The Rcsinforest Action Network
132 PART I Strategy and the Nonmarket Environment
The Rcsinforest Action Network
RAN was founded in 1985 with the mission of prot ecting tropical rainforests and the human rights of people living in them. RAN used tools such as citizen protests, media, nonviolent civil disobedie nce, and publications to bring awareness to the issues and pressure governments, corporations, and lending institutions. RAN had about two dozen employees, all in the United States, organized in three departments: operations, development
(fundraising), and campaigns. RAN had a full-time media specialist who interacted with the news media and participated in campaign planning.
Within the campaigns department, RAN typically had a campaign manager for each …show more content…
campaign and used an organizing staff of about five to support whichever campaign was active at the time.
In the mid-1990s RAN changed its focus from public policy to the private sector with the objective of changing the practices of companies with environm entally destructive practices. RAN executive direct or Michael Brune said, “Companies were more responsive to public opinion than certain legislatures
were.
We felt we could create more democracy in the marketplace than in the government.”
RAN’s Global Finance Campaign
Selecting a Target
In late 1999 RAN was concluding a successful 2-year campaign (led by Brune) targeting Home Depot, which had agreed to end by 2003 the sale of wood from endangered forests. For the Global Finance
Campaign, RAN planned to use a model similar to the one used for Home Depot—target a large, brand-oriented, U.S.-based multinational company that had a strong retail presence, was a leader in its industry, and had a key role in facilitating the destruction of old growth forests and supporting extractive industries. Because RAN was a small organization with the goal of shifting the practices of entire sectors, not just individual companies, it relied on the ripple effect of targeting a market leader.
One company stood out as the best target—
Citigroup, the world’s largest bank. Citigroup was the leading global, emerging market project finance bank, and developing country project finance bank.
Citigroup also had a key role in a number of specific projects that alarmed RAN, such as the Camisea pipeline in Peru (Citigroup was the financial …show more content…
advisor on the project but did not directly fund it) and the
Chad-Cameroon pipeline under construction by
ExxonMobil Chevron, and a consortium of central
African oil companies.2 In researching Citigroup’s involvement, RAN relied on data from Dealogic’s
ProjectWare, a database of project finance deals.
In 2000 Citigroup had net income of $13.5 billion on revenues of $111.8 billion and had customers in over 100 countries and territories. Citigroup’s activities included global consumer banking, global corporate and investment banking, global investment management and private banking, and investment activities. Citigroup’s global consumer group offered banking, lending, investment services, and credit cards to customers in over 50 countries and tern- tories. The global consumer group reported core net income of $5.3 billion on $30.4 billion of revenues in 2000.
Citigroup had a public image and a brand to protect (in particular, its large consumer banking operation and credit card business), which made it an attractive target. Ilyse Hogue, RAN’s campaign manager for the Global Finance Campaign, said:
Citigroup had poured $100 million into its brand image, most recently on its “Live Richly” marketing campaign, which was predicated on the notion that “there is more to life than money.” We saw a company that was investing a lot in making the public believe that they
opera ted in line with conirnon social values. Part of
Citi’s vulnerability was the juxtaposition of what it articulated to the public with what we saw on the ground from Citi’s finance activities.
RAN began the campaign expecting it to last up to
5 years but hoping to win in 3 years. RAN dedicated three staff members, including Hogue, full time to the Global Finance Campaign.
RAN had such limited resources and Citigroup was such a large target that many people thought
RAN could not win the campaign. RAN believed, however, that Citigroup’s vulnerability was its sensit ivity to public opinion, so exploiting that vulnerab ility by publicizing Citigroup’s environmental practices became the heart of RAN’s strategy.
2For years RAN had developed relationships with allies (e.g., other NGO5, indigenous federations, and others) on the front lines of the affeetJ areas. These allies kept RAN apprised of project developments and enabled it to track the projects and their financing.
3Citigroup Inc. 2000Armual Report.
