Somalia Research Paper

The Somali Republic is the easternmost extension of the African continent and is bordered by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The Somali are one of the largest ethnic groups in Africa. More than eight million Somalis live in a territory stretching north from northern Kenya to Djibouti and west from the Indian Ocean to the Ogaden in Ethiopia. Although Somalis are often seen as one of the few ethnic groups that define a nation, the country of Somalia does contain small enclaves of other groups. The Somalis speak the Somali language and are Sunni Muslims. By the end of the 19th century years of treaties had partitioned the Somali home territory into the British Somaliland Protectorate, French Somaliland, Italian
Somalia, northern Kenya and the Ogaden in Ethiopia. A total of sixty per cent of the population of Somalia, concentrated primarily in the north, is nomadic. The southern region between the Juba and the Shabeelle rivers is the main area where settled agriculture is practised. Because only 13% of the land is arable, there is intense pressure on available pasture and water. Somalis are divided into six major clan-families, the Daarood, Isaaq, Hawiye, Dir, Digil and Rahanwayn; each of which comprises numerous sub-families and lineages. The Isaaq and the Daarood are predominantly pastoralist, while the Southern clans (mainly Hawiye and Rahanwayn), have long mixed herding with peasant farming. Pastoralists have faced grave problems in environmental degradation of the grain lands in the north since the 1980s. Somalia has an ethnic homogeneity unusual in Africa, with Somalis constituting 85% of the population. Most of its citizens share a common language, religion and culture. Yet it has never achieved lasting stability as a nation. Since the early 1990s its civil war has been one of the most destructive in recent African history. European colonization resulted in the division of Somali territory into five different colonies. Reunification preoccupied successive elites at the cost of addressing more concrete issues. National issues remained undebated while the cultivation of clan and subclan interests accentuated the demise of kinship and the rise of clannism, the politicisation of the clan structure for personal gain. Various possibilities have been proposed in seeking to explain why one of the few nations on the continent with predominantly one ethnic group, one religion, culture and language should have become overcome by a devastating civil war. Some scholars relate this political instability to the Somali clan system, in which retaliation for offences committed by rival clans can easily escalate into warfare. Others argue that Somalia’s recent turmoil reflects efforts by elites to manipulate clan loyalties in the hope of increasing their own wealth. Still other contend that Somalia’s homogeneity is in fact a myth that obscures long –standing tensions between nomadic groups and the descendants of Bantu-speaking slaves. Moreover, some analysts trace the roots of conflict to the colonial period, when access to power and pastoral resources – long regulated by Somalia’s many widely dispersed clan leaders – came under the control of the centralized colonial and later post colonial - state. Due to a lack of written evidence of the early history of the Somaal, numerous historical perspectives on the origins of the Somaal have been presented. According to Arab historical sources the ancestors of the Somali people migrated south from the shores of the Red Sea into the Cushitic-speaking Oromo region from approximately the 10 th century, with the Oromos displacing the Bantu-speaking people further south. According to another source based in northern oral history, the Somali are a hybrid group originating in the marriages of two Arab patriarchs to local Dir women, whose descendants migrated from the Gulf of Aden towards Northern Kenya in the tenth century.
Most contemporary scholars however argue that the ancestors of the Somaal came not from Arabia but from an area between southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya and linguists trace Somali to the Cushitic language group. Based on a hybrid of archaeological, anthropological and historical linguistic evidence, it is now widely asserted that the Somaal originated in the lake regions of current day southern Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Malawi, as a sub-group of the Cushitic peoples. In the decades BC, it is believed that the sub-group known as the Omo-Tana moved northwards from the lake highland areas until reaching the Tana river and the Indian Ocean. Some settled along the Lamu peninsula, situated near the northern Kenya and southern Somalia border, while others continued to move northwards into southern Somalia. In southern Somalia patterns of farming and pastoralism provided a mixed economy for the Omo-Tana group that continued to move from the Lamu peninsula into the Somali peninsula. It is here that the initial references to Somaal were asserted. It is believed that by the 1 st Century AD the Somaal, who had continued to migrate northwards, had reached the Red Sea and occupied most of the Horn of Africa. During the 8 th to 10 th Century the movement of Somaal brought them into contact with coastal
groups. It is known that coastal settlements of non-Somali people existed well before the 10 th century. The coastal culture was hybrid, absorbing influences of the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Persians, Greeks, Arabs and Romans who came to trade and to tap frankincense and myrrh along the Gulf of Aden and sometimes also to settle. The market town of Zelia (Saylac) dates back to the 6 th century BC, when merchants there traded goods from the African interior such as hides, leopard and giraffe skins, ostrich feathers, ivory, rhinoceros horns and slaves.
Coffee came from the Abyssinian highlands to supply a large local market. Saylac later became the centre of the Islamic culture of the northern region; the capital of the medieval state of Adal. On the whole urban commerce and Islam was more developed in the south. There, coastal towns came into contact with Swahili trading settlements and ships sailing from the Indian subcontinent, China and southwest Asia. By the 9th century Mogadishu was the most prosperous of these towns. Between the 11 th and 13 th centuries many Somali converted to Islam. During this time, many of the Prophet’s earliest followers fled the Arabian Peninsula to seek refuge in Africa, where the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia often afforded them protection. This penetration from the peninsula sparked another population shift, this time from the coastal areas into the interior. The political unit that developed in the interior from the 13 th century onward that forms a prototype for contemporary political structures was the diya-paying group. In this system groups belonging to the same clan have a contractual alliance that joins them together in payment and receipt of damages to or from
another group. These groups are governed by Heer, a social contract that incorporated elements of Islamic law and common laws determined by consensus among the males of the community. In addition Somali songs and poetry took on the social and political importance they retain today, preserving oral histories of the clan as well as expressing political ideas and military ambitions. During the 14 th century, goodwill continued to exist between the Ethiopian Christian kingdom and the settled Muslims in the Somalia region, since the highlands made the kingdom largely inaccessible for Islamic conversion campaigns. In the early 15 th century, however, the Ethiopian kind Yeshaq invaded Muslim kingdoms in the Adal region forcing them to relocate to current day Djibouti. During the 15 th and 16 th centuries, centralised state systems emerged within the kingdoms of Ethiopia and Adal, with each of the kingdoms fighting off domination by the other. During the 16 th century, numerous retaliation campaigns were carried out by both kingdoms, and the arrival of the son of Vasco De Gama aided the Ethiopians in routing the Muslim operations. By the mid-16 th century, the repeated Ethiopian excursions into Saylac caused trade and the Islamic cultural centre to shift to Berbera, with both these cities falling under the sphere of power exerted by the sharifs of Mocha (in current day Yemen). By the 17 th century, Saylac and Berbera fell under the flag of the Ottoman empire. The continued fighting in the region, caused the locus of power to shift more inland towards the Ujuuraan State, at the convergence of the Shabeelle and Jubba rivers. The power of Ujuuraan diminished with the arrival of the Portuguese on the East African coast. From the late 15 th century until the early 17 th century migrations brought clans more or less into the regions they occupy today. In the early 17 th century, “Ahmed the left-handed”, with the help of Ottoman troops, conquered a large part of Abyssinia, establishing his capital at Harar.
Between the 16 th and 18 th centuries trade between the interior and the coast increased and clans struggled to establish control over the caravan routes to the Banaadir coast. Eventually, the Somali clans dislodged the Arab-dominated merchant oligarchies in the coastal towns. An exception was that in the early 19th century, the Banaadir coast was nominally controlled by the Omani Sultanate, then based in Zanzibar. Trading in slaves became significant during that time. Somali landholders had long made use of the slave labour as farming was considered a humble occupation. Bantu-speaking slaves captured in Malawi and Tanzania harvested grain and cotton in the Shabeelle and Jubba river areas. Oromo women and children were used as domestic slaves and concubines. By the end of the 19 th century the Somali homeland was partitioned into the five colonial territories referred to earlier: French Somaliland, British Somaliland, the British area known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) indirectly ruled by Kenya, Italian Somaliland and Ethiopian-controlled parts of the Ogaden. During the late 19 th century, the Ethiopian king Menelik II fought with the competing European powers to secure the Ogaden (Somali-inhabited areas) and claim them as Ethiopian territories. These divisions crossed traditional clan boundaries and disrupted centuries old seasonal migrations. The British colonial government meanwhile encouraged the commercialization of livestock production. It was a policy that affected the entire social, economic and political culture of the pastoralists; their livelihood, security of food supplies and their relationship with the environment. From 1899-1920, a local sufi brotherhood leader, was able to launch a successful dervish resistance to Ethiopian and British imperial designs. The resistance ended with his death following a Royal Air Force bombardment. The years 1900-1920 served as a period for colonial consolidation. The British were eager to seize northern Somalia (the former kingdom of Adal) as it could serve as an important source of food produce for its strategically important naval base at Aden in Yemen. The French desired an outpost along the Red Sea to strengthen links with French Indo-China, while the Italians sought to claim territory in the colonial race and thus were able to secure the Banaadir coast. The 1930s Italy, then ruled by Mussolini, recruited more than 40 000 Somali to pursue its claims to Ethiopia, particularly the Ogaden region. The Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie also recruited smaller numbers of Somali nomads. Hostilities between the two imperial powers continued after Italy took the Ogaden and had not come to an end at the time when Italy entered World War 2 in 1940.

