Tiananmen Square Massacre Case Study

American News Coverage on
Tiananmen Square Massacre 1989
I: Introduction
Through Television news media, the whole America was watching China during April 15th to June 4th in 1989. U.S. audiences were well informed the progress of student protests when journalists used news technologies to transmit instantaneously what was happening in Beijing Tiananmen Square and other places in China. Ironically, the real-time political response was not launched firstly by Bush's Administration but the Chinese Government: American news media like CNN and CBS were ordered shutdown" by "official representatives of the Chinese Government, embarrassed and clearly aware that they were losing face on live television." After June 4th the U.S. reconsidered their bilateral relations with China on "an entirely different course, one that is far more contentious and hostile than at any time since the late 1950s". In this paper, I examine the factors that may determine the relations between American news media
and the foreign policy-making process in this case by using Entman's cascade model. The main attention of my research is focused on the analysis of the dominant frame of news coverage made by the New York Times. During the analysis, the semi-influence of the news media on foreign policy decisions is explicitly displayed.

II: Rationale for Using the Cascade Model
Three points need to be notified before discussing the media-foreign policy relations in this case. One is that the behavior and reporting of American news media on Tiananmen Square Protests did have a significant influence on American public opinion against China. Another is that Bush's Administration, which was opposed to harsher restrictions to China, did take responsive sanctions to this country. The third point is that after June 4, political elites showed a disagreement with Bush's insufficient reactions to Tiananmen Square Massacre and called for harder penalties to China.
According to Risse-Kappen, in a liberal democracy like the U.S., with an "open and decentralized political system" and a "society dominated policy network", its foreign policy-making process is more close to a "bottom-up" model: the general public has a measureable and distinct impact on the foreign policy-making process. Following this vein, the American news media seemed to have played "CNN effect" to force their government to "do something" against its will by lighting up the public outrage against China.
However, the objectivity and accuracy of American news accounts on this issue had been seriously questioned not only by Chinese Government but also worldwide analysts and scholars. One possible reason for the inaccuracy is that most sources to U.S. media were cut off after the declaration of martial law on May 20. Thus what they uncritically reported to the American public was "flooded with hoaxes", "exaggerations", "rumors and disinformation". It is understandable that most Americans think Tiananmen of a "massacre" due to the Chinese government 's vague talking about what happened during that night. The other cause of the non objectivity is considered by the "disproportionate sympathy with, and admiration for, the student demonstrators distorted their reporting of the demonstrations". The excessive subjective tone illustrated in the coverage leads to another question: who was responsible for setting up the tone and conveying a moral judgment on this issue?
In addition, the political debate of political elites against White House in this case sorts out a government-media nexus close to an indexing model -- which argues that "the media index or reflect elite debate rather closely". This model is also discussed as the elite version of manufacturing consent paradigm which perceives media as subservient to the interests of political elites, where elites are defined broadly as members of the executive, legislative or any other politically powerful group. To understand the case in this way, the mass media news is simply reflect a ‘professional responsibility [for journalists] to highlight . . . struggles within the centres of power’. Thus, the as Mermin describes, the news media serve as a "vehicle" for "government officials to criticize each other". Therefore, the media's contribution to foreign policy making process is considered "no independent".

However, this conclusion is clearly at odds with the thesis that American news media addressed significant impact on foreign policy changing toward China. To find a way out of the complicated riddle, I use framing and the Cascade Model undertaken by Entman to deconstruct the ambiguous media-diplomacy ties represented in the case. This thesis, as Entman indicates, could explain who takes the dominant role and why political leaders contest the president's frame sometimes and other times not. Besides, the role of public is possibly interpreted in the larger system of communication linking different parts from the democratic structure.

Framing, knowledge networks and cascading activation are three segments to develop the cascading activation model. The concept of framing is defined as: selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution. The cultural significance generated by framing language and image is a key component for analysis as the greater the cultural significance in scale and scope, the more probable the framing is to stir up feelings and considerations in large parts of the audience.

