The decision to drop the atomic bomb

Midterm Essay

In the summer of 1945 the United States was entering the final stages of World War II. One could assume that ending the war quickly was a priority. President Truman was demanding “unconditional surrender” from Japan. In a statement he released on May 8th, he described unconditional surrender as “Our blows will not cease until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in unconditional surrender. Just what does the unconditional surrender of the armed forces mean for the Japanese people? It means the end of the war. It means the termination of the influence of the military leaders who have brought Japan to the present brink of disaster.… Unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people. (Alperovitz, Gar (2010-12-29). The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (p. 39).)” So if the war were to end the Japanese would have to unconditionally surrender, secretary of state James Byrnes said as much, “For instance, in his 1947 book Speaking Frankly, James F. Byrnes declared without qualification: “Had the Japanese Government listened to [Ambassador to Soviet Union] Sato and surrendered unconditionally, it would not have been necessary to drop the atomic bomb. (Alperovitz, p. 34)” The Japanese refused to surrender because of the terms they would be conceding to. They wanted a guarantee that their emperor would be protected and they felt unconditional surrender would put him in jeopardy. “The reality is that as the summer of 1945 progressed, most U.S. leaders fully realized that the only serious condition Japan’s leaders sought was an assurance that the Emperor would not be eliminated. (Alperovitz, p.34)” One could conclude that the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki because of Japan’s refusal to unconditionally surrender. There is also belief that the atomic bomb was dropped to intimidate the Soviet Union. As historian Barton Berstein put it, “The combat use of the bomb might greatly impress the Soviets and make them more tractable in the postwar period. (Alperovitz, p. 266)” President Truman seemed to want to flex the United States power for the world to see. “Not only had the weapon given American leaders “an entirely new feeling of confidence” during the Potsdam negotiations, but the very day Nagasaki was destroyed (August 9) President Truman declared of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary that “These nations are not to be spheres of influence of any one power. (Alperovitz, p. 266)” Although some would later contradict their opinions, at the time of the atomic bombings many military leaders were in opposition of it’s usage. They did not deem the nuclear weapon to be a military necessity and believed there were other methods to end the war. Fleet Admiral William Leahy called the atomic bomb barbarous (Alperovitz, p. 326). U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, felt it was unnessacry and that they should have waited for the naval blockade (Alperovitz, p.327). “In short, at the very top of the U.S. navy—among those with access to the best information—it is difficult to find a knowledgeable World War II officer who is on record as supporting the idea that use of the atomic bomb was militarily required. (Alperovitz, p. 332)” Leaders in the Air Force were also in opposition of this deadly and destructive weapon. The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry Arnold, felt that the dropping of the atomic bomb was unnecessary as well and that the decision was more of a political one (Alperovitz, p. 335). Major General Curtis LeMay believed the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war and that it would have been over in two weeks (Alperovitz, p.336). “After the war, LeMay became one of the nation’s leading proponents of nuclear deterrence as commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) (Alperovitz, p. 338).” Army leaders were also under the belief that the atomic bomb was not a military necessity. General Douglas MacArthur told Former President Richard Nixon that the atomic bombings were a tragedy, and that the only targets should be military not civilians (Alperovitz, p.352). General Dwight Eisenhower had hoped they would never have to use the atomic bomb, he didn't like the thought of the U.S. introducing something so horrible and destructive (Alperovitz, p.353). The people that were in favor of dropping the atomic bomb seem to be much fewer the those who opposed it. President Truman and his secretary of state, James Byrnes were major players behind the decision to drop the atomic bomb. President Truman’s reasoning behind the dropping of the atomic bomb was that it had to be used to avoid an invasion. “The other major figures involved range from the ailing and aging secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, to the tough-minded, aggressive general in charge of the Manhattan Project, Leslie R. Groves; and they include a host of lesser military and other officials (Alperovitz, p.13).” It seems as though James Byrnes was the most influential on advice to drop the atomic bomb and convincing the president to reject available alternatives (Alperovitz, p.13). Ethically, I don’t believe it was a wise long-range decision. There is ample evidence that the war was close to ending and that there were other methods of achieving the desired outcome. The atomic bomb was too destructive and took the lives of women and children. Admiral William Leahy compared our ethical standards to that of barbarians, “My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. (Alperovitz, p. 3).” As far as diplomacy and politics go, it seemed to get the reaction it was intended for. As, previously stated the atomic bomb was seen as more of a political statement by the U.S. than one produced of military necessity. “By the beginning of the 1990s, Samuel Walker’s review of the modern literature concluded that although many writers judged military factors to be critical, “nearly all students of the events leading to Hiroshima agree that, in addition to viewing it as the means to end the war quickly, the political implications of the bomb figured in the administration’s deliberations.” He also observed that “a broad consensus viewed diplomatic considerations as an important part of the administration’s view of the bomb’s value. (Alperovitz, Afterword).” In my opinion, this was absolutely an act of terrorism. The Wall Street Journal’s definition of terrorism is attacking civilians and thats what happened here. Hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children who were innocent, were slaughtered. Even President Truman could not believe the atrocities he signed off on. “At an afternoon Cabinet meeting on August 10 (according to the diary of Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace), “Truman said he had given orders to stop atomic bombing. He said the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn’t like the idea of killing as he said, ‘all those kids.’ (Alperovitz, p.416-417).” This was a horrific event and many lives were taken and many more ruined. As philosopher Michael Walzer put it, “To use the atomic bomb, to kill and terrorize civilians, without even attempting [negotiations], was a double crime.” (Alperovitz, Conclusion).