Virginia V. Black Case Summary
CASE ANALYSIS
Virginia V. Black
In Virginia on April 7th 2003 a divided United States Supreme Court opened the possibility of constitutionally restricting certain types of hate speech. The court was to hear a case that spoke to one specific Virginia state statute that prohibited cross burning with the intent to intimidate, and also rendered that any such burning shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group. This court would see this statute being used between two separate cases. The first case was against Barry Black; in August of 1998 Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally at which the conclusion resulted in the burning of a cross on private property with the permission of the owner. Black was charged under the state statute, “Burning a cross with the intent to intimidate.” [347] The jury was instructed in accordance with the Model Jury Instruction that the burning of the cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent. [364] In May 1998 Richard Elliot and Jonathan O’Mara attempted to burn a cross on the lawn of Elliot’s neighbor and were charged in accordance under the cross-burning statute. After all of the respondents were convicted, they appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia arguing that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional. The Virginia Supreme court reversed all the convictions holding that the Virginia cross-burning statute is analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found …show more content…
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the decision upheld in R.A.V. versus St. Paul.
The contested First Amendment dilemma challenges whether or not the Virginia state statute that limits “any person, with the intent of intimidating any person or group, to burn a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place,” and specifies that “any such burning shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group” is unconstitutional on its face and whether or not to affirm the judgment made by the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to the convictions.
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion for the court, in the beginning of her opinion she stated vast amounts of history that justified the courts inference that in short “a burning cross has remained a symbol of Klan ideology and Klan unity. To this day, regardless of whether the message is political one or whether the message is also meant to intimidate, the burning of the cross is a symbol of hate” [357] Justice O’Connor then goes on to state that the First Amendment does indeed protect its citizens from freedom of expression but this type of expression is a particularly “virulent form of intimidation” [363] and is not limited to race, color creed and therefor the state of Virginia does reserve the right to ban its citizens of burning a cross with the intent to intimidate. Although the state does have the power to ban cross burning the provision in the second part of the ordinance stating that cross burning shall be “prima facie” evidence in convicting anyone is unconstitutional. Her argument in short states that a person burning a cross may be doing so with the intent to intimidate or may be engage in core political speech. The prima facie provision as justice O’Connor delivered in the verbal opinion announcement “blurs the line” between these meanings an the First Amendment permits no such short cut. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion with Justice O’Connor. Justice Thomas joined by Justice Scalia in part was in dissent to the courts opinion and argued that although he agreed with the conclusion by the majorities that it is constitutional to ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, but feels the majority “errs in imputing an expressive component.”[388] The statute prohibits only conduct, not expression and Justice Thomas feels that the statute here addresses only conduct and therefore is no need to analyze it under any of the first amendment tests. Justice Thomas also disagrees that the prima facie evidence provision should be stricken from the ordinance and capitalizes that the provision “is merely a rule of evidence and not a determination of a fact” He believes the jury possesses the wit to convict under the given evidence alone. [369] Justice Souter along with Justice Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer concurs with courts judgment, but finds the ordinance unconstitutional.
The First Amendment holds many protections that Americans hold dear, but I believe that Justice O’Connor was particularly impartial and methodical on how this particular ordinance relates to the constitution. The Courts final decision was to affirm the Virginia State Supreme Court with respect to the Black conviction, and vacate and remand the judgment with respect to Elliot and O’Mara. The decision to allow the state of Virginia to ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate is content neutral and does not entail a complete ban and is consistent in their ruling in R.A.V. The provision to the ordinance was rightfully stricken from the law; the way it was used in convicting Black was overbroad. I believe that without this, the Supreme Court opens the door to restricting speech to other types of expression. The opinions ruling is consistent with the first amendment, it protects the statute on why the state can ban cross burning initially.
Virginia V. Black
In Virginia on April 7th 2003 a divided United States Supreme Court opened the possibility of constitutionally restricting certain types of hate speech. The court was to hear a case that spoke to one specific Virginia state statute that prohibited cross burning with the intent to intimidate, and also rendered that any such burning shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group. This court would see this statute being used between two separate cases. The first case was against Barry Black; in August of 1998 Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally at which the conclusion resulted in the burning of a cross on private property with the permission of the owner. Black was charged under the state statute, “Burning a cross with the intent to intimidate.” [347] The jury was instructed in accordance with the Model Jury Instruction that the burning of the cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent. [364] In May 1998 Richard Elliot and Jonathan O’Mara attempted to burn a cross on the lawn of Elliot’s neighbor and were charged in accordance under the cross-burning statute. After all of the respondents were convicted, they appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia arguing that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional. The Virginia Supreme court reversed all the convictions holding that the Virginia cross-burning statute is analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found …show more content…
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the decision upheld in R.A.V. versus St. Paul.
The contested First Amendment dilemma challenges whether or not the Virginia state statute that limits “any person, with the intent of intimidating any person or group, to burn a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place,” and specifies that “any such burning shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group” is unconstitutional on its face and whether or not to affirm the judgment made by the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to the convictions.
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion for the court, in the beginning of her opinion she stated vast amounts of history that justified the courts inference that in short “a burning cross has remained a symbol of Klan ideology and Klan unity. To this day, regardless of whether the message is political one or whether the message is also meant to intimidate, the burning of the cross is a symbol of hate” [357] Justice O’Connor then goes on to state that the First Amendment does indeed protect its citizens from freedom of expression but this type of expression is a particularly “virulent form of intimidation” [363] and is not limited to race, color creed and therefor the state of Virginia does reserve the right to ban its citizens of burning a cross with the intent to intimidate. Although the state does have the power to ban cross burning the provision in the second part of the ordinance stating that cross burning shall be “prima facie” evidence in convicting anyone is unconstitutional. Her argument in short states that a person burning a cross may be doing so with the intent to intimidate or may be engage in core political speech. The prima facie provision as justice O’Connor delivered in the verbal opinion announcement “blurs the line” between these meanings an the First Amendment permits no such short cut. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion with Justice O’Connor. Justice Thomas joined by Justice Scalia in part was in dissent to the courts opinion and argued that although he agreed with the conclusion by the majorities that it is constitutional to ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, but feels the majority “errs in imputing an expressive component.”[388] The statute prohibits only conduct, not expression and Justice Thomas feels that the statute here addresses only conduct and therefore is no need to analyze it under any of the first amendment tests. Justice Thomas also disagrees that the prima facie evidence provision should be stricken from the ordinance and capitalizes that the provision “is merely a rule of evidence and not a determination of a fact” He believes the jury possesses the wit to convict under the given evidence alone. [369] Justice Souter along with Justice Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer concurs with courts judgment, but finds the ordinance unconstitutional.
The First Amendment holds many protections that Americans hold dear, but I believe that Justice O’Connor was particularly impartial and methodical on how this particular ordinance relates to the constitution. The Courts final decision was to affirm the Virginia State Supreme Court with respect to the Black conviction, and vacate and remand the judgment with respect to Elliot and O’Mara. The decision to allow the state of Virginia to ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate is content neutral and does not entail a complete ban and is consistent in their ruling in R.A.V. The provision to the ordinance was rightfully stricken from the law; the way it was used in convicting Black was overbroad. I believe that without this, the Supreme Court opens the door to restricting speech to other types of expression. The opinions ruling is consistent with the first amendment, it protects the statute on why the state can ban cross burning initially.