That year Somali troops helped Italy take the British Somaliland Protectorate but seven months later, in March 1941, the allied army retook both Somalia and the Ogaden. For the period 1941-1949, Great Britain held all Somali areas except French Somaliland. This period of unity in a region that had originally been under the control of separate groups and then divided among different imperial rulers, helped create a pan Somali identity that would become stronger during the independence struggle. During this period, the British and Somalis also came to accept each other as quasi allies in light of Italian settlements and political organisation within the region. Thus, the British encouraged the Somalis in the southern parts to organise politically. This ushered in the establishment of the first political party in Somalia in 1943; the Somali Youth Club, renamed the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1947. The SYL enjoyed support mainly from the Marjeerteen clan of the Daarood clan-family. In response to this, another political party sprung up in the south; the Hisbia Digil Mirifle (HDM) that enjoyed tacit support from the Italians against the SYL. The SYL enjoyed some measure of support in northern parts of British Somaliland, however the two main parties that emerged in this area were the Somali National League (SNL) which enjoyed Isaaq clan support and the United Somali Party (USP) which enjoyed Dir and Daarood clan support. With the end of World War 2 in 1945, southern Somalia was however still legally an Italian colony, and the future of Somalia fell to the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers.

In January 1948, the Council sent a Commission to Mogadishu to ascertain the desires of the Somalis themselves. The SYL assumed a pro-independence stance with other groups protesting in favour of Italian rule. The SYL presented a proposal to the Commission calling for Somalia to be reunited under a 10 year trusteeship by an international body as a precursor to independence. The HDM departed from its pro-Italian stance and made a similar proposal, but calling for a 30 year trusteeship period. A mix of groups also put in a proposal for a return to Italian rule. Within the Council, under pressure from the USA and USSR, and despite mass Somali protests, the British returned the Ogaden and parts of the hinterlands, such as the Haud region, to Ethiopia. The Commission presented a plan similar to the SYL proposal to the Council, however, the matter was never taken up as in-fighting amongst the Ministers prevented a resolution resulting in the matter being referred to the UN General Assembly for consideration. In 1949, the UN GA voted for southern Somalia to be placed under Italian trusteeship while north western Somalia remained a British protectorate. The UN established the Italian Trusteeship Administration, known by its Italian acronym AFIS (Admministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia), to prepare the territory for independence. A UN Advisory Council was to observe AFIS and report to the UN Trusteeship Council situated at UN headquarters.

