Reasoning
'Does "Ideal Speech" ever really take place? '
Introduction
Ideal Speech is a philosophical theory developed by scholar Jurgen Habermas. It is a form of communication that is based on norms of truth, freedom and justice, which underlie the conditions for engaging in understandable and truthful dialogue (Badillo, 1991, p. 19). It requires what we would think of as "fair play" in dialogue. All participants must have equal opportunity to participate. They must have the right to assert, defend or question any factual or normative claim. This discussion must proceed free from accidental or systemic constraints (Badillo, 1991, p. 19). Importantly, ‘the participants in an ideal speech situation must be motivated solely by the desire to reach a consensus about the truth of statements and the validity of norms’ (Bernstein, 1995, p. 50). This paper will seek to answer the question, ‘does ideal speech ever really take place?’ by presenting and analyzing the arguments from both sides of the debate. This paper holds that ideal speech does not ever really take place.
Ideal speech does take place
Smith, 2003, interpret Habermas’ ideal speech that as a fact of life, whenever people engage in genuine conversation, they have, by definition, to be respectful of others’ arguments. In other words, the idea of impartiality is part of the structures of argumentation themselves, and does not have to be brought in from outside (Smith, 2003, p. 102). This means that Habermas can claim that his ethics is genuinely universally applicable, and must apply to all genuine arguments about values whatever language or culture they occur in. We must actually assume that something like the ideal speech situations holds. If it doesn’t, then we can actually challenge the conclusions of the debate on the grounds that it was determined by some (irrational) external factor (Smith, 2003, p. 103).
Habermas’ argues that because normative features of genuine communication, as discussed, go beyond
Introduction
Ideal Speech is a philosophical theory developed by scholar Jurgen Habermas. It is a form of communication that is based on norms of truth, freedom and justice, which underlie the conditions for engaging in understandable and truthful dialogue (Badillo, 1991, p. 19). It requires what we would think of as "fair play" in dialogue. All participants must have equal opportunity to participate. They must have the right to assert, defend or question any factual or normative claim. This discussion must proceed free from accidental or systemic constraints (Badillo, 1991, p. 19). Importantly, ‘the participants in an ideal speech situation must be motivated solely by the desire to reach a consensus about the truth of statements and the validity of norms’ (Bernstein, 1995, p. 50). This paper will seek to answer the question, ‘does ideal speech ever really take place?’ by presenting and analyzing the arguments from both sides of the debate. This paper holds that ideal speech does not ever really take place.
Ideal speech does take place
Smith, 2003, interpret Habermas’ ideal speech that as a fact of life, whenever people engage in genuine conversation, they have, by definition, to be respectful of others’ arguments. In other words, the idea of impartiality is part of the structures of argumentation themselves, and does not have to be brought in from outside (Smith, 2003, p. 102). This means that Habermas can claim that his ethics is genuinely universally applicable, and must apply to all genuine arguments about values whatever language or culture they occur in. We must actually assume that something like the ideal speech situations holds. If it doesn’t, then we can actually challenge the conclusions of the debate on the grounds that it was determined by some (irrational) external factor (Smith, 2003, p. 103).
Habermas’ argues that because normative features of genuine communication, as discussed, go beyond
References: * Bernstein, JM 1995, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory, Routledge, New York. * Badillo, RP 1991, The Emancipative Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics, CRVP Publishers, London. * Dryzek, JS & List, CA 2003, ‘Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 1-28. * Fraser, N ‘What’s Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender’, New German Critique, vol. 4 no. 35, pp. 97-131. * Moon, D, "Critical Theory and Other Critical Perspectives," in Sabia, DR & Wallulis, JT (eds) 1983, Changing Social Science: Critical Theory and Other Critical Perspectives, State University of New York Press, New York. * Rosaleen, D, Smith, M 2003, The Ethics of Tourism Development, Routledge, Oxford.