Ironically, though Frith et al. (1996) as a paper does offer explanations for each grouping of symptoms. Theory of Mind as an explanation may only apply to those patients of schizophrenia who have paranoid delusions, so both explanations of schizophrenia, are only able to offer possible explanations for the existence of one of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, paranoid/persecutory delusions. Freeman et al. (2002) state in their abstract that the focus of their theory is on persecutory delusions as a symptom of schizophrenia and not on schizophrenia as a disorder, but with a focus on psychosis. As psychosis isn't a disorder in itself, but a symptom which may appear in other disorders such as bipolar disorder, as well …show more content…
(1996) employing the DSM-III-R and Freeman et al. (2002) using the DSM-IV), using DSM-5 will gives us the best understanding of how useful the two theories are as explanations of Schizophrenia; as if they are valid they will still be applicable. In order to be diagnosed with Schizophrenia, an individual must present with two or more active symptoms from Criteria A, for a significant portion of time across a one-month period, while this criterion does include delusions, it also includes hallucinations, disorganize speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, or negative symptoms (DSM-5). To be diagnosed as a Schizophrenic one needs not even display symptoms of delusion, as such Theory of Mind may be able to offer an explanation of paranoid delusions, but not of …show more content…
(2002) main strength lies not as an explanation of the disorder, in which it does offer only a narrow view, but instead as a guideline for clinicians within treatment settings, both in terms of patient interaction, as well as what cognitive psychotherapies may be beneficial. While much focus may be on treatment options, Freeman et al. (2002) also provide a guideline to interaction between the clinician and the patient, as this will also serve to establish a sound foundation for treatment. A result of Freeman et al. (2002) focus on persecutory delusions as threat beliefs, is that they may be sensitive to feelings of