The separate colonial policies and development objectives of the imperial powers would have a profound effect on the development of the Somali post-independence political culture and precipitate integration problems. While British Somaliland stagnated, the Italians, under the auspices of AFIS, made positive progress in terms of empowering the Somalis to politically prepare themselves for independence. While there was an initial distrust between AFIS and the SYL, positive political empowerment via Somali-led initiatives granted AFIS legitimacy in the eyes of most Somalis. In 1950, AFIS established the Territorial Council, which was to act as a nascent legislative body for Somalia. The Territorial Council consisted of 35 members, dominated by the SYL and HDM. The Council gained experience in procedural and legislative matters as it participated in debates of proposed AFIS legislation for the territory. AFIS also set-up Municipal and Rural Councils to facilitate local participation in political affairs. Moreover, in addition to these political developments, AFIS also implemented a 7 year development plan in 1954, based on USAID and UNDP blueprints. These plans had positive pay-offs, education enrolment doubled and exports trebled in the period 1954-1960. However, educational progress was hampered by use of numerous languages (Arabic, English, Italian), and despite increased exports, balance of payments deficits persisted. In 1956, elections were held for the first time in Italian Somaliland to elect a new 70 seat Legislative Assembly that was to replace the Territorial Council. The SYL won the majority, claiming 43 of the 70 seats. The SYL leader of the assembly, Mr. Abdulaahi Iise was the first Prime Minister of a local government that would prepare for independence. Iise composed a government of 5 ministerial level posts that was responsible for domestic affairs. AFIS continued controlling areas of foreign policy, defense, external finance and also retained a veto on all affairs brought before the Legislative Assembly until 1958. The Iise government, whose term was from 1956-1960, was perhaps one of the most stable periods in Somali politics. However, it was a period fraught with intra-SYL squabbles as opposed to SYL/HDM squabbles across party lines. A pivotal debate in the Legislative Assembly of Italian Somaliland centred on the question of a unitary versus federal state. The HDM pushed for federalism fearing domination by the SYL, who won the debate in favour of a unitary state based on its numerical strength in the Assembly. Mr. Aadan Abdillah Usmaan, who served as the speaker of parliament under the Iise government, was to be the first President of an independent Somalia.

These empowering political developments led the Somalis in British Somaliland to protest in 1956 calling for a local representative government to be established and to prepare for integration of the two Somalilands. While the Italians had taken progressive steps in southern Somaliland, the British made little effort to administratively and politically prepare northern Somaliland for independence and unification. Thus, in 1957 a Legislative Council was created in British Somaliland. It consisted of 6 members appointed by the British governor to represent the major clan-families in the region. It was further expanded in 1958.

In 1958, elections were held in Italian Somaliland for its respective legislative body that would merge with the British Somaliland Assembly into a new National Assembly following independence. The independence National Assembly was to consist of 123 seats: 90 for Italian Somaliland and 33 for British Somaliland. In the Italian Somaliland elections, the HDM and other political parties boycotted the elections based on accusations that the SYL had tampered with the electoral process. This resulted in the SYL winning 81 of the 90 seats allocated to Italian Somaliland. The SYL had expanded its base, and gave representation to most of the major clan-families in Italian Somaliland. Iise continued as leader in Italian Somaliland. In early 1960, elections were held in British Somaliland for its respective body that would merge to form the National Assembly. The SNL and USP won all but one of the 33 seats allocated to the protectorate. Mohammad Ibrahim Egal (SNL) was chosen as the Prime Minister in British Somaliland to lead a four-man government in the north just prior to independence.

Post-independence

Independence government

Somalia became independent from Italian and British colonial rule in 1960. Upon independence, the two territories faced the daunting challenge of integration. In April 1960, the two leaders from the respective territories, Iise and Egal, met in Mogadishu and agreed to form a unitary state. The unitary government was to be headed by a President as Head of State who was to be elected by the new National Assembly. The President would then appoint a Prime Minister to draw-up a cabinet that would be approved by, and answerable to the National Assembly. Following the merger of the two separate legislative bodies into the National Assembly, Mr. Aadan Abdillah Usmaan, former speaker of parliament in southern Somalia, was elected as President. Usmaan in turn appointed Abdirashiid Ali Shermaake, a modernist in the SYL, as Prime Minister. Shermaake convened a coalition government consisting of SYL, SNM and USP members. Despite this coalition, at independence clan cleavages came to the fore and proved a political challenge for integration. During the separation of the territories, the SNM enjoyed majority support in the north since its support base was largely from the Isaaq clan-family that held a superior majority in the region. Upon unification, the Isaaq suddenly became a numerical minority in the unified Somalia. Its political opposition party in the north, the USP, which garnered support from Daarood in the north, was able to easily join with Daarood counterparts in the southern SYL. This led to Isaaq fears of domination by the south, especially within a unitary as opposed to a federal government arrangement. This distrust and anxiety was confirmed in the 1961 constitutional referendum. The draft constitution and Usmaan’s appointment was overwhelmingly supported in the south, while gaining less than 50% of support from the north.

The independence government was tasked with the role of integration. This was extremely challenging considering that the two territories has been functioning under separate legal, administrative, educational and monetary systems. Furthermore, the limited experience of Somalis in politics and governance, particularly in the north, further compounded these difficulties. Integration between the north and south was not as great a priority as was Pan-Somalism following independence. The government quickly proclaimed the right of Somalis in the Ogaden, Haud and NFD to self-determination and thus pushed for these areas to be unified with Somalia. Incidents between Ethiopians and Somalis in the Haud began soon after independence and the Somalis used guerrilla tactics in the NFD. In 1961, this led a Somali delegation to London were they demanded the separation of the NFD prior to independence being granted to Kenya. The pastoral Oromo and Somalis, who constituted a majority in the NFD, supported the calls for separation. Kenya appeased the Somalis by entertaining the possibility of a decentralised state with a degree of self-autonomy being granted to the NFD under such an arrangement, however, these hopes were dashed in 1964 when an independent Kenya adopted a highly centralised system. This created a high degree of bitterness in the Somali government who outright rejected any previous Anglo-Ethiopian treaties relating to border arrangements and pushed for the Ogaden and Haud to be incorporated into Somalia. The government was quickly drawn into the spiral of mass amounts of military aid in the context of the Cold War, creating relations with China and the USSR. The Pan-Somalism objective was accompanied by a military build-up, with military assistance from the soviet states. Somalia’s relations with its neighbours thus quickly soured as Ethiopia fell under the American sphere of influence with Haile Selassie enjoying mass amounts of US military assistance.

