The Importance Of Operation Barbarossa

World War II lasted from 1939 to 1994, but historians still argue about how the Allied Powers triumphed. Some claim that the Allied Powers enjoyed an unspoken victory from the start, yet others claim that specific events cost the Axis powers their success in the war: a single event that pushed Germany, leader of the Axis Powers, into irrevocable defeat. Indeed, the most popular response amongst scholars has to do with invasions, an archaic manner of waging war. Specifically, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, code-named Operation Barbarossa, seemed to both destroy any future hopes the Axis had in store and expedite its defeat. Barbarossa was a unilateral victory; in fact, the Soviet Union was able to triumph over Germany in spite
Hitler’s excessively decisive leadership relocated troops that were still fighting in Southern Europe to the Soviet border; more than 3.2 million German soldiers and 500,000 Axis soldiers at the Soviet border buttressed German preparation on the border and launched aerial surveillance missions. But then troops were forced to return to fight in Southern Europe because they were simply needed; this dwindled the number of troops available because this expedition across a large landmass was costly and many Germans perished (Fox). Another event that had the same effect on the number of troops available pertains to Hitler’s relationship with Benito Mussolini, who was then Italian Prime Minister and fellow leader of the Axis group. Mussolini discovered Hitler’s chicanery, which originated from opposing prospects, and assaulted Greece while seeking retribution. Moreover, German troops were then fighting in Greece because Germany was responsible for assisting Italy in its Greco-Italian war once Italy struggled (Shirer). Put simply, troops that were preparing for Operation Barbarossa were now battling in Greece and other Balkan states. The smaller number of available troops for Barbarossa was vital
Firstly, Hitler’s generals failed to agree on nearly every decision to made made during the invasion. Especially considering the fact that the Soviets were unexpectedly prepared, posing frequent counter-attacks, such aggravation at the highest level was substantive to German defeat. For example, perhaps the most crucial decision was to be made midway through July of 1941 when Hitler’s High Commanders and generals decided on whether there army should push 200 miles further to reach Moscow, the Soviet capital, or should the army adhere to the original plan, emphasizing Leningrad and the Ukraine. The High Command had support from the army leaders and the leaders of the Panzer force when they insisted on an all-out drive for the Soviet capital. On the other hand, other qualified generals had their intentions on the food belt and industrial areas of the Ukraine and on the Russian oil fields. In fact, they agreed on Leningrad and Ukraine but then argued further and finally focused on Moscow. Because leaders of any force need to be in harmony, if not in unanimity,, the dissention in the German government resulted in the country being completely unable to defeat the Red Army. As more and more time was perished arguing and re-allocating the troops, the Red Army was tactically at a large advantage. Regardless of the actions taken, the Germans were at a disadvantage at the very time it took to arrive at a