The central question of Philosophy of Language is: What makes words & expressions meaningful? (Lycan, 2000: 4) The Reference Theory (R.T) provides one answer to this question, saying that words are meaningful because they stand for or pick out things in world and they mean the thing they stand for or pick out; they are like labels (Lycan, 2000: 4). Complex expressions are meaningful because they contain meaningful words (Lycan, 2000: 5). For example, “The penguin swims in the sea.” The words ‘the penguin’ pick out the actual penguin in the world, the word ‘swims’ picks out the action being done and ‘the sea’ picks out the actual sea in the world, therefore making the expression meaningful.
Summarise …show more content…
Frege’s Puzzle about Identity (Lycan, 2000: 14): Consider the following sentence: S3: “The writer of the Harry Potter series is J.K.Rowling.” According to R.T, meaning is equal to reference. Therefore words that have the same referent must have the same meaning. Meaning that S3 is a trivial necessary truth (Lycan, 2000: 14), like (*) “The writer of the Harry Potter series is the writer of the Harry Potter series. But S3 is neither trivial (true in virtue of concepts) nor is it necessary (couldn’t be otherwise) (Lycan, 2000: 15).
4. The puzzle about Substitutivity (Lycan, 2000: 15): Consider this statement: (S4) “Jack believes that Marcel is Sue’s brother.” According to R.T, meaning is equal to reference. Therefore the words have the same referent they must have the same meaning (Lycan, 2000: 15). So S4 should be equivalent to (*) “Jack believes Mufasa is Sue’s brother.” However, S4 and (*) not equivalent. If Jack didn’t know that Mufasa is Marcel, then S4 would be true while (*) would be false.
Focus on one of the four problems and give Russell’s solution to it in …show more content…
At least one person is Sue’s brother ii. At most one person is Sue’s brother. iii. Whoever is Sue’s brother is Marcel
(*): Jack believes;
i. At least one person is Sue’s brother ii. At most one person is Sue’s brother. iii. Whoever is Sue’s brother is Mufasa
According to Russel, the beliefs in S4 and in (*) have entirely different contents and therefore have entirely different meanings and are not substitutable (Lycan, 2000: 20-21).
Do you think this solution works? Why/not?
In this instance I believe the solution does work. It provides a reasonable and logical reason to why two words can have the same referent but are not substitutional. By breaking the expressions down one can clearly see and understand that in S4 and (*) the content in the last point is quite different and therefore different meaning. If the two points have different meanings then they cannot be substitutional. Reference List:
Lycan, W. (2000), Philosophy of Language: A contemporary introduction. London and New York: