Us Involvement In The Korean War
In the aftermath of WWII, the United States found itself imbedded in a struggle to halt the expansion of communism. In doing so, the U.S. Military would be forced to protect its influence in nearby regions, its allies, and engage the communist forces of North Korea in 1950 and North Vietnam in 1965. In each of these initial engagements the U.S. Army, Task Force Smith in Korea and the 1st Air Cavalry Division in South Vietnam, stood heavily out-numbered against a very formidable enemy. Although being heavily outmanned influenced the efficacy of each U.S. Army engagement, it did not dictate the outcome. In this essay I will enumerate, not necessarily the course of events for each engagement, but rather the elements of contrast and similarity
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during each, with several instances expounded. Ultimately, there were several factors that influenced the effectiveness of the U.S. Army in each, though, in the end it came down to the milieu, the situation in which they were forced to do battle. In the introduction to the Korean War, the efficacy in which American forces displayed relied heavily on the set of circumstance in which the Army was placed. When North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, Americans needed a swift response to confirm their abiding presence and influence in NATO, and in the region. Therefore, General Douglas MacArthur, the soon-to-be Commander-in-Chief of UN operations during the conflict, ordered an immediate ad hoc force to repel North Korean forces, and defend the Port city of Pusan at all costs. While the strategic objective, purely defensive, may have been to restore the status quo, the 38 Parallel, the main emphasis was to defend Pusan, which the American force would have to do conducting a series of tactical, successive defensives, ultimately meant to delay the enemy. Moreover, the GIs that would comprise this piecemeal assembly were labeled Task Force Smith, under Lt. Colonel Smith, with further remnants of the 8th Army ( 21st, 34th, and 19th Infantry Regiments of the 24th Infantry Division—under Maj. Gen. William Dean), which Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker held overall command, to follow.
At the outset of the war, the majority of the American forces that were to be employed in South Korea were from the 8th Army, which served mostly as an occupational force in Japan ever since the end of WW2. As such, they spent a lot of time enjoying recreational activities—most likely experiencing what the geisha community had to offer—thus, they became lazy and sloppy, lacking the much needed discipline and extensive training of an Army about to be forced into combat. Furthermore, the lack of manpower (regiments and battalions were two-thirds regular size) and insufficient material strength, against a numerically superior enemy, had an overwhelming effect on American defensive measures; which were often unable to contest the North Korean combined tank and infantry offensives. Fundamentally, “good intentions and sound tactics were not enough to offset the lack of a third battalion.” Ultimately, they held impromptu positions down to the last man, until overran, very similar to the forced tactics the 1st Air Cavalry would use around the Ia Drang Valley. At any rate, Task Force Smith and the 24th Inf. Division was woefully and deplorably unprepared for the defense of Osan, and the subsequent Pusan perimeter. In severe contrast to the impromptu position of the American forces at the outset of the Korean War, the U.S. Army’s first commitment in Vietnam, would witness, for one of the very few times in American history, an Army that was undeniably ready for war. Indeed, America benefited greatly from keeping a large standing army after the Korean War. Therefore, in the October 1965, once President Lyndon B. Johnson decided the political objective of protecting non-communist Vietnam, forces were committed instantly, not to mention the approximate 16,000 U.S. personnel that were already in South Vietnam apart of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Moreover, the American force committed to the Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Air Cavalry, substantially assisting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) against the communist People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), were high-quality, well-trained soldiers, with alacrity for the up-coming battle. They entered the War at a peak of effectiveness, self-confidence, and with tech superiority. Furthermore, like the initial strategy of American forces in the Korean War, the Army would conduct a strategical defense—only the Air Force would go on the strategical offensive, hitting ideal targets in North Korea within two days after North Korea’s invasion. In doing so, the Army would concentrate defensive measures around vital American military bases and ARVN territory; however, in the opening engagements of this War, they would go on the tactical offensive using a search and destroy method to clear the enemy threat, which was nearly ten times its own strength. In each of these Wars, Americans came in with an unfavorable outlook on the allies they were about to defend. In the case of the ROK (South Korea), this viewpoint was justified. It did not matter if the tanks were made out of plastic and shot silly-string, they fled in sight of them, or the enemy in general. Thus, coalition or cooperation was virtually impossible. The ARVN, on the other hand, in instances like the defense around the Plei Me Camp, worked rather well with the Americans, resolutely defending against a North Vietnamese siege, while rooting out an ambush attempt.
