The Gettysburg Battle Analysis

In the beginning of June, 1863, the Confederate army began movement into Pennsylvania. Lee issued his first orders for the northern offensive on June 3rd, “breaking contact with Hooker’s Army of the Potomac near Fredericksburg” (Reardon, 2013). Lee’s forces moved through the Shenandoah Valley, using the Blue Ridge Mountains to conceal their movement into Pennsylvania. Lee used his cavalry Division, led by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart to screen the movement of the rest of the army as it passed over the Blue Ridge Mountains. After crossing the mountains, Gen. Lee ordered to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Union troops, providing a clear path into Pennsylvania. The screening provided by the cavalry was successful, and Gen. Hooker lost contact with the
Confederates after they moved to the west side of the mountains.
Stuart’s orders were to protect the right flank of the 2nd Corps, led by Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell. He was given two courses of action; to either cross the Potomac west of the mountains or cross east of the mountains after passing around the Union Army (Spruill, 2011). Both courses of action ended with Stuart conducting guard operations of the Confederate movement. Although Lee’s order’s did not state specifically to ride around the Army of the Potomac, they lacked precision, leaving Stuart with a great deal of discretion. This lack of clear commander’s guidance from Lee would plague him for the rest of the campaign. Instead of abandoning his movement once he came in contact, Stuart continued, and was pushed farther south and east. Stuart’s cavalry did not make it back to the main Confederate body until the second day of the battle on 2 July.
The absence of Gen. Stuart’s cavalry deprived Gen. Lee of one of his most important assets. According to Rhodes (1899), the absence of Stuart was the first mistake in Lee’s campaign, as he had no accurate knowledge of Union movement. Lee did not have his primary cavalry officer and division. This greatly diminished Lee’s reconnaissance and communication abilities. He had slower knowledge of Union forces, as well as the status of his own.
The lack of timely information provoked Lee to make a key decision, effecting the location of the battle and his own strategy options.
Prior to converging on Gettysburg Lee had given Gen. Ewell orders to march on Harrisburg (Gottfried, 2010). The order to pull Ewell back from his attack on Harrisburg in order to march on Gettysburg was a result of information gaps which were normally filled by Stuart’s cavalry. Lee had believed the Army of the Potomac was still south of the Potomac River. He ordered Generals Ewell and Longstreet to converge on Gettysburg in an effort to force the Union Army northward, across the Potomac River, into action. If the proper information had been available to Lee, he would have had a better understanding of the tactical
situation.
Buford’s Day 1 Decision: 1 July, 1863
After conducting a reconnaissance of Gettysburg, both sides had determined the presence of the opposing army.
Maj. Gen. Heth’s division was sent to conduct a reconnaissance of the town. Union cavalry was reported to be entering the town from the south (Reardon, 2013). This cavalry, led by Brig. Gen. John Buford was the lead element for the Army of the Potomac. Buford’s cavalry had been sent to Gettysburg to conduct reconnaissance as well, and the contact between the two forces had begun.
The physical terrain was part of the reason for interest in Gettysburg in the first place. Ten roads converged on Gettysburg, making it a key piece of operational terrain. For the Union, denying access to this road junction would greatly degrade the ability of the Confederates to move into a position to threaten Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, or even Washington D.C. For the Confederates, this road junction delivered a venue to move the army quickly in several directions, thus providing options and mobility at the same time. It would also provide multiple lines of communications and logistics for the Confederate
Army.
With the knowledge of the reconnaissance the day prior, Buford made a decision that had a significant impact on where and how the Army of the Potomac would fight this battle. Buford had made the decision to conduct a delaying operation, allowing Maj. Gen. John F. Reynold’s I Corps to reinforce. Buford’s cavalry was able to provide useful information on the composition and position of Confederate troops, as well as use key terrain to delay Confederate movement.
The success of Buford’s delaying action was partially due to the lack of information on the exact composition of the Union force. Heth states due to not having cavalry to scout ahead, “I was ignorant what force was near Gettysburg.” (Cited in Reardon, 2013). Because of this and Buford’s ability to produce a large volume of fire with breech-loading rifles, the Union force seemed much larger than what it was. Buford’s cavalry was able to slow the Confederate movement until Reynolds arrived. The delaying action allowed Union forces to hold defensive positions on key terrain.