It is evident that today’s modern societies faces a main challenge regarding multifaceted conflicts. Especially, over the past two years, the hybrid threat construct has found some traction. It appears in official government reports and has been cited by the US defense secretary in articles and speeches.
Hybrid Warfare may introduce some terminological clouds of confusion. It is founded on a broad characterization of hybrid conflict, as a conflict that has both regular and irregular forces in the war. These forces need not be present at the same time or place, nor centrally directed by this team’s definition.
However, it is not clear this usage is based on a common understanding of what a hybrid threat or hybrid warfare entails. …show more content…
Marine Lt. Col. Bill Nemeth’s graduate work on Chechnya and hybrid warfare is path-breaking research. He defined hybrid warfare as “the contemporary form of guerrilla warfare” that “employs both modern technology and modern mobilization methods.” He noted that the Chechens were capable of easily transitioning from conventional to guerrilla tactics, as needed, and that their tactics would often straddle the boundary between guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
Nathan Freier of the US Center for Strategic and International Studies was one of the originators of the hybrid warfare construct when he worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the US national defense strategy. That strategy laid out in its now famous “quad chart” four threats — traditional, irregular, catastrophic terrorism and disruptive — that exploit revolutionary technology to negate our military superiority. This strategy noted that in the future, the most complex threats would be combinations of these four. Freier’s version defines a hybrid threat as any actor who uses two of the four modes of conflict. Additionally, Freier retains the fourth mode as “disruptive technology,” per its original usage by the …show more content…
All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of forces — often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation — is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the