On the other end of the battlefield, the American opponents in each engagement, both North Korean and the PAVN, proved themselves to be much tougher adversaries than American GIs expected. In the case of Task Force Smith’s engagement, when U.S. soldiers arrogantly, initially anyways, engaged the enemy, they were surprised to see an enemy that could employ the principles of war almost with perfection. For instance, by maintaining the offensive, massing firepower, and maneuvering around the 21st Infantry Regiment at Choch’iwon, they inflicted great damage on the battalion, flanking and eventually forcing their retreat. However, in their continuingly desperate attempt to rapidly reach Pusan, the North Korean Army became overextended, unable to cover the principle of security—which was nearly unavoidable as U.S. Airpower rained down on their supply lines.
Also, in the Ia Drang Campaign, American soldiers were extremely impressed with the PAVN soldiers, who fought with bellicose fervor. As an extremely disciplined army, ready to test the fighting capability of American GIs, they were able to accurately employ massed firepower, while fully absorbing and employing the principles of surprise and maneuver. One Vietnam vet called the PAVN the “finest soldiers [he has] ever seen in the world except Americans.” Ambush was their specialty, and they employed it relentlessly, springing out of bushes and trees, so close to American units that localized fire-fights resulted into hand-to-hand combat. As was the case in the battle at Landing Zone Albany. During the PAVN’s cunning ambush on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry around Albany, they inflicted roughly 60 percent casualties, which would have been worse if air support did not save the day, so to speak. Essentially, the material strength of American forces in each engagement, or lack thereof, had an overwhelming impact on the abilities of the U.S. Army. As alluded to, air support played a crucial role in the Ia Drang Valley, fencing off several PAVN attacks. In giving just a sample of the magnitude air power deployed here, the “Air Force and Army planes flew more than 350 sorties between 15 and 20 November” alone. In South Korea, although the Air Force could not halt the North Korean’s opening gambit, due to lack of initial strength and bad weather—friction—air support still mired the enemy’s impetus with incessant bombardment against their supply lines. In hindsight, during each engagement, Americans had the luxury of air superiority, and though there may not be several instances of their significance in tactical situations, specifically in Task Force Smith’s employment, it can be assured that air superiority helped contain the enemy, while delivering blows to their morale. Yet, the availability of air support could not always aid the deficiencies of the soldiers on the ground.
In the defense against the North Korean tank assault at Osan, Task Force Smith was demonstrably understrength, certainly numerically, but materially as well. Although Lt. Col. Smith chose and held a favorable defensive position, he could not stop the inexorable force of thirty North Korean T34 tanks without adequate anti-tank or support weapons; thus the tanks steamrolled through Smiths front, then proceeded to wreak havoc on his communications and CP in the rear. Coincidently, the lack of material or supplies available only exacerbated after soldiers being overran, in the face of T34s and a numerous enemy, were forced to leave several weapons behind in their attempt to survive and fight another day.
Alternatively, in the Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Air Cav did not have the incessant problem of being undersupplied or a lack of material strength, such as hand-held weapons (like the M79), artillery, or even air support. In fact, American forces in Vietnam benefited quite substantially from the tactical revolution of the serpent in the sky, the helicopter. The helicopter brought unprecedented mobility to the U.S. military, which I would say, even altered the dynamics of the principles of war, if employed in such a way. (Their mobility allowed them to position GIs as commanded, on difficult terrain and in the middle of a hostile zone, establishing and maintaining greater economy of force.) Yet, the most significant aspect of the helicopter was its flexibility. Time and again, choppers descended to the Ia Drang battlefield, at the X-Ray Landing Zone, bringing ammunition, medical supplies, or rations, all the while taking heavy fire, and once again angelically ushering away the mortally wounded or dead—even despite, in most instances, the absence of red and white cross on the nose of their bird. These pilots were arguably as brave as any of the men on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the battlefield, on the ground, was where the real fighting took place; where capable leaders were forced to make swift decisions and take calculated risks to achieve victory.
Unlike several prior American wars, the initial engagements of 24th Division and 1st Air Cavalry, in each War, were led by skillful and very capable commanders on the ground, each encompassing the three traits of a great leader as enumerated by military historian Karl von Clausewitz—courage, intuition, and resolve.
(It is also important to mention here, that each engagement, and the officers commanding it, received degrees of intelligence and instruction from command and support networks; ADCOM in Korea and MACV in Vietnam.) In the Korean War, Lt. Col. Smith and Maj. Gen. Dean in each of their commands, intuitively chose good defensive positions against the enemy; the former at Osan, the latter in the defense around the Kum River. What is more, both these commanders, in each of their subsequent defensives, demonstrated resolve, holding their position until virtually overran, while personally and courageously fighting along-side their men, like Dean’s inspirational bazooka charge against approaching enemy tanks. In their gallant commands, Smith suffered from battle fatigue and Dean was captured. Regardless of their inspiring and courageous leadership, they were utterly outmanned, and in this instance, manpower dictated the course of
events—retreat.
