Volkswagen Vs Woodson Summary
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
Facts: In 1976, Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi automobile from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc (Seaway) in Massena, N.Y. The following year the Robinson family, who resided in New York, left that state for a new home in Arizona. As they passed through Oklahoma, another car struck their Audi in the rear, causing a fire which severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children. The Robinsons subsequently brought a products-liability action in the District Court for Creek County, Oklahoma, claiming that their injuries resulted from defective design and placement of the Audi’s gas tank and fuel system. They brought suit against the automobile’s manufacturer (Audi), its importer (Volkswagen of America), …show more content…
its regional distributor (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.), and its retailer dealer (Seaway Volkswagen). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that personal jurisdiction over the defendents was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute.
Issue: Can the Oklahoma court exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants given that “minimum contacts” with the State may or may not exist?
Decision: In favor of World-Wide. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed.
Reason: The concept of minimum contacts between the petitioners and the State of Oklahoma does not hold.
World Wide and Seaway have no “contacts, ties, or relations” with the State of Oklahoma. They carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State. They do not sell regularly cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents. In short, World Wide and Seaway have insufficient ties with the State of Oklahoma, therefore Oklahoma courts cannot practice in personam jurisdiction against …show more content…
them.
Case Brief 3.3
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp.
Facts: Shirley MacLaine Parker contracted with the film company, Twentieth Century-Fox, to play the female lead in a musical motion picture entitled “Bloomer Girl.” Parker was to be paid $750,000 for the role. Prior to the start of the film, Fox informed Parker that that they would not be producing “Bloomer Girl.” Fox offered Parker the lead in another film, a dramatic western entitled “Big Country, Big Man.” The compensation was to be the same - $750,000. Parker was given one week to accept and she refused. Parker then sought recovery of agreed upon compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to Parker. Fox appealed.
Issue: Was the job that Fox offered Parker (i.e. “Big Country”) comparable employment and was Parker obligated to accept in order to mitigate damages?
Decision: In favor of Parker. The trial court’s summary judgement was affirmed.
Reason: Parker’s refusal to accept Fox’s substitute employment offer could not be applied in mitigation of damages. This is because the offer of the “Big Country” lead was of employment both different and inferior. The fact that “Bloomer Girl” was to be a musical calling upon Parker’s talents as a dancer as well as an actress, and was to be produced in California, whereas “Big Country” was a straight dramatic role in a western type story taking place in Australia, demonstrates the difference in kind between the two employments. Parker was under no obligation to accept the inferior role and was not unreasonable in her refusal to mitigate the damages.
Case Brief 4.3
Granholm v. Heald
Facts: Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In several cases, some Michigan residents and some out-of-state wineries, joined by their New York customers, brought suit against the two states, arguing that the laws unfairly favor in-state business over out-of-state business. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue: Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violates the commerce clause by discriminating against interstate commerce?
Decision: In favor of the plaintiffs. Both New York and Michigan discriminate against interstate commerce through their direct-shipping laws. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and reversed the judgement of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Reason: Both Michigan and New York’s laws violate the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of state wineries. Under the commerce clause in the 21st Amendment, states may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state business. Additionally, the commerce clause demands more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods. The States provided little concrete evidence to prove that they cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state wineries.
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center
Facts: Drug compounding is where a doctor or pharmacist combines ingredients to form new medicine for a specific need. FDA regulation exempts compounded drugs from regular drug approval standards if providers follow advertising and promotion restrictions regarding those drugs. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in drug compounding brought suit against the FDA, arguing that those provisions violate the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. The district court and the court of appeals agreed with the defendants that the provisions regarding advertisement and promotion are unconstitutional.
Issue: Do the FDA’s compounded drug regulations restrict the defendants’ freedom of speech, mainly commercial speech?
Decision: In favor of the pharmacies. The U.S. Supreme court affirmed the decision of the lower courts and ruled that the FDA regulation amounts to unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.
Reason: First, the advertising and promotion restrictions involved constitute commercial speech and commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment. Second, fear that advertising compound drugs would put people who don’t need them at risk because advertisement would convince doctors to prescribe the drugs, does not justify the restriction on speech Government cannot ban the dissemination of truthful information to prevent people from making bad decisions. Additionally, forbidding the advertisement of compounded drugs would affect pharmacists other than those interested in producing drugs on a large scale. It would prevent pharmacists with no interest in mass-production medications, but who serve clienteles with special medical needs, from telling the doctors treating those clients about the alternative drugs available through compounding.
Case Brief 4.5
Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka
Facts: Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. A group of African Americans contend that segregated public schools are not equal and that they deprive black people of the equal protection of the law. The district courts in Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia denied relief to the plaintiffs and upheld the “separate but equal” doctrine. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the black schools.
Issue: Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?
