suez affair
ch6.qxd
1/28/98 9:08 AM
Page 135
CHAPTER 6
The 1956 Suez Crisis
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The ostensible reason for the nationalization was to use the tolls to ‹nance the building of the Aswan Dam. Nasser’s action was an act of revenge against the British and the French, who had previously held control of the company that controlled the Canal. This con›ict precipitated an international crisis over ownership and operation of the Suez
Canal.
The French and British were immediately thrust into the domain of losses by the nationalization of the Canal. The British had recently withdrawn 90,000 troops from the area on June 13, in response to strong
American pressure.1 The French were having trouble with their colonials in Algeria. Both countries saw the seizure of the Canal as prelude to the complete loss of their colonial positions in the African and Asian worlds.
Eisenhower’s perspective during the Suez crisis stands in stark contrast to the Europeans’, at least partly because America had different goals and stakes in the Canal than did the British and French. Eisenhower was in a relative domain of gains, unlike the British and French, who were both operating in domains of loss. According to the predictions offered by prospect theory, this should encourage Eisenhower to make relatively riskaverse decisions as opposed to British and French decisions, which were more likely to be risk seeking in nature.
At the time of the Suez crisis, the United States had the military power to force its will on Egypt, and yet Eisenhower chose not to do so.
Indeed, the United States made no military attempt to force Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser into any concessions concerning the Canal.
The British, French, and Israelis, on the other hand, did intervene militarily into Egyptian territory. Why did Eisenhower chose not to use American military power to support his allies?
In terms of
1/28/98 9:08 AM
Page 135
CHAPTER 6
The 1956 Suez Crisis
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The ostensible reason for the nationalization was to use the tolls to ‹nance the building of the Aswan Dam. Nasser’s action was an act of revenge against the British and the French, who had previously held control of the company that controlled the Canal. This con›ict precipitated an international crisis over ownership and operation of the Suez
Canal.
The French and British were immediately thrust into the domain of losses by the nationalization of the Canal. The British had recently withdrawn 90,000 troops from the area on June 13, in response to strong
American pressure.1 The French were having trouble with their colonials in Algeria. Both countries saw the seizure of the Canal as prelude to the complete loss of their colonial positions in the African and Asian worlds.
Eisenhower’s perspective during the Suez crisis stands in stark contrast to the Europeans’, at least partly because America had different goals and stakes in the Canal than did the British and French. Eisenhower was in a relative domain of gains, unlike the British and French, who were both operating in domains of loss. According to the predictions offered by prospect theory, this should encourage Eisenhower to make relatively riskaverse decisions as opposed to British and French decisions, which were more likely to be risk seeking in nature.
At the time of the Suez crisis, the United States had the military power to force its will on Egypt, and yet Eisenhower chose not to do so.
Indeed, the United States made no military attempt to force Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser into any concessions concerning the Canal.
The British, French, and Israelis, on the other hand, did intervene militarily into Egyptian territory. Why did Eisenhower chose not to use American military power to support his allies?
In terms of