Waltz and Sagan

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).
General Argument:
Waltz: Rational deterrence theory:
_ There is a fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds.
Gradual spread of nuclear weapons is better than no spread or rapid spread.
_ Nuclear weapons make war less likely, because nuclear weapons encourage both defense and deterrence. The possibility (however remote) and unacceptably high cost of destruction makes states more careful and miscalculation difficult
_ Given second-strike capabilities, the balance of forces isn’t what counts –
(asymmetric capabilities ok, just a threat ok, credibility need not be proven)
_ Not only do nukes deter attacks on the homeland, they deter attacks on any vital strategic interests, lowers the stakes of war, intensity of war
_ Weaker states are not more likely to use nukes irresponsibly – they would lose in a conventional war, so they need to save their nukes – they will only use them if survival is at stake, not for irresponsible aggression.
_ Even Hitler would have been deterred if Germany had faced nuclear weapons.
Even if not, one man can’t make a war – his generals would have stopped him.
Madman theory is defunct.
_ The last thing anyone wants to do is make a nuclear nation desperate – so nukes affect the deterrer and the deterred.
_ You can’t totally stop the spread – each state will always strive to seek its own security. _ Even terrorists are not irrational. Just as unlikely to use nukes as weak states if they do manage to get them.
Sagan: Bureaucratic politics (organizational) theory:
_ Military organizations, unless managed by strong civilian-control institutions, will display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war, because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests.
_ Future nuclear-armed states will likely lack the requisite civilian control mechanisms, and military interests, not objective interests, will dominate
_ Talks at length about characteristics of military organizations (offensive culture1, operational culture, etc.. ) and conditions fostering instability (hair trigger alert, inflexible routines that undermine development of second-strike capability) – all of these play into undermining three assumptions/assertions made by Waltz: 1.
There must not be preventive war during the period of building nukes, 2. both states must develop second-strike capability and survivability, 3. nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental use.
Unit of Analysis: The state (unitary for Waltz), bureaucratic organizations, esp. the military, and its relationship to civilian population for Sagan
1 Military officers think war is more likely in the long run than does general population, and plan incrementally, and focus on narrow responsibilities, not necessarily long term planning.
Main Hypotheses:
Waltz:
Spread of nukes _ Chance of war less likely, and intensity of war will be lower
_ Less arms racing
_ Wars fought will be unlikely to threaten a nuclear country’s vital interests
_ If deterrence fails for whatever reason, the probability the war will be carried far is lower
Sagan: Characteristics of military organizations will determine the actual behavior of new proliferators.
No checks and balances system of civilian control over military _ Likelihood of failure to create requirements of nuclear deterrence
Military biases _ Increased likelihood of preventive war
More new proliferators _ More chance of accidents
Assumptions:
Waltz: State is basically rational, self-preserving, and risk averse in the sense that it won’t risk large-scale destruction of itself, even if the chances are small, so long as the chances are not zero.
Doesn’t matter if the state is not unitary – enough people in the decision-making processes will conform to the rationality assumptions to allow us to infer unitary preferences. Sagan: State is not unitary, not necessarily rational, and subject to miscalculations and accidents. Cost benefit calculation not really applicable.
Empirics
Waltz: Looks at the history of last 50 years – argues that it fits his theory and explains away events that don’t fit – such as why Israel continues to spend more and more on defense after it got nukes (subsidized by U.S., it can afford to do that). Cold War shows nukes helped to maintain stability and preserve peace when there was instability.
Sagan: Looks primarily at U.S. history, looks for evidence of organizational influence on nuclear development. Of course, he finds support for his own views. Ex. Even when
Soviet missiles during the Cuban Missile Crisis became operational, the Joint Chief of
Staff recommended that the U.S. attack the sites and invade Cuba (implicit in this example is the argument that preventive war didn’t happen only because civilian controls on the American military were present)
Critiques
Both authors are quite speculative and give different supporting examples for their theories and excuse away empirics that don’t fit their contentions. They also don’t test the theories head to head – Waltz doesn’t look at the influence of organizational theory on outcomes, merely assumes they don’t matter. The bottom line is the empirics don’t show either is right or wrong.
Where this fits in the literature: Realism v. organizational theory, rational state v. bureaucratic politics models.