The period 1962-1964 was thus a period of isolation as the independence government pursued its pan-Somali objective and internal politics became bogged down in petty personal and clan rivalries. Ties with Britain were severed following British support for Kenya on its stance on the NFD, relations with France soured as the French continued to occupy Somali inhabited territories, which were later to form Djibouti. Somalia resented large US military assistance programmes in Ethiopia. Reasonably good relations were maintained with Italy which served as a market for Somali goods and continued to provide aid to the independence government. Internal politics were unstable as groups manoeuvred to gain the most political influence for their clans. While some steps had been taken to include political influences from the north, the government did remain mostly dominated by the Marjeeteen of the Daarood clan family. Thus, in 1962, Egal from the SNL and other northern ministers resigned, taking many SNL supporters with them, to form a clan cross-cutting party, the Somali National Congress (SNC). The SNC gained support from southern constituents when a Hawiye faction of the SYL broke away to join it. Other attempts were made to form diverse parties, but they largely failed. In 1963, the SYL grip on power was confirmed when it won 74% of seats in the municipal elections. Armed conflict flared between Ethiopia and Somalia along the border the month prior to elections in 1964. These were the first national elections held post-independence and the SYL won 69 out of 123 seats in the National Assembly. President Usmaan precipitated a political crisis when he chose to nominate someone other than the incumbent Shermaake, who was endorsed by the SYL, as Prime Minister. He chose Abdirizaaq Haaji Husseen, an active member of the SYL since the 1940s, as his choice for PM. Usmaan believed that Husseen would bring “fresh blood” to government as his support base was younger and educated. Husseen’s first proposed Cabinet failed to win the approval of the Assembly. He nominated cabinet members based on their ability and merit as opposed to looking primarily to clan considerations. He constituted a second cabinet, adding three ministerial posts to appease his opposition, and this body was duly approved. The majority of the SYL was further bloated following the ’64 elections when Egal joined the SYL. The SNC that he had formed remained an opposition party. The instability of Somali politics was further aggravated in 1967 when the National Assembly held its presidential elections. The incumbent Usmaan was pitted against former PM Shermaake. Shermaake, a southern member of the SYL, was elected President and nominated Egal from the north as his PM.

Egal was a moderate on pan-Somalism and thus was able to attenuate strained relations with neighbours during his term of duty from 1967-1969. He also made attempts at greater integration, increasing the cabinet from 13 to 15 members making allowances for all major clan-families and even making space for his opposition SNC party. The SYL continued to entrench itself in government until 1969 when national elections were again held. It was the first time that national and municipal elections were held via combined voting. Somalis had been captivated with pan-Somalism since independence and Egal’s moderate approach healed Somalia’s battered international relations but also made space for old clan cleavages to emerge as a central theme in Somali politics. Following legislation passed by the SYL government, a candidate in the ’69 elections could effectively run as a one-man party. This meant there was a proliferation of party choices on the ballots. However, many individuals who won seats based on their independence merged with the SYL post-elections. This left many Somalis disenchanted with politics as one party dominated and nepotism and corruption became the order of the day. SYL dominance sprung from 73 to 109 out of 123 seats, undoubted ly an unhealthy majority for a nascent state attempting democracy.

This fragile political situation came to a head in October 1969, when President Shermaake was killed by one of his bodyguard while PM Egal was out of the country. The intellectuals and armed forces were the most dissatisfied with the state of post-independence politics. Egal, a member of the northern Isaaq clan-family, opted to nominate someone from the Daarood clan-family as a successor to Shermaake upon his death. The military did not believe that this was the answer to the problems that plagued Somalia and thus on 21 October 1969, army units staged a coup d’etat, taking over strategic points in Mogadishu and rounding up government officials and prominent political individuals.

Barre regime

Although Major General Mohammed Siad Barre was not the mastermind behind the coup, he quickly assumed control over military units that had participated in bringing down Egal’s government. Traditional rivalries among various Somali clans, including the Isaaq of the north, Ogadeni of the south and Hawiye of central Somalia, were exacerbated by the divide and rule policies of Mohammed Siad Barre, whose regime (1969-’91) had one of the world’s worst human rights records. As many as 500,000 Somalis starved to death as warring clans struggled for power.

In 1969 the military seized power, disbanded the National Assembly and suspended the constitution. It placed Maj. Gen. Barre as the head of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). Siad Barre’s main support outside the military came from urban intellectuals and technocrats who wished to diminish the power of clan identification and establish Somalia as a modern nation. The protagonists of the coup had no real ideological basis, their driving force was to end tribalism, nepotism, corruption and misrule. Thus it is ironic that later the main characteristic of the Barre regime would be his clanistic divide-and-rule policies. Barre retrospectively adopted a Marxist socialist ideological preference.

Barre’s SRC was the governing body for his authoritarian regime. The SRC, in addition to abolishing the Assembly and suspending the constitution, also disbanded all political parties and set up National Security Courts (NSC) as its judicial branch which was a watchdog against counter-revolutionaries. It also renamed Somalia the Somali Democratic Republic. In 1969, shortly after the coup, the SRC defined its domestic policy in the First Charter of the Revolution. The Charter also defined the sources of political power in Barre’s regime. Law 1 of the Charter stated that all the functions of the President, National Assembly, Council of Ministers (cabinet) and most of those of the courts were ascribed to the SRC. The SRC consisted of a 25-man military junta that fulfilled the role of an executive committee that was responsible for policy formulation and execution. Decisions were to be based on a majority vote. In addition to this there was a subordinate 14-man Secretariat; the Council of Secretaries of State (CSS). The CSS was essentially the Cabinet responsible for the execution of daily government. It lacked any real political power as it consisted mainly of civilians and moreover many Heads of Ministries within the CSS where concurrently members of the SRC. Barre concurrently held numerous titles: Head of State, President of the SRC, Chairman of the CSS and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. He was essentially the supreme executive and legislative power in Somalia and he was easily situated to manipulate clans for his own personal power and gain. Barre was a proponent of “scientific socialism”; an ideological mix of Lenin, Marx, the Quran, Mao and Mussolini which advocated self-reliance, communal development and the eradication of the influence of lineage. Barre perceived clanism as the main hindrance to national unity. Thus in his earlier years of power, he fervently pursued his scientific socialism instituting “re-education” programmes for civil servants and civilians alike. Such programmes included professional training and political indoctrination stressing community identification as opposed to lineage as the focal point for all political and social activities. He also nationalised the manufacturing and agricultural trades and accelerated the development of infrastructure. These “crash programmes” were put in place to rapidly increase economic and social development. One of the main objectives of his programmes was also to establish a written and standard form of the Somali language. The government incurred steep debt as a result of this spending, which coincided with a decline in agricultural production. The attempts to resettle nomadic pastoralists and settle larger agricultural communities also failed. When a 1974-5 drought destroyed approximately 30 per cent of Somalia’s livestock and there was decreased agricultural output, many in Somalia were faced with famine.