The knowledge networks explain how people's ideas and feelings about one event are shaped and connected to each other when receiving a news coverage. The term "schema" is applied by Entman referring to interpretive processes happening in human mind, different from "frames" applied to texts. A schema for June 4 might include the Tiananmen Square, student protesters, the Chinese People's Liberation Army as well as Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang among others. Each idea of these is able to develop an instant emotional association. Most probably, for Americans, positive feelings toward Student protesters but negative feelings toward Chinese leaders and the Army. The new June 4 schema draws on the news coverage of the events of that day and on the existing knowledge network--the ideas about Communists for example--as well. Once the new schema is stored in memory, any relevant information is likely to connect emotions and notions from the knowledge network. In this perspective, the mechanism of spreading activation--how to bring thoughts and feeling to mind-- is the key cycle in this analysis.

According to Figure 2.1 and 2.2, the cascade model of media-policy nexus illustrates a hierarchy of networks through which mental association activate and spread; Notably, in this model, the U.S. Administration leads these associations, nonetheless reactions and feedbacks from sublevels are also able to put significant impact on the entire process. Besides, a variety of contestations among president, specific issues and political conditions are taken into consideration as well. Last but not least, the role of public in this process is explicitly explained: although public opinion is positioned underneath in the chain, the reaction and participation of citizens impose on policy makers' decision.

Figure 2.1 Cascading Network Activation
Administration
Elites
Media
News Frames
Public

Source: Theorizing U.S.
Media Diplomacy by Robert M. Entman, October 18, 2005

According to Entman, there are four factors that influence the frame diffusion of certain news coverage: Motivations, Cultural Congruence, Elite Power and Strategy. The former two internally " 'pull' counterframing mental associations into individuals' thinking; whereas the latter two from outside " 'push' consideration of anti-administration frames through the cascading system". In this perspective, the cultural congruence seems to play a key part: the degree of the congruence with the dominant political culture indicate whether the frame will achieve its goals. Figure 2.3 shows the cultural congruence key to elite, media and public responses.
Figure 2.2 Cascade of Frame Contestation

Administration
White House
State
Defense

Other Elites: Republicans
Congress
Ex-officials & Experts
Media
Journalists
News Organizations

News Frames
Words
Images

Public
Polls
Other Indicators
Other Elites: Democrats
Congress
Ex-officials & Experts

Source: Theorizing U.S. Media Diplomacy by Robert M. Entman, October 18, 2005

Figure 2.3 Cultural Congruence Key to Elite, Media and Public Responses
Stimulus: Congruent Ambiguous Incongruent
Response: Habitual Contested locked Tipping Point
Source: Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. foreign Policy by Entman, p.15.
The "tipping point" is explained as "imaginary" where dissents of leading schemas initiate and the situation becomes too complicated to handle therefore a blocking reply is called forth.
I review the features of cascade model in order to examine its applicability to analyze the ambiguity and complexity of media-foreign policy relations presented in the Tiananmen case. Due to limited resources, in the next section, I use this approach to study the verbal messages presented by the New York Times about the Tiananmen Square Protests in 1989.
III: News Coverage on Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989
Comparing Magnitude of the News Coverage
A key outcome of framing is magnitude, as Entman explains, to magnify elements that "support one side's decision, making them salient while at the same time shrinking those elements that might be used to construct a counterframe".
The selected news coverage was notably divided into two segments by June 4--an ironical blank of memory was left on that day when no witnesses nor sources assured what really happened. In the first part, 119 stories were published in total (see Table 3.1). By comparing the magnitude of the stories covered on each protagonist of the event (the student protesters and the Chinese Government), it is evident that the media granted the student demonstrators far more than the Chinese Government. Table 3.2 shows some comparisons. In 119 articles, 60 were dedicated to the protesters, accounting for 57.9% of the total number. On the other hand, only 26.5% were reported specifically what the Government was doing.
One objective factor that may leads to the inclination could be the Government's refusal of interview. However, no matter deliberately or inevitably, it is sure that Americans would have reacted much more strongly to the protesters' actions than to the Chinese Government's. Political difference is possibly made by the covering magnitude disparity: The continuing high public awareness of the protests in America overweighed Bush's attempts to keep restraint to apply intervention; Conversely, the lower public awareness of Chinese Leaders' efforts and strategies tangled the US Administration's desire to encourage a strategic relationship with Communist China.
Meaningfully, according to Table 3.3, after June 4, the focus on Chinese Government actions on protesters and citizens rose to 40.2%. To be sure, the higher public attentiveness of the Government's action -- reported as "crackdown" -- would be taken into consideration by Bush's Administration when adjusting their policy on China.
Table 3.1 Coverage of Tiananmen Square Protests before 4 Jun. after 4 Jun. Total
New York Times 119 stories 149 stories 268 stories
Source: NYT data from USC libraries. Includes coverage from April 18 to June 30 in 1989.

