The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries
The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries
Author(s): Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 194-220
Published by: Wiley on behalf of RAND Corporation
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3087430 .
Accessed: 10/11/2013 09:06
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RAND Journalof Economics
Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 2002 pp. 194-220
and to use
The strategic oftying preserve industries powerinevolving createmarket DennisW. Carlton* and Michael Waldman**
and can products be used topreserve how of
Thisarticleinvestigates thetying complementary periodcan a product thecurrent in of show Wefirst howa monopolist create monopoly positions. can in We showhowa monopolist onemarket its in future. then usetying preserve monopoly the to explains howa market. analysis
Our
emerging to its into tying extend monopoly a newly employ in rapidtechnological undergoing to dominant an industry dominant can use tying remain firm our externalities. also relate analysis
We
on costsandnetwork The focuses entry change. analysis case. totheMicrosoft
1.
Author(s): Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 194-220
Published by: Wiley on behalf of RAND Corporation
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3087430 .
Accessed: 10/11/2013 09:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Wiley and RAND Corporation are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
RAND Journal of Economics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 158.132.33.253 on Sun, 10 Nov 2013 09:06:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
RAND Journalof Economics
Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 2002 pp. 194-220
and to use
The strategic oftying preserve industries powerinevolving createmarket DennisW. Carlton* and Michael Waldman**
and can products be used topreserve how of
Thisarticleinvestigates thetying complementary periodcan a product thecurrent in of show Wefirst howa monopolist create monopoly positions. can in We showhowa monopolist onemarket its in future. then usetying preserve monopoly the to explains howa market. analysis
Our
emerging to its into tying extend monopoly a newly employ in rapidtechnological undergoing to dominant an industry dominant can use tying remain firm our externalities. also relate analysis
We
on costsandnetwork The focuses entry change. analysis case. totheMicrosoft
1.
References: Vol.90 (1976),pp. 475-498. M.D. "Coalition-ProofNash Equilibria I. Concepts." Journalof Economic Theory, 42 (1987), pp Economic Review, 78 (1988), pp.429-434. Arrangements theLeverage Problem." Law Review, 67 (1957),pp Antitrust Journal, 68 (2001b),pp. 659-683.