Psychology at its Finest

Justin MacMillin
Professor Pomerantz
Legal Studies 39D
20 May 2013
Final Exam: Benton vs. Bridges and Carter This case presents to the court two separate parties from Benton State College in the town of Benton in Eastern California. In 2010, three students founded a chapter of the Fundamentalist Church of the Latter Day Saints (FLDS) in Benton. These students included Chris Bridges, Stefani Joanne Angelina Germanotta, and Onika Tanya Maraj. Bridges and Germanotta were legally married in the state of Texas; Bridges and Maraj do not have a legal state recorded relationship. In accordance the doctrine of the FLDS, Bridges regarded Germanotta and Maraj both as his “wife” (Pomerantz, pg 1). Although Bridges sought to be legally married to both Germanotta and Maraj, California law prohibits him from doing so. Bridges applied for a marriage license at the office of the clerk of Benton and was refused the license. Bridges appealed, and denied again. Bridges looks to our court to decide whether he should be granted a marriage license for himself and Maraj. The other defendant is Shawn Corey Carter. Carter was convicted of violating Section 1 and Section 2 of the Benton Anti-Harassment Resolutions (the “AHRS”). Sections 1 and 2 are as follows:
Section 1: “Whoever places on public or private property a sign, writing, symbol, object, characterization or graffiti, with the intent to intimidate or threaten another person, commits a class A misdemeanor.” (Pomerantz, pg 3).

Section 2: “Whoever speaks or assembles on public or private property with the intent to arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others towards a person, based on that person’s race, creed, marital status, religion, sexual orientation, or gender, commits a class A misdemeanor.” (Pomerantz, pg 3).

Carter organized a KKK chapter at Benton State College. In the city of Benton there is a public area of common gathering known as “The Square”. The majority of the property on “The Square” is owned by the city of Benton. On April 15, 2013, Carter posted and distributed a flyer on the BSC campus stating:
“JOIN OUR RALLY
TIME: April 25th, 9:00 P.M.
PLACE: THE SQUARE
PURPOSE: PROTEST THE PRESENCE OF THE FLDS AT BSC” (Pomerantz, pg 3)
In addition to Carter’s actions on The Square, he and the members of the KKK posted flyers on the dorm room doors of Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj publishing “When Polygamists Die, God Laughs”; “God blesses those who take an eye for an eye”; “We live by the Bible and we will be blessed” and “We will fight the polygamist agenda—by any means necessary.” The facts state: “Each flyer was marked ‘Brought to you – and we mean you – by the BSC KKK” (Pomerantz, pg 3). On the day of the protest, BSC students, Benton residents, and members of the BSC KKK all participated. Carter distributed pictures of Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj, denouncing them “Satanists” and arguing, “polygamy is an abomination before God and should be punishable by death” (Pomerantz, pg 3). The rally agitated the crowds who angrily expressed intent of inflicting harm on Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj. After the crowd chanted “Act now or forever we are lost,” Carter “hung an effigy of Bridges on a long stick, poured kerosene on it and lit it” (Pomerantz, pg 3). The crowd then expressed clear intent to seek out Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj with intent to harm. Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj have claimed that the Benton clerk’s denial of a marriage license for Bridges and Maraj is a violation of Due Process and Equal Protection. It is the job of this court to decide whether their claim is true. In addition, Carter has claimed that the AHRs for which he has been arrested are unconstitutional on their face, and claims his speech and actions were constitutionally protected. It is also the job of this court to both determine if the AHRs are constitutional and if Carter acted within his constitutional rights. The Benton clerk’s denial of a marriage license to Bridges and Maraj is unconstitutional. It violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bridges and Maraj were denied their Fourteenth Amendment protected right of Due Process of law. First, we must decide whether or not the California law prohibiting polygamy is constitutional through an analysis of the effects on children, the decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of Equal Protection, and the First Amendment right to practice religion. Because marriage is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and it does not discriminate against a suspect class, the law does not have to pass the strict scrutiny test. Instead, it must pass the rational basis test. There is no legitimate state interest in banning polygamy. The California ban on polygamy does not pass the rational basis test and is therefore unconstitutional. A moral argument against polygamy does not stand simply because legislating morality is not practical and does not hold up under the Constitution. More often than not, legislating morality ends up discriminating against a minority group or opinion and therefore will not hold up in a court of law.