In developing its strategy, RAN drew heavily on fit past campaigns and consulted with allies that had interacted with Citigroup and were interested in helping. RAN dubbed Citibank the “World’s Most
IS! Destructive Bank” and on April 13, 2000 wrote to
Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill, asking the company to recognize its role in, and take action to address, the destruction of the world’s old-growth forests and acceleration of climate change. As with most of
RAN’s campaigns, this introductory letter pres ented the issues and a set of demands. Five days later a group of RAN campaigners addressed the board of directors and Sandy Weill at Citigroup’s annual meeting, voicing their concerns in front of a room of shareholders. On April 19, Citigroup agreed to meet with RAN to discuss its connection with the fossil fuel and forest industries. Citigroup, however, took no action to address the issues.
After Citigroup’s annual meeting, RAN organ ized a 3-day strategic brainstorming session, attended by about 20 ally organizations, to generate ideas, increase awareness, and spur interest in the campaign.
Some of RAN’s strategies included shareholder tt resolutions, high profile media attention, paid adver
- tisements, Days of Action with student networks, disruptions of Citibank branches, and other nonviolent civil disobedience (e.g., banner hangs). Hogue believed the media was one of the best arrows in
RAN’s quiver when going after a target’s brand image.
PI In September 2000 RAN launched the camp aign on college campuses, encouragmg a boycott of i4 Citigroup credit cards and job recruitment. Many of tSP!4 RAN’s actions were designed to call the public’s p attention to the campaign objectives and attract
4!4 media coverage, which was essential to mformmg the
(g$ public. In October, RAN organized a Day of Action that included demonstrations in which participants cut up their Citibank credit cards and closed their
Citibank accounts. In December, carolers gathered at
Citigroup’s headquarters and sang “Oil Wells” to the tune of “Jingle Bells.” The campaign also targeted
!S. Sandy Weffi. For Valentine’s Day 2001, Weffi received ti4 hundreds of valentines, asking him to show the Earth some love and stop funding rainforest destruction.
April 2001 saw the second Day of Action, with 80 actions in 12 countries on five continents. The actions included hanging banners, marches, and leaving symC
HAPTER 4 Private Politics 133 bolic piles of wood chips and oil at Citibank branches.
Also in April, 500 schoolchildren sent drawings to
Weill asking him to stop funding rainforest destruct ion. In October, an oil pipeline under construction in an Ecuadorian cloudforest reserve was obstructed by dozens of indigenous women and children. Students across the United States gathered at local Citibank branches, bringing pledges from 12,000 students who refused to do business with the “#1 funder of global warming.” In February 2002 students at 60 U.S. colleges participated in a National Student Week of
Action, which included demonstrations as well as telep hone calls and letters delivered to Citigroup.5
Much of RAN’s media attention was “earned”— media coverage that RAN did not pay for, such as press coverage of Days of Action or articles written about the Global Finance Campaign. In addition,
RAN paid for a number of advertisements in various newspapers and magazines criticizing Citigroup and challenging it to take leadership in protecting the environment. Enlisting students was important to the success of the campaign, and RAN found that students at many universities were eager to participate. To mobilize stud ent groups, RAN campaigners traveled to campuses to spur interest in the campaign. In addition, RAN hired organizers from Green Corps, an organization that trained young environmental activists to become future leaders. Green Corps had historically been politically aggressive but had not promoted the use of civil disobedience. Green Corps organizers were hired on a short-term basis and saturated campuses — educ ating students, organizing Days of Action, and establ ishing groups (or relationships with existing student groups) with which RAN could coordinate.
Students at Columbia University, through SEEJ
(Students for Environmental and Economic Justice), played a significant role in the campaign over time.
Citigroup had a substantial presence at Columbia— it had an affinity agreement with Columbia, and
Citigroup’s logo appeared on student identification cards. Nearly 4,000 Columbia students opened accounts with Citibank each year.6
RAN’s ability to gain the support of young peop le, such as college students, was critical in getting
5During campaign activities, no activists were injured or served jail time. However, there were many arrests — of RAN stm students, concerned citizens, and volunteers. Arrests sometimes ted to fines or community service, but most charges were dropped.
6”SEEJ Members Jufluenee Citigroup Corporate Agenda,”
Columbia Daily Spectator, February 3,2004. aa RAN’S Strategy during the First Two Years.
