According to the data that Walker has cited, special prosecution units have not produced different results from regular prosecution teams. The data that Walker cited came from a San Diego, CA prosecutorial office. However, in an article published by the National Institute of Justice in the Office of Justice Programs, the data leads to a different conclusion. In Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) the conviction rate increased from 50% to 71% when using a special prosecution team. In Milwaukee, the conviction rate increases five times over when a domestic violence prosecution team was put in place. The key factor however, that was mentioned in this article was that the …show more content…
team must be adequately staffed. In Walkers claims, there was no mention of whether the team in San Diego was adequately staffed. Additionally, the conviction rates were already pushing 90%. In order for the results to even remotely come close to statistically significant, the conviction rate would have to push close to 100%.
Citation: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/practical-implications-research/ch6/specialized-prosecution-units.htm
Proposition 28: Abolishing or limiting the insanity defense with have no impact on serious crime
Walker asserts that politicians and other lawmakers have attacked the insanity defense as a loophole in the criminal prosecution chain.
He states that it directly attacks the mens rea requirement. Hence if a criminal was to plead NGRI (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity) they have thereby eliminated the possibility that they could have had the mental capacity to commit the crime. However, in an article written by Kenneth B. Chiacchia for Psychology Encyclopedia, it is noted that less than 1 out of every 100 defendants plead NGRI. The actual statistic is .85%. Additionally, the statistics state that nearly 70% of those defendants who did plead NGRI withdrew their plea after they were found to be mentally sane. The high-profile cases that really grab the headlines are the cases that skew the public view of the NGRI defense and sit atop the “wedding cake”. Essentially, the defense is not used often and when it is used an extremely small fraction of defendants actually go through with the defense. By limiting the use of the defense, the crime rate should decrease in theory because persons intending on committing crimes will know prior to the act that they will not be able to plead
NGRI. http://psychology.jrank.org/pages/336/Insanity-Defense.html Proposition 29: Abolishing plea bargaining will not reduce serious crime
Walker asserts that plea bargaining is not a loophole for serious criminals to slip through and beat the system therefore abolishing it would not reduce serious crime. In contrast however, The Cardozo Law Review published literature stating that plea bargaining were to be abolished, then all defendants would go to trial, innocent or guilty. Conversely, if there were a limited plea bargaining policy put in place, deals would only be allowed to be offered when the defendants concession is very large. This would prevent prosecutors from plea bargaining cases with weak evidence just to get a conviction. If prosecutors are focusing less on clearing a weak case, they will be allowed to put more attention on the higher profile cases in which there is strong evidence. By this line of logic, the rate of serious crime should decrease because larger cases will be cleared, publicity will generate, and those criminals who intend to commit these serious crimes will be less willing to do so.
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/27-5/GAZAL.WEBSITE.pdf