Proceduralism Of Personal Autonomy

consequences.’ For Rawls, personal autonomy is a kind of deliberative rationality given that his procedural formalism focuses on the process of deliberation rather than its outcome, which neither implies nor is implied by personal autonomy. I find Rawls’s procedural formalistic explanation of freedom too narrow. I agree with David Johnston’s statement, ‘the pure proceduralism of personal autonomy does not assure results consistent with the moral law or any other substantive standard.’

Broad emptiness charge and moral autonomy

Given the disadvantages of the formal features of personal autonomy, we may ask how the personal autonomy would be creative. I will argue a developed interpretation of Kantian autonomy that is moral autonomy would
According to Kant, being autonomous means being autonomous in terms of moral autonomy, thus governing oneself based on CI, which, in turn, includes C2, i.e. respecting others as ends, without sufficient argument, that is, it is not possible to be personally fully autonomous without caring about the freedom and autonomy of others as well. As Raz notes moral autonomy must consider the effects on particular cases. He further explains that moral autonomy reduces ‘self-authorship to a vanishing point as it allows only one set of principles which people can rationally legislate and they are the same for all.’
Earlier, we noted that Kant says very little about freedom in his discussion of the illustrations of duties. Because Kant does not espouse practical reason, some may be concerned about the disconnect between personal autonomy and moral autonomy. However, in practice we are obligated to carry out moral duties, which mean that as we live our lives we remain minimally responsive to these duties and engage in particularistic forms of self-legislation. This dual self-legislation combines elements of personal and moral autonomy, respectively, into a unified