Summary Of Philo's Argument From Design, Cleanthes
Through the Argument from Design, Cleanthes attempts to contemplate the complex order of the universe to arrive at knowledge about the nature of God. He establishes his a posteriori argument by way of analogy: Evidence from the natural world shows that the world resembles nothing so much as a work of human artifice (machine), which is perfectly and intricately ordered so that each part from smallest to largest is perfectly adapted to the harmony of other parts. All parts of a machine are related causally, in other words, have means-to-ends relations, and all causality must work together for a common purpose, that is, have coherence of parts. The second principle employed in the Argument from Design is “like effects like cause”: Every machine
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we have ever come across in our experience has been the product of an intelligent designer. We can reasonably infer that as the adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe as in a machine designed by human intelligence, they must certainly have analogous causes. Cleanthes' design analogy leads to the conclusion that the cause of the design of the world resembles the cause of the design of a machine, although far surpassing human attributes. Hence, the universe must also have been caused by an intelligent designer.
Philo sets additional insight in the Argument from design that shows the complex nature of Cleanthes’ position. Therefore, the cause of the design of the universe resembles to that of man-made machines. The argument from design is supposed to be the best case that can be made for the claim that religious belief can be rational. In this quote, Philo intends to show that the argument from design fails as the assertion that the cause of the design of the world and the cause of the design of human contrivance bears a comparison implies a degradation of the infinite being. Thus, the dynamics of Cleanthes' analogy gives rise to religious dissatisfaction. Philo therefore, proves that religious belief cannot possibly be based on experimental reasoning. He further brings up several objections in which the argument from design fails as an inductive inference and proves to be an improper use of an argument by analogy.
Cleanthes derives his conclusions from what Philo believes is a weak analogy between the products of human artifice and the universe. He insists that "much larger faculties" cannot draw a conclusion on the attributes of the Deity. Manufactured objects are said to be designed by their makers. For example, the successful operation of a watch is due to the conscious effort of the watchmaker, who imposes order on the materials with a particular purpose to compose the watch. In comparing the universe and manufactured objects through an examination of the eye, in isolation from the rest of the universe, Cleanthes presents evidence intended to show that the structure of the universe is the product of intentional activity and not assembled in a haphazard fashion; there are too much interdependence and interaction among the components of the universe to suppose that the total system is a product of coincidence. In other words, the presence of means to ends relations and coherence of parts is all the resemblance required between a given item and machines to countenance employment of the principle “like effects prove like cause.” By contrast, Philo insists that a classification of the world as a machine of a given sort whose cause is known must precede the employment of the principle “like effects prove like causes”. He shows that Cleanthes’ argument is an imperfect analogy by giving the example of a house: We can investigate a house and conclude with great certitude that it was constructed by an architect. We have observed the construction of a house several times that when a new house of this nature is presented, we draw without disinclination the accustomed conjecture; the architect is the cause. According to Philo, the effect in question in Cleanthes’ analogy, the universe, and its empirical features do not establish its cause.
Philo's second objection is that Cleanthes’s argument commits the fallacy of composition; the analogy between the universe and a machine does not necessarily work because it is between the universe as a whole and certain parts of the universe. One should not assume that what is true of a part is true of the whole. Just because it is true that reason is a causal principle in the world does not mean that it is true that it is the causal principle of the world. A machine is a part of the universe, and it is illogical to assume that one part of the universe is analogous to the whole of the universe when we have little or no experience of the other parts. Thus, drawing an analogy between a machine and the universe might be like trying to figure out how an entire man develops by looking at how a single hair in his head grows. The argument from design assumes that what is true of part of the universe is true of the whole, thus, it proves to be flawed.
Philo's third objection is that it seems to be false to claim that all order in the world is the result of an intelligent designer.