Opposition to Barre was evident from the early days of his government. In 1970 he deflected a coup attempt and in 1971 members of the high echelon of his government were accused of plotting his assassination. His reaction was brutal reprisals and a security machine that protected and promoted his personal power. In 1971, Barre was quick to declare his intention to end military rule in the face of internal and external opposition. Thus in 1976, the SRC convened the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) to transform the SRC into a legitimate political body with a Supreme Council which would act as its new central committee. The established Supreme Council was to consist of 93 members of whom 19 would be from the SRC with additional seats being held by civilian advisers, heads of ministries and public figures. A Council of Ministers was to replace the CSS. This 5-member Council was to act as the executive power, or politburo, of the party. Barre and his son-in-law were both members of the politburo. In July 1976, the SRC was dissolved and power was vested in the SRSP via its Supreme Council. Barre himself was Secretary-General of the SRSP and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, essentially leaving day-to-day government in his hands. By the late 1970s, it was evident that Barre’s regime and his policy of scientific socialism were not effectively addressing the challenges that Somalia needed to confront, thus Barre realised the need to revert to clanistic rhetoric to maintain his grip on power.

In 1977, Emperor Haile Selassie was ousted in a socialist coup that brought Mengistu Haile Mariam to power. Barre, with Soviet support had developed one of the largest national forces on the continent, the Somali National Army (SNA). He slowly moved in and launched offensives to regain the Ogaden and Haud regions that were under Ethiopian control. The war between Somalia and Ethiopia lasted from 1977-1978 and the Somalis suffered a gross defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian military machine that had previously been propped up by US military support. Following the installation of socialist Mengistu, Cuban forces quickly rushed to aid the Ethiopian side. Cuban support meant that the usually weaker Ethiopian forces could easily overcome and drive out the SNA and other rebel movements in the area.

The crushing defeat in the Ogaden War left many Somalis further disillusioned with Barre’s regime. The war caused a massive influx of Somali and Oromo refugees from the Ogaden region and the economy that was struggling to support its own people, found itself responsible for refugees. International agencies estimated an influx of approximately 650,000 refugees, although now it is believed that the number was indeed much higher. This placed a heavy strain on Somalia’s already stressed resources. The switch of Soviet support from Somalia to Mengistu’s Ethiopia meant that Somalia suddenly found itself a client of the US. The US was quick to seize the opportunity to use the naval base at Berbera. However, the US was wary of giving Somalia military aid beyond its internal security needs.

Following the Ogaden war, Somalis were severely disappointed and faced an internal identity crisis. Barre was coming under immense internal and external pressure for political and economic liberalisation. Following the end of the war, a group of military men attempted a coup in 1978. The author of the coup and other key members were summarily executed. The exception was Colonel Abdilaahi Yusuf Ahmed who escaped to Ethiopia and formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) that was opposed to Barre. Because of the mounting pressure, in 1979, Barre held elections for a “people’s parliament”. Only members of the SRSP were eligible to stand in these elections. By 1980, there had been two reshufflings of the politburo, which led to greater internal confusion and the old SRC was resuscitated. Essentially, by 1980 there were three overlapping institutions; the politburo, the parliament and the SRC, this meant all decision-making was solely in the hands of Barre. Under international pressure, Baree moves towards market-oriented structural reforms in the 1980s and his response to internal political pressure was to increase severe government repression. In response to internal dynamics, Barre’s rhetoric became increasingly clanistic, pitting one group against another to secure his own base. His government was known by the acronym MOD: Mareehaan, Ogadeni and Dulbahante; all three clans of the Daarood clan-family and the respective lineage of Barre, his mother and son-in-law. These three clans dominated the inner circle of his regime.

Barre reacted to challenges to his authority with severe reprisals, especially later in his rule. The threats to his regime began in the period 1980-1985, leading up to the eventual civil war which began in 1986. Opposition movements such as the SSDF had already began to organise. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was organized in London in 1981 by intellectuals, businessmen and religious leaders, most of whom belonged to the Isaaq clan. This clan, which had constituted a majority in the north under Great Britain and later held key political positions in the post-independence civilian governments, also played an important part in the lucrative livestock and qaat trades. The aim of the SNM was to see the removal of Barre from power. In 1982, Somali dissidents with Ethiopian air support invaded Central Somalia. By 1984, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a group that had traditionally campaigned for the Ogaden to be ceded to Somalia, stopped its incursions into Ethiopia claiming that Barre’s regime had been using their right to self-determination as a way of advancing his expansionist policy. Barre had previously enjoyed Ogadeni support. The WSLF changed its policy to favouring greater autonomy based on a federal arrangement with Ethiopia. In 1986, Barre had a critical car accident which required a month’s recuperation. Government came to a standstill as the top echelons fought amongst themselves.

Faced with increased unpopularity and insecurity, Barre launched a campaign of terror against his own people. The campaigns were aimed at civilians and politicians alike from other clans and clan-families. Barre’s elite Red Berets carried out these campaigns. The first campaign was carried out in southern Somalia against the Marjeerteen clan of the Daarood clan-family in 1986. The SSDF enjoyed support from the Marjeerteen. The campaigns attacked water sources, civilians, livestock and food supplies. Because the Marjeerteen had monopolised power during the independence government, the other clans failed to come to their aid when Barre unleashed his terror campaigns. Next, Barre targeted the Isaaq of northern Somalia following the launching of armed resistance via a military campaign of the SNM. The Isaaq launched their resistance because of their discontentment over continual marginalisation of their tribe and region. Government forces reacted extremely harshly to the Isaaq uprising, completely destroying the important city of Hargeysa. Some aid organisations and the UN stated that the government campaign in Isaaq regions amounted to genocide. By 1989, members of the Hawiye clan (dominant in central Somalia, particularly in and around Mogadishu) were also eager to overthrow Barre. Some members of the Hawiye had enjoyed an alliance with the northern based SNM during the early 1980s, but by 1989, Hawiye leaders decided to form their own United Somali Congress (USC). By mid-1989, massive uprisings were being staged by Hawiye supported USC groups and others in Mogadishu. Barre’s regime made the political mistake of turning on clans and groups present in Mogadishu and this led to his eventual removal from power.

