Was the Bombing of Dresden and Hamburg Justified
Was the bombing of Dresden and Hamburg justified?
During the Second World War, allied forces targeted German cities for mass aerial bombardment. Two of the cities which felt the full brunt of RAF bombings were Dresden and Hamburg. This air campaign killed an estimated 600,000 civilians and destroyed or seriously damaged some six million homes. The strategy used also came at a cost as Bomber Command throughout the bombing campaigns had 57,143 men killed. The target’s for area bombing were chosen in June 1940 with indiscriminate bombings being forbidden; However as the War progressed, the decision to not use indiscriminate Bombings was overturned. It can be argued here that the experiences which were felt in Britain from aerial bombardment may have overturned this viewpoint. Michael Walzer (1977) states that ‘the aiming points are to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories, the raids were explicitly declared to the destruction of civilian morale’. Walzer also points out that a study made in 1941 indicated that of those planes that actually succeeded in attacking their target (about two thirds of the attacking force), only one third dropped their bombs within five miles of the point aimed at’. This illustrates that even if British bombers intended to hit factories and docks, it is highly unlikely that they would hit their target. In this essay the justification of the bombing campaign will be investigated.
As mentioned previously British Bomber command throughout the war didn’t have the accuracy to perform precision bombings. This inaccuracy led to the British war cabinet contemplating whether or not it was an effective policy in the first place, ‘The choice was between abandoning bombing altogether or intentionally continuing to bomb civilians’. This was a big choice for the British war cabinet to make as at the time the British war effort was closer to defeat than it was victory, ‘And it was made when no other decision
During the Second World War, allied forces targeted German cities for mass aerial bombardment. Two of the cities which felt the full brunt of RAF bombings were Dresden and Hamburg. This air campaign killed an estimated 600,000 civilians and destroyed or seriously damaged some six million homes. The strategy used also came at a cost as Bomber Command throughout the bombing campaigns had 57,143 men killed. The target’s for area bombing were chosen in June 1940 with indiscriminate bombings being forbidden; However as the War progressed, the decision to not use indiscriminate Bombings was overturned. It can be argued here that the experiences which were felt in Britain from aerial bombardment may have overturned this viewpoint. Michael Walzer (1977) states that ‘the aiming points are to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories, the raids were explicitly declared to the destruction of civilian morale’. Walzer also points out that a study made in 1941 indicated that of those planes that actually succeeded in attacking their target (about two thirds of the attacking force), only one third dropped their bombs within five miles of the point aimed at’. This illustrates that even if British bombers intended to hit factories and docks, it is highly unlikely that they would hit their target. In this essay the justification of the bombing campaign will be investigated.
As mentioned previously British Bomber command throughout the war didn’t have the accuracy to perform precision bombings. This inaccuracy led to the British war cabinet contemplating whether or not it was an effective policy in the first place, ‘The choice was between abandoning bombing altogether or intentionally continuing to bomb civilians’. This was a big choice for the British war cabinet to make as at the time the British war effort was closer to defeat than it was victory, ‘And it was made when no other decision
Bibliography: Chirot D, Why not kill them all? Princeton University press: Oxford (2006) Glover J, Humanity, Yale University press: London (1999) Grosscup B, Strategic Terror: The politics and ethics of Aerial bombardments, Zed books: New York (2006) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWportal.htm http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q_I7-fib_7s Quester G, Deterrence before Hiroshima, Transaction Publishers (1966) Ramsey P, The Just war: Force and Political responsibility, University press of America: Boston (1983) Walzer M, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books: New York (1977) [ 12 ]. George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima, Transaction Publishers New York, 1966 p. 67 [ 13 ]