Soviet

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: 1919-1945

Soviet foreign policy throughout the period from 1919 to 1945 is confusing and often contradictory. By the 1920’s the Bolshevik communists found themselves the leaders of a former Great Power which was pulled by conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, communist ideology preached a world-wide “worker’s revolution” whose goal was the dissolution of all nation-states. On the other hand, Russia needed the support of other nations in order to rebuild its political, economic and military power. The result is a foreign policy which is best described as schizophrenic as the Soviet leadership aided and abetted revolution aimed at destroying the traditional international order while also trying to maintain a place in that same system.
The 1920’s witnessed the success of the Bolshevik state against apparently insurmountable odds. By 1922 the conflicting paths of Russian foreign policy were clearly evident. In 1919 Lenin had called for the first Communist International or Comintern to be held in Moscow. This was the gathering of revolutionaries from all nations who would be inspired and directed in Leninist-Marxist ideology in order to foment the worker’s movement back in their home countries. The hope was that within a few short years the Bolshevik success would be replicated world-wide and traditional nation-states would be extinguished once and for all as a global “dictatorship of the proletariat” took over. Not surprisingly, the Bolshevik’s were given a chilly reception by the capitalist world powers and found themselves ostracized from the new world order. Russia was excluded from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and, as a result, lost much of its valuable western territory to Poland and numerous other East European countries. These new countries served a two-fold purpose in both isolating Germany and the Soviet Union and in containing any renewed aggression on their parts.
The Comintern was unsuccessful but the Soviets continued to sponsor and host its annual meeting in order to maintain their control and influence in the world-wide communist movement. This undermined the traditional aspect of Soviet diplomacy as other governments (understandably) perceived the Comintern as an aggressive attack on their social and political order. The United States, for instance, had its first (but not last) Red Scare in 1919 with the federal government and local authorities actively prosecuting and arresting any communists or communist sympathizers. As a result, the Bolsheviks were forced to work with the other international pariah of the decade – the Germans. The two countries concluded the Rapallo Treaty in 1922 which ended the isolation of each and opened the way to significant military and economic cooperation. The German military could subvert the restrictions in the Versailles Treaty by training in Russia and the Russians could develop their military (especially tanks, aircraft and gas weapons) by “borrowing” from the German visitors. The Germans also made long term loans to the USSR (aiding the success of the NEP and Five Year Plans) while the USSR’s industrialization efforts provided a ready market for German industrial equipment. By 1932, almost 50% of Russian imports came from Germany.
Traditional foreign policy was pursued by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs headed by G.V. Chicherin from 1918 to 1930. Chicherin argued that communism would inevitably prevail and, therefore, there was no harm (and considerable benefit) in maintaining diplomatic relations with the capitalist world. This outlook he termed peaceful co-existence and it boor fruit sporadically throughout the 1920’s with the British and French governments. When the British or French elected predominately left-leaning governments diplomatic ties were strengthened (the British first recognized the USSR in 1924 under the auspices of Ramsey MacDonald’s Labor Party control). When conservatives held power, the relations were strained or broken (as in 1927 when the Baldwin government conducted full scale raids on Russian trade and diplomatic missions in London). The Great Depression provided greater incentive for restoring relations as nations scrambled to find foreign countries with which to establish trade. Most notably, the United States – under the presidency of the Democrat Franklin Roosevelt – formally recognized the Soviet Union and opened trade agreements to bolster the faltering US economy.
The 1930’s witnessed a distinct shift in world relations. Hitler’s Germany severed its ties with the Soviets (the Nazis being distinctly anti-communist, anti-slavic and anti-semetic) and signed non-aggression pacts with Poland and other east European countries to isolate the Russians. Stalin’s paranoia – already reinforced by the treatment of the Soviet Union at Paris in 1919 and throughout the world in the 1920’s – began to mount as he watched the Western/capitalist powers side with Hitler and the fascist on numerous issues. The Germans and Russians found themselves on opposite sides in violent conflicts flaring around the world (most notably as Hitler helped Franco and the fascists defeat the Soviet-backed Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939). As Hitler’s demands became more aggressive the British and French searched for a means of establishing a diplomatic framework to contain his expansion. Yet, even when faced with the violent expression of Nazi racism and ambition these nations were still reluctant to deal with Stalin and the communists.
During the late 1930’s a resurgent Nazi Germany began making demands which pressed the formerly Allied powers of World War I to eliminate the constraints imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. As Hitler won each concession his ambition and power grew stronger. Stalin and the communist – the nemesis of fascist ideology – grew ever more alarmed as the Western capitalist appeared to be forging stronger ties with Germany. The Munich Conference of 1938 was the final straw. Hitler’s demand for the return to Germany of the Sudetenland prompted an emergency meeting attended by Britain, France, Germany and Italy. The result of the conference was a full concession to Hitler’s demands at the expense of the Czechoslovak nation. The Soviet’s were not invited nor consulted. Stalin drew one important lesson from this experience – the Western capitalists would always ally with Hitler at the expense of lesser powers. Their anti-communist paranoia lead them to favor the Nazis and left Stalinist Russia as isolated as ever. The Soviets were isolated and surrounded by enemies.