Although, some parts of the universe appear to have been designed: stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance. However, the universe is not analogous to a machine even though it is ordered; it might be analogous to some other form of order and not to a man-made structure. Philo argued that these features are present not only in those cases where intelligence is the cause of design, but also when non-intelligent causes are the source of design. For instance, parts of the universe was rather formed by various forces acting on it; in the case of organic bodies, intricate order and adaptability are the results of reproduction rather than of an intelligent design. Only for the reason that there is order, we cannot conclude that such an ordered system is analogous to a man-made system, and it is therefore even less reasonable to assume that all order is the product of design. Hence, to show that the design of the world has an intelligent cause of design, Cleanthes must establish that the design of the world bears a sufficient resemblance to a particular type of machine, so that the world can be classified as a machine of that sort. Only in this way, Philo insists, can the principle 'like effects prove like causes' be employed to prove that God resembles human intelligence. Within the discussion, …show more content…
Philo shows that the features of design present in the world are insufficient to classify the world as a (particular kind of) machine, and, for that matter, as any kind of object whose cause of design is known. Accordingly, Philo argues that all arguments by analogy fail to establish the nature of the cause of the design of the world. And, therefore, when he puts forth any arguments of this sort it is not done to support a particular hypothesis about the designer of the world, but to argue against Cleanthes' Design Argument.
Finally, Cleanthes' argument from design is meant to be an inductive inference, helped along by an argument by analogy.
In general, an inductive inference is supposed to look like this: Let's take the example of a flame (denoted by A), we notice that it can 'cause water to boil' (denoted by B). Analogical argument vary in their capacity to persuade us to infer that there is a coincidental connection between A and B providing that we experience a constant conjunction of A and B. An inductive argument argues that we gain evidence by seeing repeated conjunctions, and are being reasonable if we expect that all future A's will cause B's. Inductive reasoning functions in the argument from design in that every time we see A (a machine), which has B (intelligent cause of design), we are further justified in inferring that whenever we see a machine in the future, we will find its intelligent cause of design. Hume’s theory of causality shows that we’re accustomed to a habit that anticipate causality. In the case of A (universe) has B (intelligent cause of design), there is no empirical feature that reveals its causality. If causality is not learned empirically, there must be a relation between cause and effect. The relations are: i) contiguity (things that occur near each other in time or space) ii) temporal priority (there must be a priority in the cause to its effect). According to Hume, these are the only features that reveal causality; observation never reveals causality, however,
the multiplicity changes the perception. We would have to witness several creations of several universes to reveal that the cause of design of one universe resembles the cause of design of the other. However, here the relevant cause (God) and effect (the universe) are both wholly unique, so there is no way that we could have such repeated experience. It is clear that Philo thinks that because the universe is a unique effect, it is probably not analogous to machines, which are not unique. Thus, Philo concludes that the argument from design is not so much an inductive inference, as a whimsical conjecture.
Thus, Philo has shown Cleanthes that his argument fails to meet the requirements for analogical arguments: it exhibits neither relevant similarity between items compared nor repeated experience of the conjunction of items compared.
we have ever come across in our experience has been the product of an intelligent designer. We can reasonably infer that as the adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe as in a machine designed by human intelligence, they must certainly have analogous causes. Cleanthes' design analogy leads to the conclusion that the cause of the design of the world resembles the cause of the design of a machine, although far surpassing human attributes. Hence, the universe must also have been caused by an intelligent designer.
Philo sets additional insight in the Argument from design that shows the complex nature of Cleanthes’ position. Therefore, the cause of the design of the universe resembles to that of man-made machines. The argument from design is supposed to be the best case that can be made for the claim that religious belief can be rational. In this quote, Philo intends to show that the argument from design fails as the assertion that the cause of the design of the world and the cause of the design of human contrivance bears a comparison implies a degradation of the infinite being. Thus, the dynamics of Cleanthes' analogy gives rise to religious dissatisfaction. Philo therefore, proves that religious belief cannot possibly be based on experimental reasoning. He further brings up several objections in which the argument from design fails as an inductive inference and proves to be an improper use of an argument by analogy.
Cleanthes derives his conclusions from what Philo believes is a weak analogy between the products of human artifice and the universe. He insists that "much larger faculties" cannot draw a conclusion on the attributes of the Deity. Manufactured objects are said to be designed by their makers. For example, the successful operation of a watch is due to the conscious effort of the watchmaker, who imposes order on the materials with a particular purpose to compose the watch. In comparing the universe and manufactured objects through an examination of the eye, in isolation from the rest of the universe, Cleanthes presents evidence intended to show that the structure of the universe is the product of intentional activity and not assembled in a haphazard fashion; there are too much interdependence and interaction among the components of the universe to suppose that the total system is a product of coincidence. In other words, the presence of means to ends relations and coherence of parts is all the resemblance required between a given item and machines to countenance employment of the principle “like effects prove like cause.” By contrast, Philo insists that a classification of the world as a machine of a given sort whose cause is known must precede the employment of the principle “like effects prove like causes”. He shows that Cleanthes’ argument is an imperfect analogy by giving the example of a house: We can investigate a house and conclude with great certitude that it was constructed by an architect. We have observed the construction of a house several times that when a new house of this nature is presented, we draw without disinclination the accustomed conjecture; the architect is the cause. According to Philo, the effect in question in Cleanthes’ analogy, the universe, and its empirical features do not establish its cause.