Similarly, another argument against polygamy has been its supposed negative effect on the children. If this were fact, then the state would have a legitimate interest in preserving the well being of the children in its state and therefore be able to ban polygamy. This is far from the case, and impossible to prove this opinion to be fact. Yes, there may be problems with the psychology and chemistry of a polygamous relationship. However, all relationships must be considered when singling one out. There are problems with heterosexual and homosexual relationships as well: in any relationship there is always the possibility of issues with children. This argument also cannot be applied to support a ban on polygamy. While there may be small trends or higher percentages of unhappy children, it is unconstitutional to enforce a blanket ban on all polygamous relationships as the constitution is in place partly to protect the rights and interests of the minority.
Arguing that a marriage is not between more than two people also is not valid according to previous rulings in California. Perry v. Schwarzenegger overturned Proposition 8, which defined a marriage a union between one man and one woman. As a result of this decision, the strict definition for marriage has been lifted. Marriage no longer exclusively exists as a union between one man and one woman, leading to the possibility of marriage being between more than one man and more than one woman (or any permutation of these possibilities). The Benton clerk’s denial of a marriage license does not grant Bridges and Maraj equal protection under the laws. The Constitution guarantees every citizen of the United States the right of life, liberty, and property. Congress or state law cannot infringe upon these rights. Bridges and Maraj are being denied these rights, to choose whom they want to be married to under the laws of, for this specific case, California. More specifically, Maraj is lawfully unable to marry the person she chooses because he is already married. She is being denied her right to life and liberty in her selection of a marriage partner. It is difficult to ban a marriage between two consenting adults.
Bridges and Maraj are being denied their freedom of religious expression within the FLDS. The Fundamentalist Church of Latter Day Saints believed that it was ordained by God to have more than one wife. This particular sect of the Mormon religion believed that a man having more than two wives would be granted the most holy form of salvation and deliverance. The California law prohibiting polygamy and the Benton clerk’s denial of their marriage license denies Bridges and Maraj their fundamental right to practice the religion of their choosing. For a law to deny a fundamental right, it must pass strict scrutiny. For the law to pass, it again must show a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn to serve that interest. To synthesize, there is no legitimate governmental interest in banning polygamy. Shawn Cory Carter is guilty of violating Section 1 and Section 2 of the Benton Anti-Harassment Resolutions (AHRs), both of which are in accordance with the Constitution. First it must be determined if the laws are constitutional. The government acts in question are Sections 1 and 2 of the Benton Anti-Harassment Resolutions. Section 1 prohibits anyone from using any sort of use of a sign or symbol or the like to threaten or intimidate another person. The behavior infringed upon by Section 1 is the freedom of speech under the First Amendment, which is a fundamental right. Because it is fundamental, Section 1 must pass the strict scrutiny test, which states that it must further a governmental interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Section 1 furthers the governmental interest to protect its people from danger, including potential or impending danger. The government does not have to wait for danger to happen, it can step in as long as there is intent. For example, a police officer does not have to wait for a man to pull the trigger of a firearm that is aimed at another person, the officer can stop the man before he fires. This act is also narrowly drawn; it specifies that any symbol meant to threaten or intimidate another person is illegal. This still allows speech that is controversial; it only prohibits a specific type of speech. As stated in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, fighting words are not protected by the First Amendment, and therefore the government can regulate them. Section 2 of the AHRs prohibits anyone to assemble on private or public property with the intent to “arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others towards a person, based on that person’s race, creed, marital status, religion, sexual orientation or gender” (Pomerantz, pg 3). The right infringed upon in this rule is the fundamental right of speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Because this infringes upon a fundamental right, Section 2 must also pass the strict scrutiny test. Section 2 furthers a government interest in maintaining peace in public and private areas in which a party intends to arouse anger. This section does not say that controversial speech is prohibited, only that speech intended to bring about unrest and violence is not protected by the Constitution. In Terminiello v. Chicago, the Court ruled that speech can be restricted if it is “likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest” (Terminiello v Chicago, pg 1). The goal of this law is not to abridge speech, but to protect the people of Benton from substantive evil. For this the government has a legitimate interest in preserving this law. Furthermore, according to the strict scrutiny test, this section must be narrowly drawn in furthering the government interest. The section passes this aspect as well, as the subject matter of unprotected speech is clearly stated. It is not too general as to prohibit “free debate and the exchange of ideas” as per Justice