Scotsman's Competitive Advantage: A Case Study
Carnegie backed away from bidding for ship armor plate because of the lack of large profitability under the represented agreement. The Scotsman’s pacifism dovetailed nicely with his opinion that the profits were too low in ship plating until 1889. Due to the lack of plating, the battleships New York and Maine suffered delays. Any opportunity that came along for Navy Secretary Benjamin Tracy went to Carnegie to rethink his involvement with the Navy. Carnegie was still continually looking for the best arrangement for his company. In 1890, Tracy threatened to purchase steel from the British, forcing Carnegie to build a new plate near Homestead, Pennsylvania and win three new battleship contracts.
Although, American ships still lagged behind the
British designs, but they started catching up and were fortunate in 1898 they didn’t have to fight the British. Resulting in Dewey turning his ships, which were considered superior, toward Spanish. The major questions of naval war planners was whether he had enough firepower and skill to defeat the feared Spanish fleet. Dewey had gathered and assessed information on the Spanish fleet that included, forts, mines, water depths, locations of channels, entrances to Manila and Subic bays, the state of the tides, currents, and winds resulting in a detailed plan ensuring his personnel were fully ready for battle by the time he had sailed from Hong Kong.
Europeans were watching, confident that exactly the opposite would happen and America’s military would prove inadequate. They saw the war through class, national, and religion, all reflecting what they thought would happen and what some hoped would happen. For the European socialists, the Spanish, the Americans, and the Cuban elites leading the revolution were agents of “capitalist exploitation.
France not only retained a strong monarchical streak, but cultivated a strain of anti-Americanism over the French failure to maintain colonies in the Caribbean. This, combined with the concern that revolutionary eagerness in one part of the world might cause democratic feelings in other French colonies to form dangerously near the crest, which inspired France to support Spain. However, France was not alone in its fears; three Russian volunteers managed to reach Cuba. Only Britain concluded that the threats posed by an independent Cuba or a Cuba controlled by the Americans were outweighed by a victory monarchist Spain, since a principal beneficiary of a Spanish victory would be Imperial Germany. Thus the British sided with Uncle Sam, even if their views about American fighting were doubted.
England was in good company with their skepticism about the United States military power and more Europeans had different views about the United States. Continental newspapers routinely blared condemnations of the Monroe Doctrine. The Dutch press warned that the United States would turn its eyes toward Dutch possessions in the Caribbean. Also, they predicted that the United States would need 70,000 troops to establish order in the Philippines, estimating the number of the rebels there under Emilio Aguinaldo at 40,000. Even as the remnants of the Spanish fleet in Manila were surrendering, Dutch papers prophesied that the “real” Spanish fleet was on its way to Cuba and would teach Americans a lesson. Many papers said many things, but they were slow to learn.
Although, American ships still lagged behind the
British designs, but they started catching up and were fortunate in 1898 they didn’t have to fight the British. Resulting in Dewey turning his ships, which were considered superior, toward Spanish. The major questions of naval war planners was whether he had enough firepower and skill to defeat the feared Spanish fleet. Dewey had gathered and assessed information on the Spanish fleet that included, forts, mines, water depths, locations of channels, entrances to Manila and Subic bays, the state of the tides, currents, and winds resulting in a detailed plan ensuring his personnel were fully ready for battle by the time he had sailed from Hong Kong.
Europeans were watching, confident that exactly the opposite would happen and America’s military would prove inadequate. They saw the war through class, national, and religion, all reflecting what they thought would happen and what some hoped would happen. For the European socialists, the Spanish, the Americans, and the Cuban elites leading the revolution were agents of “capitalist exploitation.
France not only retained a strong monarchical streak, but cultivated a strain of anti-Americanism over the French failure to maintain colonies in the Caribbean. This, combined with the concern that revolutionary eagerness in one part of the world might cause democratic feelings in other French colonies to form dangerously near the crest, which inspired France to support Spain. However, France was not alone in its fears; three Russian volunteers managed to reach Cuba. Only Britain concluded that the threats posed by an independent Cuba or a Cuba controlled by the Americans were outweighed by a victory monarchist Spain, since a principal beneficiary of a Spanish victory would be Imperial Germany. Thus the British sided with Uncle Sam, even if their views about American fighting were doubted.
England was in good company with their skepticism about the United States military power and more Europeans had different views about the United States. Continental newspapers routinely blared condemnations of the Monroe Doctrine. The Dutch press warned that the United States would turn its eyes toward Dutch possessions in the Caribbean. Also, they predicted that the United States would need 70,000 troops to establish order in the Philippines, estimating the number of the rebels there under Emilio Aguinaldo at 40,000. Even as the remnants of the Spanish fleet in Manila were surrendering, Dutch papers prophesied that the “real” Spanish fleet was on its way to Cuba and would teach Americans a lesson. Many papers said many things, but they were slow to learn.