Much of the same can be said of leadership in the Ia Drang Campaign. From MACV and General Westmoreland came brilliant management over the operation, which included an array of things, such as assessing enemy movements and combating these threats by employing forces or support arms against them—though this just a fraction of what Westmoreland and his advisors managed. Moreover, on the ground Lt. Col. Harold Moore incorporated the same fighting spirit of the commanders of the 24th Division in South Korea. Once Moore was committed to the area, ordered to seek out and destroy the enemy, fortuna brought the North Vietnamese to him, however, his virtu and a little bit of vigilance saved the Americans from a “potentially deadly ambush.” With an extreme adherence to the principle of security, Moore defended off wave after wave of PAVN soldiers—with the aid of support arms, artillery and air power—personally engaging the enemy around the LZ, killing several himself. His actions at the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray, and in general, are nothing short of merit.
The failures and frustrations of Task Force Smith’s employment, influenced heavily by the lack of prewar preparation, demonstrated the need for a combat-ready peace time army. Therefore, their failure, consequently and undeniably, had a direct influence on the success of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Ia Drank Valley, as they were physically and materially ready for war at a moment’s notice.
In each of these engagements, both for Task Force Smith and the 1st Air Cavalry Division, there are several factors to compare and contrast—U.S. adversaries, Army readiness, material strength, and leadership qualities—however, the efficacy of their operations has less to do with these factors enumerated, but more to do with the situation they were placed in. For Task Force Smith, more than anything, the consequences of the circumstance in which the American Army was hurled into—insufficient resources and lacking manpower, compounded by a time sensitive strategy to delay an enemy who was superior in strength—determined the outcome of the initial engagements. Moreover, in the Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Air Cav arrived in a situation where a North Vietnamese Army awaited their chance to test the fighting capability of American soldiers. Essentially, “their willingness to stand and fight in the face of devastating artillery fire and air strikes reflected a calculated decision to absorb more punishment than necessary in order to learn how the Americans fought.” In doing so, they risked a major engagement, exhausting their manpower assaulting an American force that was ready for the test—they were well-equipped, disciplined, experienced, with good air support and top-notch leadership—and paid for it dearly with roughly 4,000 North Vietnamese casualties. In the end, the situation in which American forces were heaved into in the Ia Drang Valley and in South Korea influenced the outcome of the engagements more than any material advantage, any soundly displayed tactics, or any brilliant leader.
Heller, Charles E and Stofft, William A. America's First Battles, 1776-1965. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986.
during each, with several instances expounded. Ultimately, there were several factors that influenced the effectiveness of the U.S. Army in each, though, in the end it came down to the milieu, the situation in which they were forced to do battle. In the introduction to the Korean War, the efficacy in which American forces displayed relied heavily on the set of circumstance in which the Army was placed. When North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, Americans needed a swift response to confirm their abiding presence and influence in NATO, and in the region. Therefore, General Douglas MacArthur, the soon-to-be Commander-in-Chief of UN operations during the conflict, ordered an immediate ad hoc force to repel North Korean forces, and defend the Port city of Pusan at all costs. While the strategic objective, purely defensive, may have been to restore the status quo, the 38 Parallel, the main emphasis was to defend Pusan, which the American force would have to do conducting a series of tactical, successive defensives, ultimately meant to delay the enemy. Moreover, the GIs that would comprise this piecemeal assembly were labeled Task Force Smith, under Lt. Colonel Smith, with further remnants of the 8th Army ( 21st, 34th, and 19th Infantry Regiments of the 24th Infantry Division—under Maj. Gen. William Dean), which Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker held overall command, to follow.
