The Cuban Missile Crisis - Soviet Diplomacy and United States Aggression
The Cuban Missile Crisis:
Soviet Diplomacy and United States Aggression
The Cuban missile crisis brings to mind visions of a great triumph over the Soviet Union and the defusing of an all-out nuclear war. However, this "crisis" was not so much the product of true Soviet advances towards war as much as it was a series of misinterpretations and miscommunications between the United States and Soviet governments that culminated in excessive aggression by the U.S. and unnecessary escalation of tensions and hostilities. These hostilities were fed not only by the Cold War sentiments against the Soviet Union, but also by the rapid deterioration of Cuban relations after the assumption of power by Fidel Castro. This aligned Cuba increasingly with the Soviet Union, and created a sort of threatening alliance against the United States that escalated and already tense situation. Of prime importance in this escalation are events such as the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the stationing of American missiles in strategically threatening locations, an American naval blockade of Cuba, and a threat by John F. Kennedy to directly invade Cuba. Any of these actions could have been considered just cause for a Soviet declaration of war, but in general, the Soviet response to these actions was comparatively mild, and represented no true original aggression by the Soviet Union. The action taken by Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet administration during the Cuban missile crisis was simply defensive retaliation that was taken in the wrong light by the United States ' administration. The first roots of the Cuban missile crisis can be found in the late 19th century, when American victories in the Spanish-American war rendered Cuba a territory of the United States. Within the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1898, Spain renounced all rights to Cuba, and left it under the military control of the United States. The same year, Henry Teller proposed an amendment to a joint
Soviet Diplomacy and United States Aggression
The Cuban missile crisis brings to mind visions of a great triumph over the Soviet Union and the defusing of an all-out nuclear war. However, this "crisis" was not so much the product of true Soviet advances towards war as much as it was a series of misinterpretations and miscommunications between the United States and Soviet governments that culminated in excessive aggression by the U.S. and unnecessary escalation of tensions and hostilities. These hostilities were fed not only by the Cold War sentiments against the Soviet Union, but also by the rapid deterioration of Cuban relations after the assumption of power by Fidel Castro. This aligned Cuba increasingly with the Soviet Union, and created a sort of threatening alliance against the United States that escalated and already tense situation. Of prime importance in this escalation are events such as the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the stationing of American missiles in strategically threatening locations, an American naval blockade of Cuba, and a threat by John F. Kennedy to directly invade Cuba. Any of these actions could have been considered just cause for a Soviet declaration of war, but in general, the Soviet response to these actions was comparatively mild, and represented no true original aggression by the Soviet Union. The action taken by Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet administration during the Cuban missile crisis was simply defensive retaliation that was taken in the wrong light by the United States ' administration. The first roots of the Cuban missile crisis can be found in the late 19th century, when American victories in the Spanish-American war rendered Cuba a territory of the United States. Within the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1898, Spain renounced all rights to Cuba, and left it under the military control of the United States. The same year, Henry Teller proposed an amendment to a joint
Cited: - Ball, S J. The Cold War: an International History. London: Arnold, 1998. - Friedman, Norman. The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. Annapolis: Naval Institute P, 2000. - Gaddis, John L. Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: an Interpretive History. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. - Kennedy, John F. Letters to Premier Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Government. 14-27 Oct. 1962. - Khrushchev, Nikita S. Letter to Bertrand Russell. 25 Oct. 1962. - Khrushchev, Nikita S. Letters to the Kennedy Administration. 17-26 Oct. 1962.