Decision: In favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and ruled that racial segregation in public education deprives black people of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Reason: Even though white schools and black schools approach equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salary, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on black children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The effects of this separation on their educational opportunities are devastating. When in comes to public education, “separate but equal” is inherently unequal. Therefore, separate educational facilities wrongly deprive black students from the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts: In 1976, Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi automobile from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc (Seaway) in Massena, N.Y. The following year the Robinson family, who resided in New York, left that state for a new home in Arizona. As they passed through Oklahoma, another car struck their Audi in the rear, causing a fire which severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children. The Robinsons subsequently brought a products-liability action in the District Court for Creek County, Oklahoma, claiming that their injuries resulted from defective design and placement of the Audi’s gas tank and fuel system. They brought suit against the automobile’s manufacturer (Audi), its importer (Volkswagen of America), …show more content…
its regional distributor (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.), and its retailer dealer (Seaway Volkswagen). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that personal jurisdiction over the defendents was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute.
Issue: Can the Oklahoma court exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants given that “minimum contacts” with the State may or may not exist?
Decision: In favor of World-Wide. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed.
Reason: The concept of minimum contacts between the petitioners and the State of Oklahoma does not hold.
World Wide and Seaway have no “contacts, ties, or relations” with the State of Oklahoma. They carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State. They do not sell regularly cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents. In short, World Wide and Seaway have insufficient ties with the State of Oklahoma, therefore Oklahoma courts cannot practice in personam jurisdiction against …show more content…
them.
Case Brief 3.3
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp.
Facts: Shirley MacLaine Parker contracted with the film company, Twentieth Century-Fox, to play the female lead in a musical motion picture entitled “Bloomer Girl.” Parker was to be paid $750,000 for the role. Prior to the start of the film, Fox informed Parker that that they would not be producing “Bloomer Girl.” Fox offered Parker the lead in another film, a dramatic western entitled “Big Country, Big Man.” The compensation was to be the same - $750,000. Parker was given one week to accept and she refused. Parker then sought recovery of agreed upon compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to Parker. Fox appealed.
Issue: Was the job that Fox offered Parker (i.e. “Big Country”) comparable employment and was Parker obligated to accept in order to mitigate damages?
Decision: In favor of Parker. The trial court’s summary judgement was affirmed.
Reason: Parker’s refusal to accept Fox’s substitute employment offer could not be applied in mitigation of damages. This is because the offer of the “Big Country” lead was of employment both different and inferior. The fact that “Bloomer Girl” was to be a musical calling upon Parker’s talents as a dancer as well as an actress, and was to be produced in California, whereas “Big Country” was a straight dramatic role in a western type story taking place in Australia, demonstrates the difference in kind between the two employments. Parker was under no obligation to accept the inferior role and was not unreasonable in her refusal to mitigate the damages.
Case Brief 4.3
Granholm v. Heald
Facts: Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In several cases, some Michigan residents and some out-of-state wineries, joined by their New York customers, brought suit against the two states, arguing that the laws unfairly favor in-state business over out-of-state business. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue: Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violates the commerce clause by discriminating against interstate commerce?
Decision: In favor of the plaintiffs. Both New York and Michigan discriminate against interstate commerce through their direct-shipping laws. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and reversed the judgement of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Reason: Both Michigan and New York’s laws violate the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of state wineries. Under the commerce clause in the 21st Amendment, states may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state business. Additionally, the commerce clause demands more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods. The States provided little concrete evidence to prove that they cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state wineries.
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center
Facts: Drug compounding is where a doctor or pharmacist combines ingredients to form new medicine for a specific need. FDA regulation exempts compounded drugs from regular drug approval standards if providers follow advertising and promotion restrictions regarding those drugs. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in drug compounding brought suit against the FDA, arguing that those provisions violate the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. The district court and the court of appeals agreed with the defendants that the provisions regarding advertisement and promotion are unconstitutional.
Issue: Do the FDA’s compounded drug regulations restrict the defendants’ freedom of speech, mainly commercial speech?
Decision: In favor of the pharmacies. The U.S. Supreme court affirmed the decision of the lower courts and ruled that the FDA regulation amounts to unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.
Reason: First, the advertising and promotion restrictions involved constitute commercial speech and commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment. Second, fear that advertising compound drugs would put people who don’t need them at risk because advertisement would convince doctors to prescribe the drugs, does not justify the restriction on speech Government cannot ban the dissemination of truthful information to prevent people from making bad decisions. Additionally, forbidding the advertisement of compounded drugs would affect pharmacists other than those interested in producing drugs on a large scale. It would prevent pharmacists with no interest in mass-production medications, but who serve clienteles with special medical needs, from telling the doctors treating those clients about the alternative drugs available through compounding.
Case Brief 4.5
Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka
Facts: Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. A group of African Americans contend that segregated public schools are not equal and that they deprive black people of the equal protection of the law. The district courts in Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia denied relief to the plaintiffs and upheld the “separate but equal” doctrine. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the black schools.
Issue: Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?
Decision: In favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and ruled that racial segregation in public education deprives black people of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Reason: Even though white schools and black schools approach equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salary, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on black children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The effects of this separation on their educational opportunities are devastating. When in comes to public education, “separate but equal” is inherently unequal. Therefore, separate educational facilities wrongly deprive black students from the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.