Rawls Social Justice

Social justice is what people in society owe to one another in a matter of rights. It is whether people have rights and entitlements to certain kinds of political and social arrangements, and as a result, to certain social outcomes. Rawls states that social justice is a type of fairness, where the social cooperation appropriately distributes the burdens and benefits of society (1999: 4). Rawls aims to do this using the theoretical device of the Original Position. The intention of the thought experiment is to establish rules for the basic structure of society that would create a fairer society and advance the interests of the mutually disinterested parties involved. The conclusion about social justice that Rawls comes to is the two principles of the theory of justice as fairness. In this essay I will argue that Rawls’ conclusion about social justice, the theory of justice as fairness, is sound but the methodology using the Original Position and Veil of Ignorance is flawed. Rawls’s theoretical devices of the Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance do not help us to come to sound conclusions about social justice. This will be done by questioning Rawls’ assumption that
Yet, this would not account for the pessimism that could be created inside of the original position even when there is no prior knowledge of the concept. It is an innate feeling – parties may not realise that they are leaning towards conservative principles. Some critics believe that Rawls’ conclusion is full of principles that would only be chosen by parties who are “conservative by temperament, and not by men who were natural gamblers” (Dworkin 1973: 500). While Rawls has removed any knowledge of risk aversion, Dworkin maintains that it is possible for this bias to occur naturally inside the original