Summary Of The Eternalist Argument Against Free Will

Names: Avontay Williams and Clarence Whitt This paper evaluates an Eternalist argument against free will and presents possible positions to maintain free will despite a fixed future. Firstly, we demonstrate that the Eternalist argues against free will because the future is not alterable, so it conflicts with traditional conceptions of free will. Secondly, we object to the Eternalist’s argument by providing an alternative definition of free will that does not require the ability to change the future. Afterwards, we provide possible responses for the Eternalist and evaluate how our objection can fair against the issues it can encounter.
The Eternalist’s objection to free will can be casually depicted by the following scenario: The past is
Afterwards, he decides to save money to hopefully purchase the game. By the time he has saved enough, he discovers that all copies are sold. It is still plausible to say that the person has free will because he is freely deciding to save money, it is just an eternally true fact that his efforts will be meaningless. As a result, people with free will do not have to be able to change the future. In this scenario, the future cannot be altered because it is already true that he will never have enough money, so it follows that he will not be able to change the future. If the gamer’s free will does not depend on being able to change the future however, then his free will should be immune from the fact that the future cannot be changed. As a result, it is wrong to say that an unalterable future will negate his free
The Eternalist could argue that people with genuine free will must be able to change the future, otherwise, they do not have control over the progression of events. It follows that if we cannot voluntarily change future events, then future events are decided by factors beyond our control. If this were the case, then we do not appear to possess free will because there is no room for possibility. As a result, there are possible grounds where the Eternalist could make our objection unsound.
We can respond by appealing to our definition of free will; we only assert that people possess free will when their actions are not controlled. Although we can grant the Eternalist that the future is fixed and we are powerless to change it, the fixed future itself does not coerce us to act a certain way. It is just a fact of the matter that we can freely choose our actions but we encounter circumstances beyond our control. Although the future is fixed, it is still arguable that we still possess free will because we can still make our own decisions. As a result, a fixed future alone cannot completely deny free