own safety, and at the same time, have to show to their superiors an ability to manage prisoners competently. We, as a society, need to have a better understanding of the role of the prison guard. These individuals seem to always be found between a rock and a hard place, and that type of position has seemed to go unnoticed for the most part in our culture.