Similarities Between Seneca Smith And Nietzsche

Seneca, Smith, and Nietzsche introduce interesting variations in their philosophical ideas of emotions and passions in the political realm. While Stoicism calls for the banishment of emotions all together, Smith advocates for putting oneself in another’s situation and imagine their feelings. Nietzsche on the other hand offers an amusing account of acknowledging the detrimental effects of suppression and internalization of emotions, which thereby produce bad conscience.
Consistent with the Stoic worldview, Seneca was dedicated in upholding the idea that emotions are fundamentally irrational, and by exercising one’s innate rationality, emotions should not be apart of the political sphere by any means. With that, passions and reason are not
distinct from one another, but instead transform the mind for better or for worse, implying that one who acts by emotion has lost his sense of reason (p.21). In his work, On Anger, Seneca especially condemns the voluntary feeling of anger, as it is “foul and frenzied,” and “raging with an inhuman desire to inflict pain in combat and shed blood in punishment,” (p.14). Rather than allowing oneself to assent to anger, Seneca argues that “reason suffices, in and of itself, not only for planning ahead but also for the conduct of affairs,” (p.29). Furthermore, it is by exercising reason, or cultivation of the individual within a larger community, that one is able to attain virtue, the only good in and of itself, and therefore, apatheia, or peace of mind. With that being said, cultivation of the individual requires one to maintain an indifference to external events, and only respond to one’s own internal reason. Response to external events is indicative of emotion, a fundamental error in judgment and the overthrowing of reason that equates to voluntary emotion. Seneca details a three-stage progression into the state of passion, beginning with an involuntary jolt, or stirring of the mind under certain circumstances, “propathos,” like shivering when one is splashed by cold water, or blushing when one hears obscenities. It is because none of these physiological responses are in human control, reason can’t argue against them (p. 35). When an initial stirring or jolt evokes a feeling of personal wrongdoing inflicted on oneself by another, the first preludes to passion have been evoked, and the assent to anger are en route (p.35). The third stage occurs when a feeling of vengeance takes over, and all reason has been overthrown, regardless of the appropriateness (p. 37). All in all, if one is able to use correct reason in deterring oneself from allowing the assent of emotion, the opportunity to reach apatheia, a tranquil peace of mind, becomes possible. As such, for Seneca and the Stoic worldview, emotions have no place in the political sphere, or any aspect of life for that matter, and with use of reason, one must deter himself from allowing emotions to assent.
In The Moral Sentiments, Smith advocates that sensible morality is not an innate sense, but something that must be cultivated.
In addition, Smith not only vouches for the recognition of sentiments and emotions, but takes it to another level by arguing that it is essential for individuals to put themselves in the shoes of others, and to feel their feelings. However, Smith recognizes that it is seemingly impossible for us to feel the exact feelings of another individual, and for which he prescribes the guidance of the impartial spectator. By using a third party, the impartial spectator, to guide us in understanding the feelings of others, we are able to better to relate to those around us, which Smith strongly advocates. In relation to the political sphere, Smith asserts that “our sensibility to the feelings of others, so far from being inconsistent with the manhood of self-command, is the very principle upon which that manhood is founded,” (p.108). Thus, Smith not only acknowledges the existence of emotions, but requires that people make a legitimate attempt to feel what others feel, before passing judgment. In addition, for Smith, “the object of justice is the security from injury,” (p.38). As such, political justice is anchored within moral sentiment, and injustice is viewed as an injury that causes great harm. A concentric circle model illustrates the notion that we are morally obligated to have the highest regard of sympathy to those closest around us, and the least to those farthest away from us. However, a just society rests on virtuous citizens, so sympathizing with one’s community strengthens and builds a society that will flourish. The ability to put oneself in the shoes of someone else and make a moral judgment constitutes ‘mutual sympathy’ which advances the creation and maintenance of a rational social order. With the help from an impartial spectator, Smith argues that to share the sentiments of the impartial spectator is to share the norms of
society.
In his work, The Geneaology of Morals, Nietzsche provides a confusing, yet interesting account of his acknowledgment of emotions. Primarily, Nietzsche is concerned with the manmade morality that surfaces within the public sphere that has created values in which are prohibiting humanity from thriving. Thus, he asserts that the meanings of “good”, “bad,” and “evil,” are creations created and implemented by society, which have detrimentally affected society, leading humans to nihilism. As such, Nietzsche gives a realistic account of a creditor-debtor relationship between an individual and his community, in that the individual enjoys the accommodations of his community, and thereby adheres to acting in a civil way that will not inflict destruction upon the community (p.71). If the individual is to behave unjustly, he is to be punished, which will create a negative memory, and thus gives way to the concept of the creditor-debtor relationship. The fear of punishment that poses as a risk to the individual within the community is thought to be the driving force in maintaining an ordered, rational society. However, it is imperative to note that Nietzsche’s account of emotions presumes that as society has been created and emotions have emerged, the concept that ‘punishment tames man’ isn’t to say that humans have become more civil when acting in their communities or the political realm. Rather, the human nature hasn’t actually changed, but it is the manmade emotions that have been suppressed, and internalized as the will of power, into bad conscience.