Socrates Rhetorical Analysis

1. Doesn’t the same hold for all the other things? Don’t you call shapes and colours admirable on the account of either some pleasure or benefit or both?
2. Doesn’t this also hold for sounds and all things musical?
3. And certainly things that pertain to laws and practices – the admirable ones, that is- don’t fall outside the limits of being either pleasant or beneficial.
4. Doesn’t the same hold for the admirability of the fields of learning, too?
Conclusion. Whenever one of two admirable things is more admirable than the other, it is so because it surpasses the other either in one of these, pleasure or benefit, or in both. Whenever one of two shameful things is more shameful than the other, it will be so because it surpasses the other either in pain
or in badness.
Following from the conclusion that Socrates has drawn in the argument, and base on the fact that Polus believes – it is more shameful to do unjust, it can be interpreted that doing unjust surpasses suffering injustice in pain and in badness.
Therefore, for Socrates, no one would choose to do injustice since no one would choose what is more painful and bad. However, according to Vlastos, there is no suggestion here that the conclusion represents one of Polus’ standing convictions. Since the conclusion does not follow from anything Polus had said so far in this discussion, Socrates ‘mounts the above epagoge to win Polus’ acceptance of conclusion on the spot’. For Vlastos, Polus can reject premise 4 when Socrates tries to apply pleasure and benefit to laws and practices; and if Polus has sensed the shift to these more abstract objects, no less than that of bodies, colours, shapes, and sounds, the pleasure to the actual or ideal beholder is what accounts for admirability, he would have stymied Socrates. And it is true that it would be flawed to compare the more abstract things like laws and practices to bodies, colours, shapes and sounds. Therefore, Socrates refutation is not sound, as one of the premises can be
denied.

Moreover, Callicles offers another argument to challenge Socrates’ belief that no one would choose to do injustice rather than suffer it. Callicles claims that after Polus agreed doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, Polus was “bound and gagged” by Socrates in the discussion, too ashamed to say what he thought. According to Callicles, nature and law are for the most part opposed to each other, so if a person is ashamed and doesn’t dare to sat what he thinks, he’s forced to contradict himself. Callicles accuses Socrates work mischief in his discussions: “if a person makes a statement in terms of law, you slyly question him in terms of nature; if he makes it in terms of nature, you question in terms of law.” And thus, Callicles points out that in fact Polus is correct that by nature, it is worse to suffer injustice, however, by law it is more shameful to commit injustice. This critique against Socrates is very effective, as the greatest utility principle of utilitarianism indicates that people ought to act to maximise pleasure and minimise pain and suffering. Suffering injustice cannot produce the greatest amount of utility, therefore, it is by nature that people would avoid to suffer injustice and thus it is worse to suffer it.

In conclusion, when Plato was writing this dialogue, he clearly suggests that Socrates secured a victory in his refutation to Polus and to oratory. But we must consider that, especially over the claim that Socrates made – doing injustice is worse than suffering it – does not seem coherent and sound. And Socrates seems to have made plenty of inappropriate comparisons that may have misled Polus. Therefore, Socrates did not really refute Polus.