Following the end of the Cold War, t he weakness of the military state became conspicuous with the disappearance of Soviet aid and technical assistance. The failing economy and political system reawakened long suppressed discontent over the regional neglect of the north, compounded by the fact that various clan groups in the north and elsewhere were not treated equally. The historically strong and wealthy Isaaq had been systematically undermined in military and civil posts and through the unequal development of resources and the siting of development projects. Barre had constructed the inner core of his government from representatives of three clans belonging to the Daarood clan family. Two events in 1990 signalled the death of Barre’s regime. In May 1990, a group of various prominent political leaders from across the clan spectrum formed the Council for National Reconciliation and Salvation (CNRS) to push for political change. They presented a Manifesto signed by 114 leading Mogadishu citizens calling for political change. In June 1990, a soccer match in Mogadishu turned into a mass anti-Barre riot. Barre’s forces opened fire on the demonstrators and at the same time Barre sentenced 45 signatories of the Manifesto to death. This just served to further fuel anti-Barre sentiments in the capital and waves of opposition and armed fighting eventually led to the removal of Barre from power in January 1991.

Post-Barre: The stateless nation: early 1990s

The USC and Barre’s Red Berets fought in open warfare in the streets of Mogadishu for a month before forcing Barre from power. While the various clans and proliferation of political parties had temporarily been unified in their fight against the repressive Barre regime, there was no cohesion in terms of political ideology or vision for Somalia. Post-Barre, a plethora of political parties/organisations vied for power: the SNM (Isaaq dominated, northern Somalia); the SSDF (Marjeerteen of the Daarood dominated, widely dispersed); the USC (Hawiye dominated in central and southern Somalia); the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM, Ogadeni dominated); the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA, Gadabursi of the Dir dominated); and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM, Rahanwayn dominated, interriverrine areas). The USC armed forces had forced Barre out of Mogadishu without direct military assistance from other groups. It was quick to announce the formation of an interim transitional government even though it did not assert its authority over the entire Somali territory. Other clans and groups would not support this. Furthermore a rift within the USC prolonged internal fighting in Mogadishu. The USC split into two distinct factions.

The USC Abgaal-Hawiye faction and the USC Habar Gidir-Hawiye faction were distinctly formed. The Abgaal faction was led by Ali Mahdi Mahammad who supported a USC-led interim transitional government and was elected by his faction as President for the interim government. The Habar Gidir faction was led by Mahammad Faarah Aideed who contested the authority of the USC to form a government and favoured cooperation with other parties, in particular the SNM in the north. The two groups turned Mogadishu into a war zone as they vied for influence and control of key outposts. Aideed didn’t recognise the interim government formed by the Abgaal faction and thus he formed his own alternative government in southern Mogadishu.

In northern Somalia, the SNM opposed the unilateral takeover by the USC and quickly assumed responsibility for all local governance issues in the region. The SNM convinced all major clan leaders in the northern regions to attend a conference in Buroa which led to the independence declaration. On 17 May 1991, the independent Republic of Somaliland was declared. The Republic of Somaliland declared its borders to be that of the former British Somaliland (the states of Awdal, Woqooyi, Glabeed, Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool – the north-western tip of Somalia). The Secretary General of the SNM, Abdirahmaan Ahman Ali “Tour” was appointed President and Hasan Iise Jaama Vice-President. At the conference in Buroa, a national flag was chosen, certain fundamental freedoms were assured and it was agreed that elections would be scheduled for 1993. A Standing Committee was established, giving careful consideration to all clans, to draft a constitution. Somaliland has since being attempting to gain international recognition. Peaceful elections were held in 1993, with Mohammad Ibrahim Egal voted in as President. In 2002, President Egal passed away and his Deputy, Dahir Riyale Kahin peacefully assumed the Presidency. Kahin is a member of the Gadabursi clan of the Dir clan-family. Thus, the peaceful acceptance of a non-Isaaq leader in the region is a positive step towards mature democracy. Moreover, Kahin is also not a member of the SNM, but from the Democratic United Peoples’ Movement, known by its Somali acronym UDUB.

As the situation in central and southern Somalia continued to worsen, other regions also began seeking greater autonomy as no central government in Mogadishu was established. The fighting between the Daarood and Hawiye clan families essentially turned the area between Mogadishu and the Kenyan border into a complete shatter zone; there were mass killings, accusations of ethnic cleansing, rape, and the destruction of livestock and agricultural lands which led to numerous humanitarian emergencies in Mogadishu and the interriverrine areas. Ethnic minorities were particularly targeted and many lands seized for the larger clans. Somalia was characterised by an economy of plunder and criminality whereby inter-clan fighting could not be distinguished from responses to criminality. International aid was drawn into this destructive “looting and plunder” mentality. In March 1992, the UN mediated talks between the numerous USC factions to bring peace to Mogadishu. However, the ceasefire and the promise of disarmament were never honoured. Ali Mahdi and Aideed’s factions continued fighting and international food aid was used as a weapon in the conflict.

UN intervention in Somalia

In April 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 751 which called for 50 UN Observers to be sent to Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1), mandated in terms of the Resolution, consisted of 50 unarmed observers and 500 lightly armed infantry. By August 1992, UNOSOM 1’s mandate was enlarged to also protect humanitarian convoys in addition to UN personnel. During this time, the ceasefire was not honoured and fighting between Ali Mahdi and Aideed’s factions meant that the situation in Mogadishu continued to deteriorate. Food aid was being used as a weapon in the civil war, with both sides trying to starve the other. Aideed launched an opposition against the intervention which resulted in his supporters attacking Pakistani peacekeepers situated at the airport in November 1992 with the threat of more violence.

It quickly became clear that UNOSOM 1 was not successfully providing adequate security for the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians caught in the cross-fire of conflict and a natural- and war induced drought. The Security Council thus authorised a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), under Resolution 794, in December 1992. Their mandate was to protect and safeguard relief efforts. The US-led UNITAF lasted until May 1993. UNITAF included a large force compliment of 28,000 US troops who were given a UN Chapter 7 mandate to “use all necessary means” to secure humanitarian assistance. The US Special Envoy, Robert Oakley, negotiated an agreement on disarmament with major clan leaders in Mogadishu in January 1993. The UN Secretary-General pushed for UNITAF to carry out the disarmament, but the US insisted that this was not part of UNITAF’s mandate nor its priority, although it did carry out some small-scale disarmament operations. Thus, following the end of UNITAF’s mandate in May 1993, the UN made provision for UNOSOM 2 in Security Council Resolution 814. UNOSOM 2 meant that well-equipped US troops from UNITAF were replaced with poorly equipped Pakistani peacekeepers which decreased the effectiveness of UN patrols in Mogadishu.