Table 3.2 Coverage of Protesters vs. Chinese Government before June 4

Protesters Government Both Sides US Response Others Total
New York Times 57.9% 26.05% 13.4% 4.2% 5.9% 100% number 60 31 16 5 7 119
Source: Author's analysis. Includes coverage from April 18 to June 3 in 1989.

Table 3.3 Themes of Coverage on Tiananmen Square Protests after June 4 (Total=149) U.S. Government Political Elites Other Countries Chinese political Comments on reaction reactions reactions situation June. 4 New York Times 9.4% 1.3% 4.7% 40.2% 12.8% number 14 2 7 60 19

American Public Chinese Victims HK & Taiwan Chinese Public Others response reactions reactions reactions New York Times 8.1% 10.1% 2.0% 2.0% 9.4% number 12 15 3 3 14
Source: Author's analysis. Includes coverage from June 4 to June 30 in 1989.

Table 3.4 Use of Humanizing/Approving Terms in Coverage of Student Protesters (before Jun.4) Humanizing/Approving Neutral Total
New York Times 59.2% 50.8% 100% number 45 31 76

Source: Author's analysis. Includes coverage from April 18 to June 3 in 1989.

Table 3.5 Use of Critical, Neutral or Positive Terms in describing Chinese Government in Coverage of Post-Tiananmen Movement (After June 4)

Critical or Negative Neutral Positive Total
New York Times 56.38% 42.28% 1.34% 100% number 84 63 2 149
Source: Author's analysis. Includes coverage from June 4 to June 30 in 1989.

Indicative Words for Framing the Problem and Its Causes
Problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment and remedy endorsement are the main functions of framing. Morally judgmental words used for problem definition and causal analysis were saturated in the framing of the Tiananmen event. According to Entman, in terms of spreading activation, once the problem was identified as a "massacre" on the part of Chinese Government and the cause of the event was established to be the public desire calling for "democracy" in this country, "the journey along the pathway to emotional, negative moral judgments was instantaneous". In case like this, the former three of framing functions are generally "interwined" and possible remedies are practically "predetermined".
CONTRASTING WORDS FOR TWO SIDES
One notable feature presented in the problem identification and cause analysis processes is the morally judgmental words used on both sides were mutually contrasting. Taking a look at the headlines appeared in the coverage, positive and justified expressions were mostly dedicated to the causal part of student demonstrators, whereas passive and critical words given to the problematic part of the Chinese Government. The first report after the protests started was titled "Chinese Student March for Democracy"(18 April 1989). During that week, articles related to this event were published with headlines like "Thousands Chant for Democracy Within Earshot of China's Leaders"(19 April 1989), "Thousands Again Protest in Beijing: 'They hit me on the head and face with a belt,' a student says"(20 April 1989), "China's Date With Destiny; A Day of Reckoning Nears for Protesters"(21 April 1989) and "100,000 Defy a Ban on Protests in Beijing to Demand Democracy"(22 April 1989). Analogous words and expressions were continuously applied into headlines of the coverage before June 4. after the day stories were found titled by "The Beijing Spring: from Heady Defiance to Repression"(4 June 1989), "Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy with Blood"(5 June 1989), "Darkness in China"(6 June 1989); "Violence of Old Man vs. the Idealism of Youth" (7 June 1989), "PRAISE FOR TROOPS: Protesters Are Called On to Surrender or Face Heavy Punishment Turmoil in China: A Face Reappears China's Premier Surface After 2 Weeks"(9 June 1989). The view propounded by these words was "a yearning for freedom and democracy, for the dignity of the individual-ideals on which many believe America was founded--was brutally denied, not only by the use of military force, but by the revenge taking and police-state crackdown that followed". The newspaper defined the event as an act of violence confirming established moral assessments of the Communist China.
Approving and humanizing terms congruent with American culture were highly used in report of the protests. For instance, the movement was described as "democratic", "pride", "honored" with "tears", sad" but "defiant", with "courage" and "sacrifice", and the student protesters were "flowers", "future of China". According to Table 3.4, 59.2% of the stories used humanizing or approving terms toward the demonstrators. On the contrary, critical and negative words were more often dedicated to the Chinese Government: "dictatorship", "no glasnost", "repression", "massacre", "enemies of the people" "violent", "old", "lying" and the like. Statistics show that after the June 4 only two stories covered used positive terms regarding to the Chinese Government(see Table 3.45).
The emphasis of humanizing and approving terms consistent with American values is notoriously ethnocentric, as Entman indicates, "the more congruent the frame is with schemas that dominate the political culture, the more success it will enjoy". Americans seem to empathize more easily with sufferers sharing the same values with them. On the other hand, by placing the event in the category of evil massacre, the highly resonant and emotional Tiananmen descriptors furthered moral judgment--to be exact, outrage--at the incident and its executors.