Philo's second objection is that Cleanthes’s argument commits the fallacy of composition; the analogy between the universe and a machine does not necessarily work because it is between the universe as a whole and certain parts of the universe. One should not assume that what is true of a part is true of the whole. Just because it is true that reason is a causal principle in the world does not mean that it is true that it is the causal principle of the world. A machine is a part of the universe, and it is illogical to assume that one part of the universe is analogous to the whole of the universe when we have little or no experience of the other parts. Thus, drawing an analogy between a machine and the universe might be like trying to figure out how an entire man develops by looking at how a single hair in his head grows. The argument from design assumes that what is true of part of the universe is true of the whole, thus, it proves to be flawed.
Philo's third objection is that it seems to be false to claim that all order in the world is the result of an intelligent designer.
Although, some parts of the universe appear to have been designed: stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance. However, the universe is not analogous to a machine even though it is ordered; it might be analogous to some other form of order and not to a man-made structure. Philo argued that these features are present not only in those cases where intelligence is the cause of design, but also when non-intelligent causes are the source of design. For instance, parts of the universe was rather formed by various forces acting on it; in the case of organic bodies, intricate order and adaptability are the results of reproduction rather than of an intelligent design. Only for the reason that there is order, we cannot conclude that such an ordered system is analogous to a man-made system, and it is therefore even less reasonable to assume that all order is the product of design. Hence, to show that the design of the world has an intelligent cause of design, Cleanthes must establish that the design of the world bears a sufficient resemblance to a particular type of machine, so that the world can be classified as a machine of that sort. Only in this way, Philo insists, can the principle 'like effects prove like causes' be employed to prove that God resembles human intelligence. Within the discussion, …show more content…
Philo shows that the features of design present in the world are insufficient to classify the world as a (particular kind of) machine, and, for that matter, as any kind of object whose cause of design is known. Accordingly, Philo argues that all arguments by analogy fail to establish the nature of the cause of the design of the world. And, therefore, when he puts forth any arguments of this sort it is not done to support a particular hypothesis about the designer of the world, but to argue against Cleanthes' Design Argument.
Finally, Cleanthes' argument from design is meant to be an inductive inference, helped along by an argument by analogy.
In general, an inductive inference is supposed to look like this: Let's take the example of a flame (denoted by A), we notice that it can 'cause water to boil' (denoted by B). Analogical argument vary in their capacity to persuade us to infer that there is a coincidental connection between A and B providing that we experience a constant conjunction of A and B. An inductive argument argues that we gain evidence by seeing repeated conjunctions, and are being reasonable if we expect that all future A's will cause B's. Inductive reasoning functions in the argument from design in that every time we see A (a machine), which has B (intelligent cause of design), we are further justified in inferring that whenever we see a machine in the future, we will find its intelligent cause of design. Hume’s theory of causality shows that we’re accustomed to a habit that anticipate causality. In the case of A (universe) has B (intelligent cause of design), there is no empirical feature that reveals its causality. If causality is not learned empirically, there must be a relation between cause and effect. The relations are: i) contiguity (things that occur near each other in time or space) ii) temporal priority (there must be a priority in the cause to its effect). According to Hume, these are the only features that reveal causality; observation never reveals causality, however,
the multiplicity changes the perception. We would have to witness several creations of several universes to reveal that the cause of design of one universe resembles the cause of design of the other. However, here the relevant cause (God) and effect (the universe) are both wholly unique, so there is no way that we could have such repeated experience. It is clear that Philo thinks that because the universe is a unique effect, it is probably not analogous to machines, which are not unique. Thus, Philo concludes that the argument from design is not so much an inductive inference, as a whimsical conjecture.
Thus, Philo has shown Cleanthes that his argument fails to meet the requirements for analogical arguments: it exhibits neither relevant similarity between items compared nor repeated experience of the conjunction of items compared.