in the way that Fairfax acted, was a fair assessment of their actions and therefore was the correct judgement for the situation.
Throughout the case, White J found multiple reasons as to why the conduct of Fairfax was not reasonable in publishing the newspapers, the poster and tweets.
Fairfax media published the newspaper articles outlining how Hockey had granted private access to select members of the community, in exchange for donations to his political campaign. White J found, with respect to the published articles, that, under Section 30(3)(i) , there was no consideration of “alternative meanings…for the choice of words…in the headline” , also finding that “there were inadequacies… to obtain a response by Hockey” , under Section 30(3)(h) . In terms of the poster, White J found that “there were readily available alternative formats of the poster” that were not explored by Fairfax, rather, there was no effort to find any defamatory meaning that could have been associated with the poster. The publication of the tweets by Fairfax was also found to not be reasonable. Similar to the poster, the tweets could have been reworded in a non-defamatory way, however, this was not cross checked with anyone at Fairfax, thus leading White J to believe that the conduct, in relation to the tweets was not reasonable. Overall, White J, decided that the newspaper articles, the poster and the tweets were not published with reasonable
conduct.
Reasonableness is a major idea that is discussed by White J throughout the case due to the defences that are available in a defamation case. As Fairfax used qualified privilege as their defence of the claims, White J had to determine whether or not the defendant acted reasonably in their breach of the defamation act, as such, qualifying for all of Section 30 of the Defamation Act . Also being used as a defence by Fairfax is Lange qualified privilege , which is a common law defence which takes into account the reasonableness of the actions that the defendant has taken when publishing a defamatory statement. As such, it was necessary for White J to consider reasonableness in terms of the case.
White J’s assessment of Fairfax’s conduct follows from previously that they have not satisfied the criteria of qualified privilege and Lange qualified privilege for the newspaper articles, the poster and the tweets. Fairfax’s conduct in obtaining the information of the article, although potentially being able to pass section 30(3)(a) and (i) and being granted the claim that acceptance of donations in exchange for access, unavailable otherwise, was a matter of public interest, however, upon taking into account Section 30(3)(h) , it is clear that Fairfax has not satisfied this criteria, which may be taken into account by a court of law. As such, Fairfax is not able to rely on the use of qualified privilege under Section 30 of the defamation act. In using the common law defence of Lange qualified privilege , Fairfax had to prove the reasonableness in the actions that were taken by the Sydney morning Herald (SMH) and The Age (TA), in researching and publishing the article, poster and tweets. Although SMH took the proper steps to verify the accuracy of the material they intended to publish and believed that the imputations themselves were, in fact, true, they did not ask for a reasonable response from Hockey, as such, Hockey was unable to prove otherwise, potentially also giving way to malice which would defeat both of the defences used by Fairfax.
In conclusion, it can be seen that White J’s assessment of the way that Fairfax acted was a fair assessment and overall judgement. Fairfax’s defences of qualified privilege, using Section 30 and Lange qualified privilege, were not able to prove that reasonable steps were taken in obtaining the information, rather, Fairfax acted maliciously in their wording of the titles of the article and poster, as well as the wording of the tweets. Therefore white J’s assessment was correct in finding that Fairfax had defamed Hockey in their actions, with respect to the use of reasonableness.