Subverting the Impact of Contradictory Information
This case exemplifies one-sided framing that presented few distinct opinions and generated little elite or public dissent. It cannot be denied that contradictions to the dominant frame did come into view. However, merely two stories offered by the New York Times challenged the dominant frame(see Table 3.5): supporting the Chinese Government's actions. However, with such little magnitude, the contradictions could be easily neglected by the majority of citizens because "the isolated reports that challenged the logic of the dominant frame likely sputtered out without spreading activation of a contrary interpretation". Besides, the stories appeared later after the event schema had been implanted in audiences' minds. It is hard to change first impressions, "particularly when they are vividly supported by emotional language". In addition, for a stereotyped "other" (Communist China), negative information seems to have more significance. After all, not many journalists would admit that their reports were not "objective" or utterly "false".

IV: Who Influenced Whom? Media vs. U.S. Administration
According to Entman's theory, the political outcomes indirectly but strongly suggest the significance of the dominant frames. In this perspective, this case has its particularities. It seems that the dominant frame controled the American public opinion toward China as statistics illustrate that 65% to 72% of Americans had a favorable perspective of the Asian country before June 4 1989, nevertheless the proportion declined sharply to 16% to 34% afterward. Hostile views of China increased more than 55%. However, it didn't put that much impact on the policy to China. Facing the public outrage and urge for further sanctions, Bush's Administration was criticized by the newspaper for its "insufficient reaction" to the issue. In deed some "reasoned careful'' actions were taken into account instead of "an emotional response'', including "suspensions of weapon exportations to China and mutually military visits", "sympathic review of requests by U.S. and Chinese students in the United States to extend their stay", as well as "the offer of humanitarian and medical assistance through the Red Cross". These moves were far less than the U.S. Congress or the public expected.
Actually, the Congressional response was moving in exactly the opposite side compared with the White House reaction. Although some Republicans initially favored the president's "measured" response, their mood changed to "anger" and "a desire of harsher penalties on China'' together with the Democratic Party Leaders because the "U.S. and foreign media devoted more coverage to the brutal crackdown". Starting from here, the battle between Congress and the White House over China policy lasted through the Bush presidency and beyond. Without question the political struggles did appear in the newspaper's coverage, but with little magnitude. Only two stories illustrated explicitly the political dissidents on China policy during the selected period(see Table 3.4). It was tricky that on one side the tone of the entire coverage indicated the position of the media on the part of the public and political elites, on the other hand, there were no much evidence in the coverage showed an explicit unsupported attitude toward the White House line. As Bush described his reaction, the newspaper's response towards him was also "restrained".
No one played an dominant role in the policy making process towards China. Both parts, the media and the U.S. government seemed to be in a dilemma：between American long-term interests--a normal bilateral relationship with China--and the values they appreciated all the time--"the official assaults on human rights are unacceptable".
In this way, the final diplomatic action taken by U.S. towards China could be considered as a "compromise" between reason and emotion. Moreover, the position of American news media could be located between dominating the public opinion and conforming the official agenda.

V : Conclusion
In this case, the American news media addressed a semi-influence on the foreign policy-making process. On one side, the dominant framing of the coverage put huge impact on American opinion towards the Chinese Government and the protesters, and was "in part responsible for the widespread outrage" after June 4. On the other side, it put much less impact on the President who sticked with the establishment of a normal diplomatic relationship with the Communist China. The analysis displays a neither opposite nor subservient attitude toward Bush's response. To sum up, multiple variations among "presidents, specific issues and political conditions" should be taken into account when discussing the relations between new media and foreign policy-making. One question is left here: is there any need for American news media to keep objective when reporting international issues against the values and interests they persist in? To further the study, more verbal and visual data from distinct news media are expected to be collected for specified comparison and investigation. Besides, a more refined methodological model is in deep need.

