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Redistan Cyber Attack
The botnet type of cyber-attack that targeted the US defense firm is espionage. The attack did not result in any physical damage but compromised significant technological secrets about a new surveillance. The features of this damage relate to espionage where a perpetrator gains unauthorized access to confidential information of government or another individual. The absence of tangible physical damage and casualties in the attack informs the decision that it was espionage1.
Response of US The first quick response of the US in this attack is to identify the sources of the attack quickly. They should shut down the system to audit the level of damage and prevent the attackers from accessing more information. After the identification of the attackers, they should impose financial sanctions against the perpetrators such as freezing their assets or prohibiting commercial trade. They should then audit their systems to detect the vulnerabilities to prevent future attacks2.
US Defense Against Cyber Attacks
The severity of the cyber-attacks on the US presents serious challenges, especially when the criminals stop operations and access the secrets of the homeland security. The attacks target key private and public institutions where most workers have limited information about cyber security. There is also significant difficulty interagency information sharing. The private companies and many informational infrastructures have weak protection against cyber-attacks. For the US to prevent future attacks such as espionage, it has to take the following measures.
Increase Public Awareness
Cybercrimes often occur because people are ignorant about how to detect them and take appropriate action to combat their negative effects. The national government should partner with educators to conduct public awareness of the risks associated with online activities and educate them how to combat
References: Forsyth, James W. “What Great Powers Make of It: International Order and the Logic of Cooperation in Cyberspace.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 7:1 (2013) http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring_13/forsyth.pdf (accessed 13 May 2013) Hurwitz, Roger Libicki, Martin C., Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, RAND Report, Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG877.pdf. (accessed 13 May 2013). Libicki, Martin C. “Cyberspace is Not a Warfighting Domain.” I/S A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 8:2 (2012): 325-40, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/4.Libicki.pdf (accessed 13 May 2013). Libicki, Martin C. “The Spectre of Non-Obvious Warfare.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 6:3 (2012): 88 - 101 http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/fall/fall12.pdf (accessed 13 May 2013) Lin, Herbert Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, (2013) http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (accessed 13 May 2013) Michael N White House, International Strategy for Cyber Space: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked World (May 2011) ONLINE http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cybe rspace.pdf (accessed 13 May 2013). White House, Cyberspace Policy Review ONLINE http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf (accessed 13 May 2013). White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative ONLINE http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity.pdf (accessed 13 May 2013).