Strategic Interaction in the Fight Against Terrorism
Strategic Interactions in the Fight against Terrorism
Maastricht University
School of Business and Economics
Maastricht, 12 December 2011
Raphael Mankopf, RM
ID number: i6033138
Study: International Business
Course code: EBC1009
Economics & Business Group number: 39
Tutor’s name: A. Kuczynski
Writing tutor’s name: K. Richardson
Writing Assignment: Main paper
Maastricht University
School of Business and Economics
Maastricht, 12 December 2011
Raphael Mankopf, RM
ID number: i6033138
Study: International Business
Course code: EBC1009
Economics & Business Group number: 39
Tutor’s name: A. Kuczynski
Writing tutor’s name: K. Richardson
Writing Assignment: Main paper
1. Introduction
Since the existence of communities, states and governments, there have always been minority groups, who disagree with decisions and circumstances in society. Terrorism occurs when these groups act violently to influence a target audience and to change behaviour and opinions. In history the dimensions of terrorism have changed and the fear and awareness of the population concerning terrorism has increased. Transnational terrorism causes most of the actual international conflicts and lead to the attacks of 9/11 and to a global war against terrorism (Garrison, 2003). The suicide attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York could probably be regarded as the most catastrophic and biggest terrorist attacks in history, which forced governments to develop strategies for combating, but first and foremost, for avoiding terrorist attacks. The decision made by the US government after 9/11 caused ten years of war, costing the USA 1.283 trillion dollar (Belasco, 2011), and many lives. When taking such a decision many options and strategies must be evaluated. This paper states, that game theory can be used by governments to make decisions in the fight against terrorism.
As it is necessary to gain a basic knowledge about terrorism, the reason for terrorism, its
Maastricht University
School of Business and Economics
Maastricht, 12 December 2011
Raphael Mankopf, RM
ID number: i6033138
Study: International Business
Course code: EBC1009
Economics & Business Group number: 39
Tutor’s name: A. Kuczynski
Writing tutor’s name: K. Richardson
Writing Assignment: Main paper
Maastricht University
School of Business and Economics
Maastricht, 12 December 2011
Raphael Mankopf, RM
ID number: i6033138
Study: International Business
Course code: EBC1009
Economics & Business Group number: 39
Tutor’s name: A. Kuczynski
Writing tutor’s name: K. Richardson
Writing Assignment: Main paper
1. Introduction
Since the existence of communities, states and governments, there have always been minority groups, who disagree with decisions and circumstances in society. Terrorism occurs when these groups act violently to influence a target audience and to change behaviour and opinions. In history the dimensions of terrorism have changed and the fear and awareness of the population concerning terrorism has increased. Transnational terrorism causes most of the actual international conflicts and lead to the attacks of 9/11 and to a global war against terrorism (Garrison, 2003). The suicide attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York could probably be regarded as the most catastrophic and biggest terrorist attacks in history, which forced governments to develop strategies for combating, but first and foremost, for avoiding terrorist attacks. The decision made by the US government after 9/11 caused ten years of war, costing the USA 1.283 trillion dollar (Belasco, 2011), and many lives. When taking such a decision many options and strategies must be evaluated. This paper states, that game theory can be used by governments to make decisions in the fight against terrorism.
As it is necessary to gain a basic knowledge about terrorism, the reason for terrorism, its
References: Archick, K & Gallis, P. (2008). Nato and the European Union. Congressional Research Service Belasco, A. (2011). The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror since 9/11 Garrison, A. (2003). Terrorism: The Nature of its history. Criminal Justice Studies. 16 (1): 39-52 Sandler, T (2005). Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism. Springer. Public Choice.124 Sandler, T., & Arce D. (2003) Terrorism and Game Theory. Simulation & Gaming. 34 (3) Victoroff, J Wenzlaff, K. (2004). Terrorism: game theory and other explanations. Bayreuth, Germany: University