Bibilography
Barone Center Study, 86
Benett, "Toward a Theory of Press State Relations in the United States".
Entman, Robert M. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004
Entman, Robert M. "Theorizing US Media Diplomacy", 2005.
Friedman, Thomas L. "Foley Says U.S. Should Consider Further Sanctions Against China", New York Times, Jun 19, 1989

Lewis, Anthony. " America And China", New York Times Jun 18, 1989. p. E27.
Marcus, George.E., W. Russel Neuman and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment ,New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Mermin, Jonathan. Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam War Era ,Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
New York Times, " Excerpts From Bush's News Session", Jun 6, 1989. p.A15
Oberdorfer, Don. "House Plans News China Sanctions; Bipartisan Package Would Counter Bush's Caution", Washington Post, June 29, 1989, p.A1.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies" World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 pp. 479-512, Cambridge University Press, July 1991.
Robinson, Piers. "The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?", Review of International Studies , 25, pp.301–309, 1999.

Ryavec,Karl W. "Insufficient Reaction", New York Times .Jun 18, 1989.

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[ 1 ]. Quoted in Seib, Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy (Westsport: Praeger, 1997), p.116.
[ 2 ]. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.85.
[ 3 ]. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.86.
[ 4 ]. Don Oberdorfer, "House Plans News China Sanctions; Bipartisan Package Would Counter Bush's Caution", Washington Post, June 29, 1989, p.A1.
[ 5 ]. Karl W. Ryavec, "Insufficient Reaction", New York Times .Jun 18, 1989; Thomas L. Friedman, "Foley Says U.S. Should Consider Further Sanctions Against China", New York Times, Jun 19, 1989
[ 6 ]. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies" World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), pp. 479-512, Cambridge University Press.
[ 7 ]. The CNN effect is a theory in political science and media studies that postulates that the development of the popular 24-hour international television news channel known as Cable News Network, or CNN, had a major impact on the conduct of states' foreign policy in the late Cold War period and that CNN and its subsequent industry competitors have had a similar impact in the post-Cold War era. In another word, this theory assumes that news can make policy.
[ 8 ]. Barone Center Study, p. 38
[ 9 ]. Quoted in Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.86.
[ 10 ]. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p.4. The Index approach, as well as the hegemony approach, are two models to analyze the media-foreign policy relations based on largely events during the Cold War. Both theories endorse more democracy in foreign policy.
[ 11 ]. Quoted in Robinson, "The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?", Review of International Studies (1999), 25, pp.301–309
[ 12 ]. Benett, "Toward a Theory of Press State Relations in the United States".
[ 13 ]. Jonathan, Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam War Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.7.
[ 14 ]. Ibid,.pp.143.
[ 15 ]. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p.12-13.
[ 16 ]. Ibid,. p.5.
[ 17 ]. Ibid,.p.14.
[ 18 ]. Ibid,.p.7.
[ 19 ]. Robert M. Entman, "Theorizing US Media Diplomacy", 2005.
[ 20 ]. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p.15.
[ 21 ]. Ibid,. p.31.
[ 22 ]. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.86.
[ 23 ]. New York Times, " Excerpts From Bush's News Session", Jun 6, 1989. p.A15
[ 24 ]. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p.13
[ 25 ]. Ibid,. p.32.
[ 26 ]. Ibid,. p.33
[ 27 ]. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.86.
[ 28 ]. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p.14.
[ 29 ]. Ibid,.p.42.
[ 30 ]. G.E. Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[ 31 ]. Quoted in Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 87.
[ 32 ]. New York Times, " Excerpts From Bush's News Session", Jun 6, 1989. p.A15
[ 33 ]. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.84.
[ 34 ]. Ibid,. p.85.
[ 35 ]. Karl W. Ryavec, "Insufficient Reaction", New York Times, Jun 18, 1989. p. E26; Thomas L. Friedman, "Foley Says U.S. Should Consider Further Sanctions Against China", New York Times, Jun 19, 1989. p. A10.
[ 36 ]. Anthony Lewis, " America And China", New York Times Jun 18, 1989. p. E27.
[ 37 ]. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.86.
[ 38 ]. Robert M. Entman, "Theorizing US Media Diplomacy", 2005.