Douglas’s qualifier in Terminiello. It has been proved that Section 1 and Section 2 of the Benton AHRs are Constitutional. It is now the decision of the court whether or not Carter acted within his constitutionally protected rights in his actions on The Square. This court will make the decision under the doctrine of stare decisis. Under Schenck v. United States, Schenk was arrested for creating a “clear and present danger” through his speech. The Court ruled that if the words uttered create a clear and present danger, Congress has the right to prevent the repercussions of uttering those words. It is obvious the words said by Carter created a clear and present danger at The Square in Benton through the agitation of the crowd and his motivation to burn an effigy of Bridges. Not only did he create a threat against the lives of Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj; but he also created a danger to the people who happened to be present on that day. A sizable crowd is unpredictable and capable of significant damage in a public area. Congress has a legitimate interest in protecting the citizens of the United States, enabling it to stop Carter from his particular choice of words. Under Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, the Court ruled “the right of speech is not absolute at all times,” allowing regulation of speech that is “lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, pg 1). Fighting words are defined as those that “by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” according to Justice Douglas in the Chaplinsky decision. Carter’s words are exactly those. In the facts stated in the beginning of this opinion it is clear that Carter targeted Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj with words that drove a crowd to agitation and desire for violence. The peace in The Square was broken as a result of Carter’s words, causing him to feel led to burn an effigy of Bridges and chant with his crowd that they intent to act violently on their beliefs “by any means necessary.” Had Bridges, Germanotta, and Maraj been present at The Square at this time, they would have naturally and legitimately feared for their lives. The ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio on its face does not apply to this specific situation because Carter and his group were out on The Square mixed with the public. It is a fact that The Square is a public area with more than just the BSC KKK group present at any given time. If the context of the situation had been different, Carter would be protected in his speech under the First Amendment. Allow me to clarify the situations in which he would be protected. Had Carter and his group been in a private meeting simply speaking that he disagrees with the ideals of the FLDS church on the BSC campus, his actions would be protected because he does not pose a real threat to the public or the people in question. The government cannot prohibit controversial speech. This situation changes when he burns an effigy of Bridges. The KKK group in the Brandenburg case burned a cross in private, which did not directly target an individual person. The First Amendment would have protected Carter if he had not held the rally in The Square and if he also had not burned a symbol of Bridges himself. As stated above, the Court ruled in Terminiello v. Chicago that the First Amendment does not protect words “likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest” (Teriminiello v. Chicago, pg 1). At the BSC KKK rally on April 25th, it is clear that Carter’s words were likely to cause distress and unrest in the people who were in attendance. The context of this situation is important when looking at the people who made up the crowd. The facts state BSC is “almost entirely white, Christian socially conservative” (Pomerantz, pg 1). The practice of polygamy is highly frowned upon in Christianity, which gives the crowd motive for correcting a perceived evil at their university. Carter was undoubtedly aware of the overall moral compass of Benton and knew that he could strike up passion in a crowd at The Square. Carter burning an effigy truly validates the application of Terminiello to this case. This form of speech is illegal because it directly threatens an individual. Not only was Bridges pictured but pictures of Germanotta and Maraj were also distributed at The Square. These pictures validate all three parties to fear for their lives simply by the probable chance of being recognized anywhere within Benton. Other ‘conduct as speech’ cases include Brandenburg v. Ohio and Texas v. Johnson. In each of these cases the burning of a symbol was protected because each did not threaten a certain individual, but shown disapproval of an idea or entity. Carter’s actions directly threatened Bridges, naturally causing Bridges to fear for his life. Furthermore, Carter is guilty of violating the right of Bridges to feel safe in his person because he acted in a public area. Had Carter expressed his opinions and feelings in a private environment and in a less violent way (adhering to Section 2 of the AHRs), his speech would be protected.
It is decided that Carter acted outside of his First Amendment rights. The charges held against him will stand. I will now synthesize this opinion. The Benton clerk’s denial of a marriage license to Bridges and Maraj was unconstitutional because it denied Chris Bridges and Onika Tanya Maraj the Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process of Law and Equal Protection under the laws. In proving this fact, the California law banning polygamy is declared unconstitutional because it serves the state no rational basis for doing so. In addition, Shawn Corey Carter has been convicted of violating Section 1 and Section 2 of the Benton Anti-Harassment Resolutions. Furthermore, it has been shown that both sections of the Benton AHRs are constitutional. Bridges and Maraj are to be granted a marriage license in the state of California. Carter’s charges stand.