UNOSOM 2 had a broader mandate but lacked the capacity to fulfil it. It had an authorised strength of 26,000 but never reached more than 16,000. UNOSOM 2 was given the go-ahead to undertake disarmament operations and a wider nation building mandate; helping Somalis to rehabilitate their political, social and economic institutions. The UN had little experience in nation building and the capacity shortage, too great a mandate and confusing leadership structures meant that UNOSOM 2 was a dismal failure.

UNOSOM 2 fell under the general leadership of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe. Concurrently, the military contingent of UNOSOM 2 fell under the separate leadership of a designated Turkish Lieutenant General, Cevik Bir. The US provided UNOSOM 2 with logistical personnel but was at pains to keep its military staff in Somalia separate. Lieutenant General Bir’s deputy, American Major General Thomas Montgomery, besides acting as his deputy also separately commanded a US Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Later on, the US also deployed its distinct US Army Ranger and Delta Force units that did not fall under the US command in Somalia but were directly controlled from the US Central Command (CENTCOM). These overlapping command structures, coupled with insufficient troops to effectuate the disarmament of hostile clan factions and great expectations based on a wide mandate led to UNOSOM 2’s failure. Neither UNITAF nor UNOSOM 2 were able to end hostilities or win local support as factions violently rebelled against the authority and presence of foreign troops in Somalia. UNOSOM 2 functioned from May 1993 until March 1995. In June 1993, Aideed followed through on his earlier threat of greater violence when his supporters killed 25 Pakistani peacekeepers. The international community was outraged and the following day a UN Security Council Resolution (837) called for action against Aideed. In is within this context that the US Task Force Ranger was deployed in August 1993 that reported to CENTCOM. The Task Force was tasked with finding and capturing Aideed. Their mission was never fulfilled and in an operation in October 1993 eighteen US soldiers were killed and one captured alive following fighting between Somali militias and UN and US troops that resulted in the downing of 2 Black Hawk helicopters and fire fighting in the streets of Mogadishu. US forces were to withdraw from Somalia by March 1994 with the last UNOSOM 2 forces evacuated from Mogadishu in March 1995.

The stateless nation: late 1990s

Following the disastrous UN mission to Somalia, anarchy again prevailed as low scale inter-clan fighting continued, minorities were excluded and discriminated against and no agreement could be reached to form a central government. By 1998, the autonomous self-governing state of Puntland (Bari, Nogaal Garowe and parts of Muduq, Sool and Sanaag) had been established. Puntland was under the leadership of Abdilaahi Yusuf Ahmed, founder of the SSDF. Yusuf was able to exert his power mainly based on military strength; little progress was made in terms of setting up real governance structures in the region. Throughout the 1990s, conflict flared between the Independent Republic of Somaliland and Puntland over areas in the Sool and Sanaag districts. Somaliland claimed its authority over the districts based on the previous borders between British and Italian Somaliland and the SSDF pushed for inclusion of parts of the districts into Puntland based on clan affiliation. Yusuf’s military strength assured his political leadership. In late 2001, an internal political crisis emereged when Yusuf refused to hand over power and rejected the election of his successor Mr. Jama Ali Jama. He was able to maintain his power grip through his military prowess.

The interriverrine areas were central conflict hotspots. The fertile agricultural land between the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers and the good pasture lands in the region were devastated by the conflict. These areas were home to many of Somalia’s ethnic minorities who constitute approximately 15% of the population and the Rahanwayn clan-family. In 1999, the Rahanwayn Resistance Army (RRA) was established. The RRA controlled the Bay and Bakool districts as an autonomous region and declared the “State of southwest Somalia”.

Some attempts at peace were made during the late 1990s, but all were unsuccessful. In August 1996, Ethiopia organised and sponsored a reconciliation conference that brought together most of the factions. However, Hussein Aideed, who took control of the influential Habar Gidir faction following the death of his father boycotted the conference. In November 1997, another unsuccessful meeting was held in Cairo. The period 1998-1999 saw the emergence of two aforementioned autonomous regions within Somalia as fighting continued.

Post-2000: Attempts at peace

Djibouti is home to members of the Iise clan of the Dir clan-family and a minority of Isaaq clan-family communities. Traditionally the Iise and Isaaq competed with each other in the north western regions. Djibouti was deeply disturbed by the declaration of an Independent Somaliland in 1991. Following the complete failure of the UN mission and other peace talks during the 1990s, Djibouti thought it in the best interests of its Iise members to pursue peace in Somalia and advocate a strong central government in Mogadishu that could reclaim jurisdiction over the Isaaq-dominant Somaliland. Djibouti thus launched the Somali National Peace Conference in Arta, in May 2000. It brought together many warlord members and it was the first time that the warlords would not be allowed to dictate and control the agenda. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was created at the Arta talks. The TNG consisted of a 245 member Transitional National Assembly based on clan representation. This Assembly elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as Somalia’s president. The TNG was to function until August 2003 and was to operate as a three-year interim national authority to prepare for a constitutional conference and elections.

The TNG lacked recognition and exerted very little power in Somalia. It was perceived as illegal and unrepresentative of Somalia. It did not enjoy the support of militia factions controlling Mogadishu, leaders from Puntland or Somaliland, the RRA or the Juba Valley Authority (JVA). The TNG was also internally divided and received much criticism for being dominated by one clan of the Hawiye clan-family. Its lack of credibility meant that it could not attract the level of foreign assistance needed to make it operational. Because it didn’t exert control over Mogadishu it was unable to raise taxes or control the important ports; businessmen also opposed the TNG.