At the outset of the war, the majority of the American forces that were to be employed in South Korea were from the 8th Army, which served mostly as an occupational force in Japan ever since the end of WW2. As such, they spent a lot of time enjoying recreational activities—most likely experiencing what the geisha community had to offer—thus, they became lazy and sloppy, lacking the much needed discipline and extensive training of an Army about to be forced into combat. Furthermore, the lack of manpower (regiments and battalions were two-thirds regular size) and insufficient material strength, against a numerically superior enemy, had an overwhelming effect on American defensive measures; which were often unable to contest the North Korean combined tank and infantry offensives. Fundamentally, “good intentions and sound tactics were not enough to offset the lack of a third battalion.” Ultimately, they held impromptu positions down to the last man, until overran, very similar to the forced tactics the 1st Air Cavalry would use around the Ia Drang Valley. At any rate, Task Force Smith and the 24th Inf. Division was woefully and deplorably unprepared for the defense of Osan, and the subsequent Pusan perimeter. In severe contrast to the impromptu position of the American forces at the outset of the Korean War, the U.S. Army’s first commitment in Vietnam, would witness, for one of the very few times in American history, an Army that was undeniably ready for war. Indeed, America benefited greatly from keeping a large standing army after the Korean War. Therefore, in the October 1965, once President Lyndon B. Johnson decided the political objective of protecting non-communist Vietnam, forces were committed instantly, not to mention the approximate 16,000 U.S. personnel that were already in South Vietnam apart of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Moreover, the American force committed to the Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Air Cavalry, substantially assisting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) against the communist People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), were high-quality, well-trained soldiers, with alacrity for the up-coming battle. They entered the War at a peak of effectiveness, self-confidence, and with tech superiority. Furthermore, like the initial strategy of American forces in the Korean War, the Army would conduct a strategical defense—only the Air Force would go on the strategical offensive, hitting ideal targets in North Korea within two days after North Korea’s invasion. In doing so, the Army would concentrate defensive measures around vital American military bases and ARVN territory; however, in the opening engagements of this War, they would go on the tactical offensive using a search and destroy method to clear the enemy threat, which was nearly ten times its own strength. In each of these Wars, Americans came in with an unfavorable outlook on the allies they were about to defend. In the case of the ROK (South Korea), this viewpoint was justified. It did not matter if the tanks were made out of plastic and shot silly-string, they fled in sight of them, or the enemy in general. Thus, coalition or cooperation was virtually impossible. The ARVN, on the other hand, in instances like the defense around the Plei Me Camp, worked rather well with the Americans, resolutely defending against a North Vietnamese siege, while rooting out an ambush attempt.
On the other end of the battlefield, the American opponents in each engagement, both North Korean and the PAVN, proved themselves to be much tougher adversaries than American GIs expected. In the case of Task Force Smith’s engagement, when U.S. soldiers arrogantly, initially anyways, engaged the enemy, they were surprised to see an enemy that could employ the principles of war almost with perfection. For instance, by maintaining the offensive, massing firepower, and maneuvering around the 21st Infantry Regiment at Choch’iwon, they inflicted great damage on the battalion, flanking and eventually forcing their retreat. However, in their continuingly desperate attempt to rapidly reach Pusan, the North Korean Army became overextended, unable to cover the principle of security—which was nearly unavoidable as U.S. Airpower rained down on their supply lines.
Also, in the Ia Drang Campaign, American soldiers were extremely impressed with the PAVN soldiers, who fought with bellicose fervor. As an extremely disciplined army, ready to test the fighting capability of American GIs, they were able to accurately employ massed firepower, while fully absorbing and employing the principles of surprise and maneuver. One Vietnam vet called the PAVN the “finest soldiers [he has] ever seen in the world except Americans.” Ambush was their specialty, and they employed it relentlessly, springing out of bushes and trees, so close to American units that localized fire-fights resulted into hand-to-hand combat. As was the case in the battle at Landing Zone Albany. During the PAVN’s cunning ambush on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry around Albany, they inflicted roughly 60 percent casualties, which would have been worse if air support did not save the day, so to speak. Essentially, the material strength of American forces in each engagement, or lack thereof, had an overwhelming impact on the abilities of the U.S. Army. As alluded to, air support played a crucial role in the Ia Drang Valley, fencing off several PAVN attacks. In giving just a sample of the magnitude air power deployed here, the “Air Force and Army planes flew more than 350 sorties between 15 and 20 November” alone. In South Korea, although the Air Force could not halt the North Korean’s opening gambit, due to lack of initial strength and bad weather—friction—air support still mired the enemy’s impetus with incessant bombardment against their supply lines. In hindsight, during each engagement, Americans had the luxury of air superiority, and though there may not be several instances of their significance in tactical situations, specifically in Task Force Smith’s employment, it can be assured that air superiority helped contain the enemy, while delivering blows to their morale. Yet, the availability of air support could not always aid the deficiencies of the soldiers on the ground.
In the defense against the North Korean tank assault at Osan, Task Force Smith was demonstrably understrength, certainly numerically, but materially as well. Although Lt. Col. Smith chose and held a favorable defensive position, he could not stop the inexorable force of thirty North Korean T34 tanks without adequate anti-tank or support weapons; thus the tanks steamrolled through Smiths front, then proceeded to wreak havoc on his communications and CP in the rear. Coincidently, the lack of material or supplies available only exacerbated after soldiers being overran, in the face of T34s and a numerous enemy, were forced to leave several weapons behind in their attempt to survive and fight another day.
