The Pros And Cons Of Adverse Possession

Adverse possession, squatting or limitation of actions as it is variously called, embodies one of the most fundamental principles of English land law; namely that a person may only own an estate in the land, not the land itself. It follows from this that any person with a superior estate (better title) may assert that title so as to claim seisin of the land.

The principle of limitation gives practical effect to this doctrine of the relativity of title by providing that a person may be barred from bringing any claim to recover possession of land after the period of limitation has passed.
In other words, if an estate owner sleeps on their rights, those rights will be extinguished in the sense that a court will not enforce them against
Secondly, by far the most difficult problem in relation to adverse possession is deciding when this period shall be deemed to have begun. In other words, at what moment in time does the actual occupation of land by another person become adverse to the paper owner so as to give them 12 years from that date to enforce their paramount title? Another way of looking at this is to ask what actions of a person in actual possession amount to adverse possession so as to give rise to the possibility that, after the limitation period has expired, the paper owner’s title will be extinguished. The particular rules concerning this vital question are not to be found in statute. The LA 1980 does not tell use how to assess whether adverse possession has occurred, only how it works and what its consequences are. The rules are entirely judge made and thus flexible, open-ended and subject to a variety of applications as the circumstances of each case permits.
Following a number of cases that illustrated the uncertainties in the law, the
House of Lords in Pye v Graham (2003) sought to codify the principles
In either case, the loss of possession by the paper owner must be followed by actual adverse possession by the squatter. This will be a question of fact in each case, although it is clear that the degree of physical possession required will vary with the type of land involved (for example,
Lambeth v Blackburn (2001): making a flat secure was sufficient, as was clearing a derelict shed, erecting a new roof and fitting a makeshift door fixed by a chain: Purhrich v Hackney (2003)).
For example, it may well be easier to establish adverse possession over land which is not susceptible to developed use (Red House Farms v Catchpole
(1977)) and there are some indications that adverse possession is easier to prove in cases of discontinuance as opposed to cases of dispossession (Red
House Farms). Yet, as noted, it is a question of fact in each case (Powell v
McFarlane (1970)) and there is no requirement that the adverse possession must actually inconvenience the paper owner (Treloar v Nute (1976)). However, it seems clear from Moran that the same act that amounts to the second part of a successful claim (actual adverse possession) may also