The Rcsinforest Action Network
RAN was founded in 1985 with the mission of prot ecting tropical rainforests and the human rights of people living in them. RAN used tools such as citizen protests, media, nonviolent civil disobedie nce, and publications to bring awareness to the issues and pressure governments, corporations, and lending institutions. RAN had about two dozen employees, all in the United States, organized in three departments: operations, development
(fundraising), and campaigns. RAN had a full-time media specialist who interacted with the news media and participated in campaign planning.
Within the campaigns department, RAN typically had a campaign manager for each …show more content…
campaign and used an organizing staff of about five to support whichever campaign was active at the time.
In the mid-1990s RAN changed its focus from public policy to the private sector with the objective of changing the practices of companies with environm entally destructive practices. RAN executive direct or Michael Brune said, “Companies were more responsive to public opinion than certain legislatures
were.
We felt we could create more democracy in the marketplace than in the government.”
RAN’s Global Finance Campaign
Selecting a Target
In late 1999 RAN was concluding a successful 2-year campaign (led by Brune) targeting Home Depot, which had agreed to end by 2003 the sale of wood from endangered forests. For the Global Finance
Campaign, RAN planned to use a model similar to the one used for Home Depot—target a large, brand-oriented, U.S.-based multinational company that had a strong retail presence, was a leader in its industry, and had a key role in facilitating the destruction of old growth forests and supporting extractive industries. Because RAN was a small organization with the goal of shifting the practices of entire sectors, not just individual companies, it relied on the ripple effect of targeting a market leader.
One company stood out as the best target—
Citigroup, the world’s largest bank. Citigroup was the leading global, emerging market project finance bank, and developing country project finance bank.
Citigroup also had a key role in a number of specific projects that alarmed RAN, such as the Camisea pipeline in Peru (Citigroup was the financial …show more content…
advisor on the project but did not directly fund it) and the
Chad-Cameroon pipeline under construction by
ExxonMobil Chevron, and a consortium of central
African oil companies.2 In researching Citigroup’s involvement, RAN relied on data from Dealogic’s
ProjectWare, a database of project finance deals.
In 2000 Citigroup had net income of $13.5 billion on revenues of $111.8 billion and had customers in over 100 countries and territories. Citigroup’s activities included global consumer banking, global corporate and investment banking, global investment management and private banking, and investment activities. Citigroup’s global consumer group offered banking, lending, investment services, and credit cards to customers in over 50 countries and tern- tories. The global consumer group reported core net income of $5.3 billion on $30.4 billion of revenues in 2000.
Citigroup had a public image and a brand to protect (in particular, its large consumer banking operation and credit card business), which made it an attractive target. Ilyse Hogue, RAN’s campaign manager for the Global Finance Campaign, said:
Citigroup had poured $100 million into its brand image, most recently on its “Live Richly” marketing campaign, which was predicated on the notion that “there is more to life than money.” We saw a company that was investing a lot in making the public believe that they
opera ted in line with conirnon social values. Part of
Citi’s vulnerability was the juxtaposition of what it articulated to the public with what we saw on the ground from Citi’s finance activities.
RAN began the campaign expecting it to last up to
5 years but hoping to win in 3 years. RAN dedicated three staff members, including Hogue, full time to the Global Finance Campaign.
RAN had such limited resources and Citigroup was such a large target that many people thought
RAN could not win the campaign. RAN believed, however, that Citigroup’s vulnerability was its sensit ivity to public opinion, so exploiting that vulnerab ility by publicizing Citigroup’s environmental practices became the heart of RAN’s strategy.
2For years RAN had developed relationships with allies (e.g., other NGO5, indigenous federations, and others) on the front lines of the affeetJ areas. These allies kept RAN apprised of project developments and enabled it to track the projects and their financing.
3Citigroup Inc. 2000Armual Report.