Alternatively, in the Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Air Cav did not have the incessant problem of being undersupplied or a lack of material strength, such as hand-held weapons (like the M79), artillery, or even air support. In fact, American forces in Vietnam benefited quite substantially from the tactical revolution of the serpent in the sky, the helicopter. The helicopter brought unprecedented mobility to the U.S. military, which I would say, even altered the dynamics of the principles of war, if employed in such a way. (Their mobility allowed them to position GIs as commanded, on difficult terrain and in the middle of a hostile zone, establishing and maintaining greater economy of force.) Yet, the most significant aspect of the helicopter was its flexibility. Time and again, choppers descended to the Ia Drang battlefield, at the X-Ray Landing Zone, bringing ammunition, medical supplies, or rations, all the while taking heavy fire, and once again angelically ushering away the mortally wounded or dead—even despite, in most instances, the absence of red and white cross on the nose of their bird. These pilots were arguably as brave as any of the men on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the battlefield, on the ground, was where the real fighting took place; where capable leaders were forced to make swift decisions and take calculated risks to achieve victory.
Unlike several prior American wars, the initial engagements of 24th Division and 1st Air Cavalry, in each War, were led by skillful and very capable commanders on the ground, each encompassing the three traits of a great leader as enumerated by military historian Karl von Clausewitz—courage, intuition, and resolve.
(It is also important to mention here, that each engagement, and the officers commanding it, received degrees of intelligence and instruction from command and support networks; ADCOM in Korea and MACV in Vietnam.) In the Korean War, Lt. Col. Smith and Maj. Gen. Dean in each of their commands, intuitively chose good defensive positions against the enemy; the former at Osan, the latter in the defense around the Kum River. What is more, both these commanders, in each of their subsequent defensives, demonstrated resolve, holding their position until virtually overran, while personally and courageously fighting along-side their men, like Dean’s inspirational bazooka charge against approaching enemy tanks. In their gallant commands, Smith suffered from battle fatigue and Dean was captured. Regardless of their inspiring and courageous leadership, they were utterly outmanned, and in this instance, manpower dictated the course of
events—retreat.
Much of the same can be said of leadership in the Ia Drang Campaign. From MACV and General Westmoreland came brilliant management over the operation, which included an array of things, such as assessing enemy movements and combating these threats by employing forces or support arms against them—though this just a fraction of what Westmoreland and his advisors managed. Moreover, on the ground Lt. Col. Harold Moore incorporated the same fighting spirit of the commanders of the 24th Division in South Korea. Once Moore was committed to the area, ordered to seek out and destroy the enemy, fortuna brought the North Vietnamese to him, however, his virtu and a little bit of vigilance saved the Americans from a “potentially deadly ambush.” With an extreme adherence to the principle of security, Moore defended off wave after wave of PAVN soldiers—with the aid of support arms, artillery and air power—personally engaging the enemy around the LZ, killing several himself. His actions at the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray, and in general, are nothing short of merit.
The failures and frustrations of Task Force Smith’s employment, influenced heavily by the lack of prewar preparation, demonstrated the need for a combat-ready peace time army. Therefore, their failure, consequently and undeniably, had a direct influence on the success of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Ia Drank Valley, as they were physically and materially ready for war at a moment’s notice.
In each of these engagements, both for Task Force Smith and the 1st Air Cavalry Division, there are several factors to compare and contrast—U.S. adversaries, Army readiness, material strength, and leadership qualities—however, the efficacy of their operations has less to do with these factors enumerated, but more to do with the situation they were placed in. For Task Force Smith, more than anything, the consequences of the circumstance in which the American Army was hurled into—insufficient resources and lacking manpower, compounded by a time sensitive strategy to delay an enemy who was superior in strength—determined the outcome of the initial engagements. Moreover, in the Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Air Cav arrived in a situation where a North Vietnamese Army awaited their chance to test the fighting capability of American soldiers. Essentially, “their willingness to stand and fight in the face of devastating artillery fire and air strikes reflected a calculated decision to absorb more punishment than necessary in order to learn how the Americans fought.” In doing so, they risked a major engagement, exhausting their manpower assaulting an American force that was ready for the test—they were well-equipped, disciplined, experienced, with good air support and top-notch leadership—and paid for it dearly with roughly 4,000 North Vietnamese casualties. In the end, the situation in which American forces were heaved into in the Ia Drang Valley and in South Korea influenced the outcome of the engagements more than any material advantage, any soundly displayed tactics, or any brilliant leader.
Heller, Charles E and Stofft, William A. America's First Battles, 1776-1965. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986.