By mid-1939 tensions were mounting and a world war seemed inevitable. Stalin looked at the world situation and concluded that only by allying with Hitler could he best protect Soviet interests. A pact with Germany would buy time to continue the Soviet military and industrial expansion and prevent the danger of a two-front war (the Russians were again in conflict with the Japanese on their Pacific borders). In the process Stalin would regain portions of Poland and Eastern Europe lost in World War One. Hitler gained many of the same advantages for his ambitions in Western Europe. Thus, in August, 1939 the two powers cynically concluded the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. In September the two countries invaded and dismembered Poland. Hitler then turned west (culminating in the defeat of France in May, 1940) while Stalin annexed the Baltic States and invaded Finland (formally a piece of Russia’s czarist empire). The Russian’s were eventually victorious but the Winter War against Finland demonstrated the fundamental weakness of Stalin’s military machine. The Russian army was very large but lacked resources, experience and leadership. Hitler’s assessment was the Soviet government was like a rotted structure – “kick in the door and the whole thing will collapse.” Frustrated by his inability to invade Great Britain Hitler betrayed his ally and attacked the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa (June, 1941). With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the former enemies of Britain, America and Russia found themselves united as the Grand Alliance.
Although the allies would defeat the Axis their relationship was not without its problems. Stalin saw the role of the Soviet Union as crucial to winning the war. 80% of the German army was locked in a life and death struggle in Russia. If Russia were to be defeated, Hitler would have free reign (and Russian resources) to annihilate the British and American armies. Thus, he argued that it was crucial for the allies to attack Germany quickly and save Russia from destruction. The British and American leaders saw it differently – while Hitler was distracted by Russia they could build up their strength and attack the “soft under-belly” of the Axis powers through North Africa and Italy. To Stalin this appeared to be a naked abuse of the Grand Alliance – the British and Americans could increase their world influence (especially in the Mediterranean and oil rich Middle East) while the communist were fatally weakened while defeating the Nazis. This debate – called the second front controversy – strengthened Stalin’s paranoia about the western/capitalist ambitions.
Throughout 1942 and 1943 the British and Americans pursued their jointly agreed upon strategy and liberated French North Africa from Axis control and then successfully invaded Italy. Meanwhile, the Soviets defeated the German invaders and began a long and brutal counter-attack to regain Russian territory. While being supplied by their allies (especially the US) the blood spilled in Russia was entirely Soviet in origin. Stalin again pressed for a united attack into northern Germany in order to relieve pressure on the Soviets and again the British and Americans balked at the proposition. Instead they launched the allied invasion to liberate France in June, 1944. By early 1945 a two-pronged strategy was pressing toward the German borders from east (the Soviets) and west (the British, Americans and liberated French). By early 1945 the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt – the only questions remaining involved how long it would take, how many more would die and how the allies would reconstruct Europe (and the wider world) once the smoke had cleared.
The first attempt to answer these questions had taken place in Teheran in December, 1943. This conference was the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin and revealed the gaps between the Allies’ competing world views. Stalin made clear his ambitions in Eastern Europe while Roosevelt attempted to overcome his paranoia and fears of the western/capitalist world (Roosevelt thought he could charm anybody, even Stalin). The “Big Three” met again at Yalta in February, 1945. This was to be the most important of the war-time conferences and laid the foundations of the post-war world. Roosevelt pressed Stalin for an agreement to aid in the war against Japan once the Nazis were beaten. Stalin’s price for such aid was the acquisition of Pacific territories which had long been an issue in Russian/Japanese relations. In addition, the question of a post-war German occupation was detailed with each ally taking a portion of the defeated nation and its capital city, Berlin. Finally, Roosevelt attempted to get Stalin’s promise that all east European territories “liberated” by the Soviets (and then under Red Army occupation) would be entitled to free elections. Stalin was happy to sign on to the Declaration on Liberated Europe since its wording left him plenty of wiggle room diplomatically. Stalin’s view was clear – unless the West was going to wage war against the Red Army they would have to abide by his definition of “free elections” and “friendly governments”. Finally, the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945 clearly marked the end of the Grand Alliance in all but name. President Truman (succeeding the recently deceased Roosevelt) was no friend of Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee (replacing the newly un-elected Churchill) was concerned with a rising tide of British domestic discontent. In addition, the United States had just acquired atomic weapons and had reversed its policy on Soviet aid. Japan could be defeated at much less cost and without signing a “devil’s deal” with the communists. From Truman’s standpoint, Stalin was obviously intent on creating a Soviet sphere of influence as far as he could in Europe and he would be doing the same in Asia if possible. To Stalin, the US was mobilizing its full weight to confront the communists and contain Soviet power. In his mind, the pre-war Western coalition (lead by the British and French) had simply been replaced by the United States. To many historians the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945 were not just a means to bring the Pacific war to an end more swiftly and with fewer casualties. They were also a warning shot to the USSR – the Western/capitalist world was still bent on combating the communist threat and was now armed with the ultimate weapon to do so.
Thus, the Soviet foreign policy of the late 1940’s strongly resembled the foreign policy of the 1920’s. To the western world, the USSR was an aggressive, expansionistic communist power bent on global domination. From the USSR’s perspective, the western world was quickly world alliances whose aim was to actively seek the end of the “people’s revolution” in Russia and replace it with yet another capitalist, exploitive government. Both sides did indeed make such moves (the formation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances for example) but the major difference this time was the potential impact if any confrontation resulted in a military conflict. This time the fate of the human species – and all life on the planet – was at stake.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS QUESTIONS

1. Why is Soviet foreign policy described as “schizophrenic” in nature?

2. What was Chicherin’s world-view concerning Soviet foreign policy?

3. How did the post-war political structure push Germany and the USSR into a working relationship?

4. How did the Great Depression influence other nations’ views on a relationship with the USSR?

5. How did the West’s dealings with Hitler reinforce Stalin’s paranoia?

6. Why did both Hitler and Stalin agree to the non-aggression agreement of 1939?

7. How did the Second Front Controversy reinforce Stalin’s paranoia concerning the West?

8. What issues were discussed at each of the following conferences:

Teheran –

Yalta –

Potsdam –

9. Why did the US and Soviet relationship change between 1941 and 1945?

10. How was the Soviet foreign policy of the 1950’s the same as that of the 1920’s? How was it different?