Thomas Paine: Narcissist Disposition Of Democracy

2.2.1 UNIVERSALISM DISPOSITION OF DEMOCRACY
Thomas Paine's moral and political thought raises the question, "How can we become a more self-governing society?" According to Paine, self-governing individuals are necessary to have a self-governing society. By self-governing is meant the willingness of individuals to consciously choose and hold to principles or an ideal that apply in diverse situations. The common good and a democratic government are thus posited as broad criteria for making government indirectly self-governing because representative government is "owned" by citizens, and citizens are free to appraise the outcomes of their government (Paine, 2000). In this view, the great enlightenment revolutionary, Thomas Paine, is making a case
for popular sovereignty as the best form of rule leading to, and ensuring, universal human rights (Paine, 2008). As specified in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, the sole purpose of government anywhere is the preservation of the natural and imperceptible rights of man for which vigorous citizenship and self-rule are the only suitable templates. Embedded within this universalist prescription are two different conceptions of democracy: one focusing on democratic regime, another concerned with democratic society. In the former formulation, universal human rights are best realized and secured through the constitution of a “government that is restricted to the making and administering of laws” (Paine, 1908). Democracy, in this limited sense, is conceived of as a method of rule, whereby the elected representatives of the people, in accordance with the wishes of their constituents, draft, challenge and administer laws and regulations governing the lives of all. The second formulation conceives of democracy as something altogether more substantive, by contrast; for Paine envisions any regime type to be perennially defective and in need of constant improvement. Hence the need for “open discussion” among active and rational citizens in “forming or reforming, generating or regenerating governments and constitutions” (Paine, 2000). Democracy, in the latter sense, requires a more substantive set of justifications for the maintenance of its daily affairs; it must allow for a more expansive role for its citizens, just as it ought to ensure a fair, representative and impartial system of government. The substance of democratic outcomes is what matters most in this conception, not merely the inclusive nature of democratic procedures. Yet, different though these conceptions of democracy may be in scope, they must not be viewed as mutually exclusive of one another (Paine, 2008).
In the above view, one of the most problematic issues in defining democracy is also the determination of whether democracy is primarily a substantive way of life or rather a set of procedural rules. In this regard, two broad variants of conceptualization dominate most approaches to democracy: the “maximalist” definitions that stipulate “substantive” or comprehensive concepts encompassing social and economic aspects as defining criteria, and the “minimalist” or procedural definitions that are mostly concerned with the process of institutional arrangements. From this perspective, there are plenty of definitions of democracy with variations in its conceptual meaning but with a set of the two core characteristics. The discussion between Dahl and Schumpeter is particularly revealing. Schumpeter defines democracy as a political method, since "the democratic method is that institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1942; Beetham, 1994). But this is a procedural conception and, as Dahl argues, it requires amendments, including the process of forming governments through the free competition among politicians for votes. In Dahl's words "the two processes - democratization and the development of public contestation - a key characteristic of democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens" (Dahl, 1989). Therefore, not satisfied with Schumpeter's framework, Dahl introduced the concept of "polyarchy" as the necessary procedures for democratic principles. This model of democracy by Robert Dahl is both competitive and inclusive. Polyarchies, what referred as “realistic democracies” are regime types composed of two dimensions: (i) contestation, which allows for competition between individuals and political parties, and more importantly, for opposition to the ruling faction; and (ii) participation, which guarantees the right of citizens to engage in public contestation (Dahl, 1973). Together, these dimensions comprise an institutional framework that, however minimal, is far less elitist and more attuned to the interests and grievances of the population it seeks to draw its legitimacy from. With polyarchy, the public space for deliberation and power struggles is widened so that the competition over people’s votes is not merely confined to the rich and powerful members of society (Ibid).
Similarly, Samuel Huntington’s conception of democracy offers a more inclusive version of the Schumpeterian model, one which he terms “procedural democracy.” What Huntington means by “procedure,” however, is strictly electoral. He argued that elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. According to him, these qualities may make such governments undesirable, but they do not make them undemocratic. For Huntington, democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political systems (Huntington, 1993). This rather brusque account fulfills the minimal requirement of democracy-as-regime type but it also amends the traditional conception to observe “open, free, and fair” electoral procedures.
