Summary Of The Masks Of War By Carl Builder

Chapter two of Masks of War examines Carl Builder’s thesis that the U.S. military services each have a unique service personality and that their cultural characteristics influence service operations, including joint operations. The examination will summarize how Builder defines the individual service cultures in his book, The Masks of War, and how these service cultures affect the Joint Organizations to which they belong. This chapter presumes with a summary of what many consider is the most dramatic military reform legislation in American history, the Goldwater Nicholas Act of 1986. Builder’s study of military service culture was sponsored by the RAND Corporation and initiated by the Army. Specifically, the study’s purpose was to determine why anomalies existed in the ability of the various services to conduct systems analysis. It is significant to note that the study began before the Goldwater Nichols act of 1986 was passed but was not published until 1989. Carl Builder illustrates each branch roles and responsibility during wartime and how essential joint operation is to help win the hearts and mind on the battlefield.
For the active service member, veterans or any affiliates of the military can understand when I say that at some point in their military career they have picked on another military branch or vice versa.
We can all tell stories of how cadences that we recite during foot marches can also serve as ways to taunt other branches of the military, but LTC DiMarco helped put Carl Builder point in perspective. As much as we would disagree and put one branch above the other, I look at all five branches and including the US Coast Guard (see what I did) are essential to the mission in what we called combined joint forces land components command
(CJFLCC).
Builder makes the argument that as the youngest, least established service, the Air Force is the most sensitive about its legitimacy and most nervous about its relevancy. The fight for Air Force independence was long and hard and, Builder argues, not wholly won. The Air Force sees the possession by the Navy and the Army of their aircraft as a constant reminder of the fragility of Air Force legitimacy. However, the Air Force is supremely confident in the ability of its aircraft to solve any question about relevancy. Carl Builders is very clear that Service culture is a strong aspect of the military services of the U.S. and that it affects virtually everything that the services do. Service behavior and culture are defined by Builder as the service’s sense of self. For the Navy, it is marked by its independent nature and its stature. The Air Force sees itself as the “keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war,”24 its beloved planes. The Army is focused on keeping itself prepared to meet whatever demands the nation asks of it. Builder sees the different service cultures reflected in the architecture of the various service’s institutional buildings. In a word: Navy-opulent, Air Force-futuristic, and the Army-strongly conservative.