Socrates Chapter 9 Summary
In summation of chapter 12, Socrates is discussing the difference between praise and honor to suggest that an object of praise, i.e. virtue, is inferior to an object of honor, i.e. happiness.
To start off the section, Socrates proposes that:
Objects of praise are praised for character in relation to something else as well as their actions and achievements.
This praise is different than the praise given to the gods, for they cannot be referred to our standard of good.
There are things above praise that are better and greater which are congratulated for blessedness and happiness, just as gods and godlike men are congratulated for these same things.
Therefore, we count happiness as being blessed and godlike rather than praising it as we would …show more content…
He contends that, “For praise is given to virtue, since it makes us do fine actions; but celebrations are for achievements, either of body or of soul” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1101b32-34). Within this, we are able to see the importance and even necessity of praising virtue because of its strong influence on our actions and character. Moreover, there are no restrictions to praising such achievements, which Socrates explains when stating the possibility of being externally from the body or internally from the …show more content…
He refutes an idea separate from Eudoxus’ that refers to an anti-hedonistic approach of having all things aim at something not good, further prompting us that anti-hedonism isn’t correct either. He declares that, “For if things seem [good] to all, we say they are [good]; and if someone undermines confidence in these, what he says will hardly inspire more confidence in other things” (Nic. Ethics, 1173a1-3). In this, Socrates is trying to say that the people who object that everything aims at good have no other theory that is any more credible. He states that if only animals who have no understanding desired happiness, then the objectors could be correct. This is because these senseless creatures would not have an aim toward the good, since they do not think with aims. These objectors are proven wrong, though, if intelligent animals desire happiness, because they are indeed aiming at something good rather than not good. Socrates adds in his presumption that even unintelligent creatures may have some natural good that directs their aims toward a good. As a result, the anti-hedonistic views can be eradicated because there is evidence that prudent creatures, and possibly even creatures that are unwise, have an aim toward
To start off the section, Socrates proposes that:
Objects of praise are praised for character in relation to something else as well as their actions and achievements.
This praise is different than the praise given to the gods, for they cannot be referred to our standard of good.
There are things above praise that are better and greater which are congratulated for blessedness and happiness, just as gods and godlike men are congratulated for these same things.
Therefore, we count happiness as being blessed and godlike rather than praising it as we would …show more content…
He contends that, “For praise is given to virtue, since it makes us do fine actions; but celebrations are for achievements, either of body or of soul” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1101b32-34). Within this, we are able to see the importance and even necessity of praising virtue because of its strong influence on our actions and character. Moreover, there are no restrictions to praising such achievements, which Socrates explains when stating the possibility of being externally from the body or internally from the …show more content…
He refutes an idea separate from Eudoxus’ that refers to an anti-hedonistic approach of having all things aim at something not good, further prompting us that anti-hedonism isn’t correct either. He declares that, “For if things seem [good] to all, we say they are [good]; and if someone undermines confidence in these, what he says will hardly inspire more confidence in other things” (Nic. Ethics, 1173a1-3). In this, Socrates is trying to say that the people who object that everything aims at good have no other theory that is any more credible. He states that if only animals who have no understanding desired happiness, then the objectors could be correct. This is because these senseless creatures would not have an aim toward the good, since they do not think with aims. These objectors are proven wrong, though, if intelligent animals desire happiness, because they are indeed aiming at something good rather than not good. Socrates adds in his presumption that even unintelligent creatures may have some natural good that directs their aims toward a good. As a result, the anti-hedonistic views can be eradicated because there is evidence that prudent creatures, and possibly even creatures that are unwise, have an aim toward