The predominant variant of the maximalist conception is “deliberative democracy,” the notion, according to Joshua Cohen, that in democratic states “the exercise of power is manifestly tied to conditions of public reasoning” (Cohen, 2007).
Public reason, in this set up, functions as the ultimate source and barometer of legitimacy in any democratic society. For maximalists, the legitimate use of coercion by agents of the democratic state requires a more substantive commitment to the core values of democracy that regard individual citizens as free and equal members of society. Deliberative democracy is premised on the “fact of reasonable pluralism,”20 which speaks to the observable reality of multiple commitments, obligations, and beliefs that condition the behavior and reasoning of individuals in society (Thompson, 2008). As such, whereas in the minimalist conception the ultimate objective is the formation of government through democratic procedures, the maximalist view strives for the observance and practice of democratic values in society as a whole. Moreover, since it is conceivable that a government elected through free and fair democratic procedures may enact unjust laws or even infringe upon the rights of their citizens due to certain beliefs or under special circumstances, there must exist a deliberative framework through which opposing views are represented and the meaning of dominant values challenged regardless of who is in power (Rawls, 2009). The deliberative
conception, therefore, provides a dynamic framework for the discussion of issues vital to the interests and beliefs of all members of society, provided that the arguments offered are reasonably acceptable to all regardless of who or what party is in power (Karpowitz, et al., 2009). This suggests that a broader, more substantive set of ideals and political values must guide the ideal procedures of deliberation. That is to say, in a deliberative setting, individuals enter the domain of public reason with an understanding of one another as equals, endowed with the right to participate freely in society under the conditions of collective self-rule.
For deliberative liberal democrats such as Cohen, these values combine to form a unique ideal of “democratic toleration” that touches very significantly upon the classical liberal values of toleration, but which also makes substantial revisions in order to provide a political space for fundamental moral, religious, and philosophical disagreement in democratic societies (Cohen, 1997). In democratic societies where this overarching value of democratic toleration is prized and adhered to, the public realm is characterized by inclusive modes of interaction among citizens of many backgrounds and beliefs. Together, these conceptions, however truncated or expansive, have come to constitute a canonical tradition – universalism – concerned with the formation, operation, and validity of democratic practices in the abstract. Both minimalist and maximalist variants of universalism avoid delving into the specific social-historical context in which democratic ideals are debated, challenged and amended. In the case of minimalists, empirical observations about electoral procedures, voter participation, and curious indexes purporting to measure “freedom” and basic rights are often brandished to track the metamorphosis of political regimes at different stages of their democratic journeys.
Maximalists, on the other hand, deploy highly sophisticated normative philosophical arguments to probe various idealized configurations, hypotheses, and connections in the ever-complex relationship between state and society under a democratic setting.
Nowhere in either one of these variants are the intermingling of local histories and democratic ideals contemplated in great depth; instead, the kinds of conceptions envisioned are offered as universal in both essence and breadth. But perhaps the most significant flaw in universalist accounts of democratic legitimacy is the failure to distinguish between the “universal content” of democratic ideals, and their “universal justifiability” (Benhabib, 2007). Indeed, most of the universalist accounts of democratic legitimacy – especially of the maximalist variety – do make the mistake of only emphasizing the universal justifiability of democratic ideals without considering the possibility that people of different backgrounds may have reasons to support them, but only in a way that would honor their historical experiences and fit their political circumstances. The minimalist conception of democratic government with its singular emphasis on elections and the institutions they help to sustain completely overlooks the fact that most basic rights and freedoms have not been won at the ballot box but through other democratic means such as public persuasion, grassroots mobilization, or acts of civil disobedience. At the heart of this
oversight is the notion that rational individuals are best placed to decide what is in their self-interest, and therefore a government produced through their votes will find it against its interests to displease the electorate (Urbinati, 2006). In general, universalist conceptions of democratic legitimacy are directly concerned with compelling reasons as to why democratic ideals should be endorsed and separating matters that concern the content of democratic ideals and those that seek a universalist justification. But in both cases, the emphasis on the historical construction of democratic ideals is rather thin.