In developing its strategy, RAN drew heavily on fit past campaigns and consulted with allies that had interacted with Citigroup and were interested in helping. RAN dubbed Citibank the “World’s Most
IS! Destructive Bank” and on April 13, 2000 wrote to
Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill, asking the company to recognize its role in, and take action to address, the destruction of the world’s old-growth forests and acceleration of climate change. As with most of
RAN’s campaigns, this introductory letter pres ented the issues and a set of demands. Five days later a group of RAN campaigners addressed the board of directors and Sandy Weill at Citigroup’s annual meeting, voicing their concerns in front of a room of shareholders. On April 19, Citigroup agreed to meet with RAN to discuss its connection with the fossil fuel and forest industries. Citigroup, however, took no action to address the issues.
After Citigroup’s annual meeting, RAN organ ized a 3-day strategic brainstorming session, attended by about 20 ally organizations, to generate ideas, increase awareness, and spur interest in the campaign.
Some of RAN’s strategies included shareholder tt resolutions, high profile media attention, paid adver
- tisements, Days of Action with student networks, disruptions of Citibank branches, and other nonviolent civil disobedience (e.g., banner hangs). Hogue believed the media was one of the best arrows in
RAN’s quiver when going after a target’s brand image.
PI In September 2000 RAN launched the camp aign on college campuses, encouragmg a boycott of i4 Citigroup credit cards and job recruitment. Many of tSP!4 RAN’s actions were designed to call the public’s p attention to the campaign objectives and attract
4!4 media coverage, which was essential to mformmg the
(g$ public. In October, RAN organized a Day of Action that included demonstrations in which participants cut up their Citibank credit cards and closed their
Citibank accounts. In December, carolers gathered at
Citigroup’s headquarters and sang “Oil Wells” to the tune of “Jingle Bells.” The campaign also targeted
!S. Sandy Weffi. For Valentine’s Day 2001, Weffi received ti4 hundreds of valentines, asking him to show the Earth some love and stop funding rainforest destruction.
April 2001 saw the second Day of Action, with 80 actions in 12 countries on five continents. The actions included hanging banners, marches, and leaving symC
HAPTER 4 Private Politics 133 bolic piles of wood chips and oil at Citibank branches.
Also in April, 500 schoolchildren sent drawings to
Weill asking him to stop funding rainforest destruct ion. In October, an oil pipeline under construction in an Ecuadorian cloudforest reserve was obstructed by dozens of indigenous women and children. Students across the United States gathered at local Citibank branches, bringing pledges from 12,000 students who refused to do business with the “#1 funder of global warming.” In February 2002 students at 60 U.S. colleges participated in a National Student Week of
Action, which included demonstrations as well as telep hone calls and letters delivered to Citigroup.5
Much of RAN’s media attention was “earned”— media coverage that RAN did not pay for, such as press coverage of Days of Action or articles written about the Global Finance Campaign. In addition,
RAN paid for a number of advertisements in various newspapers and magazines criticizing Citigroup and challenging it to take leadership in protecting the environment. Enlisting students was important to the success of the campaign, and RAN found that students at many universities were eager to participate. To mobilize stud ent groups, RAN campaigners traveled to campuses to spur interest in the campaign. In addition, RAN hired organizers from Green Corps, an organization that trained young environmental activists to become future leaders. Green Corps had historically been politically aggressive but had not promoted the use of civil disobedience. Green Corps organizers were hired on a short-term basis and saturated campuses — educ ating students, organizing Days of Action, and establ ishing groups (or relationships with existing student groups) with which RAN could coordinate.
Students at Columbia University, through SEEJ
(Students for Environmental and Economic Justice), played a significant role in the campaign over time.
Citigroup had a substantial presence at Columbia— it had an affinity agreement with Columbia, and
Citigroup’s logo appeared on student identification cards. Nearly 4,000 Columbia students opened accounts with Citibank each year.6
RAN’s ability to gain the support of young peop le, such as college students, was critical in getting
5During campaign activities, no activists were injured or served jail time. However, there were many arrests — of RAN stm students, concerned citizens, and volunteers. Arrests sometimes ted to fines or community service, but most charges were dropped.
6”SEEJ Members Jufluenee Citigroup Corporate Agenda,”
Columbia Daily Spectator, February 3,2004. aa RAN’S Strategy during the First Two Years.