In 2001, three other main opposition groups, in addition to the RRA, emerged that strongly opposed and challenged the TNG. The Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) was established in 2001 and consisted of numerous political parties, clan militias and other groups opposed to the TNG. The commonality of groups drawn into the SRRC was Ethiopian patronage. Abdulaahi Yusuf Ahmed, the leader of Puntland and the SSDF, was the strongman of the SRRC. The SRRC had no common ideology or vision. Many of the SRRC members were in fact engaged in clan warfare amongst themselves, but they were drawn into a loose alliance based on their opposition to the TNG, and their Ethiopian patronage. Another opposition group known as the G-8 emerged in opposition to the TNG. The G-8 was also a loose alliance of various clan militia groups. Among the groups represented in the G-8 were warlords who effectively controlled Mogadishu and important business and trade interests, such as the airport and port areas. Most of the G-8 militias also extended their power beyond Mogadishu into other areas in southern and central Somalia and as such often came into conflict with the RRA and the JVA. The G-8 factions were mostly from Hawiye clans. They had no political ideology and were potential spoilers for any Somali peace process. Because their patronage and wealth was acquired as a result of the upheaval in Mogadishu, they mostly preferred the status quo. They were opposed to any form of decentralisation that could diminish the role of the capital and were also opposed to any government such as the TNG or other, in which they did not have a large and dominant voice. The JVA is another opposition group that emerged post-2000. The JVA is a loose alliance of Habar Gidir and Mareehaan clans (two different clan-families), that control the important port of Kismayo in southern Somalia. The JVA has been described as being in essence, an external occupier of Kismayo. They have no clear political or other policy; they simply use militia to protect the interests of businessmen who profit handsomely from trade in the port.

The collapsed state machinery of Somalia has meant that a plethora of political parties, clan-affiliated militias, loose alliances and other internal actors have emerged, died and re-emerged during the last two decades. The sheer number of actors, whether with a clear political objective or not, has made any peace process for Somalia extremely difficult.

In late 2002, when it was clear that the TNG was not the solution to Somalia’s problems, the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), a regional orgainisation in the Horn of Africa, launched a National Reconciliation Conference in Mbagathi, Kenya. Many Somali stakeholders and internal actors were present in these IGAD talks including the defunct TNG, the SRRC and some G-8 members. Somaliland, although invited, refused to attend, asserting that it is an independent sovereign state that will not entertain ideas of unifying again with the Somali Democratic Republic. The talks from 2002-2004 were long, tortuous and often hampered by delays and squabbles. By October 2004, however, the talks had rendered progress in that a 275-member transitional parliament had been established under the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was operating out of Nairobi, Kenya. On 14 October 2004, the transitional parliament elected Abdulaahi Yusuf Ahmed (the founder of the SSDF, the SRRC strongman and the president of Puntland) as interim President. In turn, Yusuf appointed Ali Muhammad Ghedi as his Prime Minister on 4 November 2004.

The TFG elicits its political legitimacy for the Transitional National Charter, which was hammered out at the talks. The Charter established the parliament based on a formula whereby 61 seats would be granted to each of the four major clan-families and the remaining 31 seats would be reserved for other minority groups. The Charter is clear in stating the theoretical dedication of the TFG to certain rights, freedoms and principles; democratic guiding principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law, political pluralism etc. However, some international bodies, such as the International Crisis Group, have criticised the document in terms of its lack of clear policy direction and operationalisation guidelines for transitional institutions. The offices of the President and Prime Minister are outlined, but the checks and balances needed to ensure good governance are opaque. It has been critiqued as lacking clear direction for federal institutions and as being unclear on a premise for future elections, constitutional issues, and discussion on Somaliland’s assertion of self-determination.

While progress made at the talks is admirable, such progress must not necessarily always be viewed to be in the best interests of Somalis. The TFG has already taken some actions in contravention of the Charter from which it elicits its powers and such trends are reminiscent of the unsuccessful, former TNG. Although the TFG is still extremely young, such trends are already a cause for concern for outside observers. The article stipulating that 12% of all parliamentary seats should be fulfilled by women has not been met. The article stipulating that the PM is to be a member of parliament has also been manipulated for political expedience. When the parliament failed to approval Yusuf’s proposal that a PM be allowed to be a non-member of parliament, he persuaded one of his factional allies to vacate his seat in favour of Yusuf’s choice candidate. The controversial adoption of a federal structure for Somalia, which was made without much substantive debate on the issue, raised concerns over the stability of a federal arrangement. However, the future constitution is to be submitted for a popular referendum.

The election of Yusuf as interim president has also raised some eyebrows. Yusuf has been involved in Somali politics for quite some time and some perceive him as the archetypal Somali warlord. His focus has been mainly on military actions with political and governance issues often second in line. The strong military hand that he uses to control Puntland compared to the embryonic governance structures testifies to this. During the earlier years of the SSDF, Yusuf established close ties with Ethiopia which continue today. Ethiopia has been quite influential during the Mgabathi talks and many Somali politicians are suspicious of Yusuf’s close ties with Ethiopia and consider him a proxy for the country. The International Crisis Group has also suggested that Yusuf might in fact have won the presidency election by buying votes with tacit Ethiopian support. While some observers are alarmed by Yusuf’s warlord background and the decisive blow which he dealt his elected opposition in Puntland in 2001, others attribute to him decisive leadership, and statesman-like qualities. Arguments can be found in favour of both portrayals of him. The actions of the nascent TFG will be indicative of the man as interim President and the wider future of Somalia.

Outlook

The stability of the TFG has already been tested when PM Ghedi’s first proposed Cabinet failed to be approved. President Yusuf called for a 20,000 strong AU peacekeeping force to help his government relocate to Mogadishu. The December 15, 2004 deadline for relocation from Nairobi to Mogadishu passed and by early 2005, the government had not yet been installed. Somalis demonstrated in the streets of Mogadishu in opposition to Ethiopian contingents being sent as part of the AU peacekeeping troops, and there is a general weariness about foreign troops coming to Somalia based on the collective memory of the failed UN intervention during the 1990s. The challenges that the TFG have to tackle are enormous and the international community is anxiously waiting to gage how the TFG performs on certain key issues.

Some of the urgent issues that the TFG will need to address include an enforceable ceasefire and disarmament arrangement, establishing transitional political institutions in anticipation of elections, substantial engagement on the type of government that Somalis want (federal vs. central state), and a constitutional roundtable. Possible obstacles for the TFG, beyond relocation, include: securing domestic sources of revenue to operationalise government – many militias secure their livelihood from controlling ports and trade routes and are likely to resist attempts from the TFG to gain control over them and introduce taxation systems; effectively execute governance activities with a bloated 72-member Cabinet, establishing independence and addressing claims of being a proxy for Addis Ababa; negotiating with autonomous regions such as the State southwest of Somalia, Puntland, the JVA and the independent Somaliland.